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Music and time in Theodor W. Adorno

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Music and Time in Theodor W. Adorno



NIKOLAUS BACHT

*Doctoral Dissertation, presented to
the Department of Music, King's College,
University of London*

2002



Synopsis

Music and Time in Theodor W. Adorno offers an analysis of Adorno's entire musicological and philosophical output, including unpublished typescripts. In the first chapter, *Time and Musical Materialism*, key temporal-philosophical premises are extracted from Adorno's journalistic publications from the 1920s. Adorno's endeavour in the 1930s to define more precisely the categories he developed in the 1920s is examined in the second chapter, *Presence in Wagner*. The third chapter, *Modernity as Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, provides an analysis of Adorno's major works from the 1940s, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, *Minima Moralia* and *Philosophy of New Music*. Chapter IV, *Writing Time*, elaborates with reference to Adorno's mature writings a linear narrative about music from the Middle Ages to the Darmstadt School in order to reveal the temporalising strategies of his music historiography. The fifth and final chapter, *'Overcoming' Time*, ventures into metaphysical terrain.

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Introduction

Dazzled by intricate conceptual paradoxes and a powerful rhetoric, Adorno scholars often tend to oversee the obvious. The notion, for instance, that music is a temporal art, has never been used as the basis of an investigation of Adorno's writings. The author of the present study is convinced that exactly this apparently trivial and commonplace notion forms the key problem of Adorno's philosophy, leading directly and deeply into the centre of his thought. To verify this hypothesis, the present study traces the effect of temporal concepts in Adorno's specific version of materialist dialectics, negative dialectics. The hypothesis is associated with another one, namely that Adorno's project of a negative temporalisation of dialectics and, more generally, his intellectual development, are crucially conditioned by experiences with musical time.

The author takes a twofold perspective on this task. On the one hand, he intends to provide a useful morphology of Adorno's ideas on time. On the other hand, he aims at a fundamental-critical deconstruction. For particularly with reference to temporal concepts, one can demonstrate that a great deal of what Adorno wrote was motivated by strategy rather than by an interest in the object. Reconstruction and deconstruction, however, go hand in hand and cannot be neatly separated. Moreover, where others would use harsh critical language to make their mark, the author will only intervene with subtle hints and rely upon the intellectual sensitivity of the reader.

Introduction

If Adorno scholars have anything in common, it is their attraction to intricacies and paradoxes – a fatal attraction indeed, for it blinds us to apparent trivialities and commonplaces that may lead far more directly and deeply into the elusive conceptual centre of his thought. The simple notion, for instance, that music is a temporal art, has never been used as the basis of an investigation of Adorno's writings. The author of the present study is convinced that exactly this simple notion forms the central problem of Adorno's philosophy. To verify this hypothesis, the present study traces the effect of temporal concepts in Adorno's specific version of materialist dialectics, negative dialectics. The hypothesis is associated with another one, namely that Adorno's project of a negative temporalisation of dialectics in particular and his intellectual development in general are crucially conditioned by experiences with musical time.

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The study is primarily addressed to musicologists and philosophers. While there is an ongoing Positivist Dispute in Anglo-American musicology, the author would like to share with his colleagues his experience that we usually operate with merely technical temporal concepts, failing to reflect on the normative and metaphysical implications these concepts might have. Philosophers might acknowledge on reading this study that Adorno's name needs to be put on a historiographical map that is in urgent need of revision because it was drawn under the sole direction of Heideggerians. Finally, the author hopes in all modesty to gain for his project some representatives from other academic disciplines with an interest in a 'Politics of Time'¹. Especially scholars from literature, theology and sociology departments might find inspiration here.

The relevant sources are covered in their entirety in this study, but for reasons of space it will neither be feasible to pursue all lines that connect Adorno's philosophy of time with other complexes of his work nor to investigate all possible interpretative aspects. It must remain open, for instance, how Adorno relates to Bergson and Husserl. The influence of these thinkers on Adorno's philosophy of time is, compared to Kant, Hegel and Heidegger's, definitely of minor importance. The same goes for Adorno's interpretation of Ancient Greek temporal-philosophical paradigms, which could with some effort be extrapolated from the lecture *Metaphysik: Begriff und Probleme* (1965). The Adorno critique of the later generations of the Frankfurt School, which could be adequately cast in temporal terms, will not be discussed, with the exception of Habermas's critique of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The debate about a post-Adornian music aesthetics will be strictly bracketed out. Nonetheless, the author conjectures that the approaches of Derrida,

1 Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde*, New York 1995.

Foucault, Lyotard and their European and American devotees would reveal their weaknesses very distinctly from an Adornian temporal-philosophical perspective.

Method

The method devised for the present study might seem conservative. Adorno's musicological and philosophical texts will be analysed via principles that are best described as a critical hermeneutic. The primary concern will be to reveal historically specific temporal-philosophical paradigms and to understand the underlying discursive patterns. The results of the analysis will be presented in the form of a genealogical narrative. At the same time the analysis is emphatically interdisciplinary, for the author fully agrees with Adorno that the 'cuts between special disciplines ... make the cognitive interest vanish in pedantically drawn, inflatedly defended trenches'.² In order to bridge the gap between the disciplines, musicological and conceptual analysis will be counterbalanced and excurses into the other disciplines mentioned above – literature, sociology and theology – will be made whenever the cognitive interest demands this.

The critical-hermeneutical method will be supported with a sound philological foundation. In the current academic climate, this might seem particularly conservative. Yet, the author is convinced that when

2 'Der Schnitt zwischen Einzeldisziplinen ... läßt in den pedantisch gezogenen und überwertig verteidigten Gräben das Interesse der Erkenntnis verschwinden' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik, Gesammelte Schriften* 6, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, assisted by Gretel Adorno, Susan Buck-Morss and Klaus Schultz, Frankfurt am Main 1970, 7-411, here 81; *Negative Dialectics*, tr. E.B. Ashton, London 1973, 73). Adorno's *Gesammelte Schriften* will hereafter be abbreviated with GS and volume number; for publication details cf. bibliography.

addressing the problem of musical time, any kind of 'timeless' scholarship must be avoided. So far, no need for philological work has been felt in Adorno scholarship. Serious research into the dates of Adorno's writings has hitherto not been undertaken; the *Gesammelte Schriften*, published in twenty volumes by Suhrkamp from 1970-1986, do not represent a historical-critical edition, but merely a compilation of the writings printed in Adorno's lifetime and some unpublished texts that the editors deemed ready for the press. Rolf Tiedemann and his team have only researched printing dates, and in most cases neglected writing dates. Thus no reliable information is available about Adorno's writing process and the chronological evolution of his thought.

For the early phase before Adorno's emigration in 1933, Tiedemann's chronology can be used profitably, since Adorno wrote in those years either formal academic studies with officially recorded submission dates or journalistic articles that were immediately published, mainly in *Die Musik*, *Der Anbruch* and *Pult und Taktstock*. Between 1933 and 1948, Adorno published only very little. Many of the typescripts from that time were not dated and printed only after World War II, generally in revised versions. Not all original typescripts have survived. In the process of cataloguing, which began in the early 1970s, they have been only superficially sifted. Dates were often only estimated. From the 1950s and 1960s, Adorno's most productive period, we have accurate printing dates but little information about when the preparatory work for particular texts began. The *Nachgelassene Schriften*, which Suhrkamp has been publishing since 1993 with about one volume per year, is also problematic. Although the editions follow historical-critical standards, there are mistakes in the editorial notes, particularly where the estimated dates from the *Gesammelte Schriften* are used to contextualise texts that were not published there. Such mistakes occur especially in volume I.1 of the *Nachgelassene Schriften*, the all-important Beethoven

fragments. The precise dates of the notes collected in that volume, which can justifiably be understood as Adorno's Beethoven diary or *Konversationsheft*, were in most cases withheld by the editor, although Adorno dated many of these notes to the day.

Due to the philological negligence on the part of Adorno's literary executors, there exists after thirty years of Adorno scholarship no exact chronological account of his life and work. Even Martin Jay, a major authority on Adorno, believes that there are no periods in his work.³ That philological work can be most revealing is exemplified by Rudolph Stephan's article on Adorno and Hindemith.⁴ This contribution, which greatly helps explain Adorno's difficult relationship to Hindemith through an investigation based on dates of texts, letters and biographical events, has encouraged the author to undertake research at the *Theodor W. Adorno Archiv* in Frankfurt am Main. There he produced a detailed chronology of Adorno's writings as well as comparative editions of those of his major works that proceeded through different versions, *Versuch über Wagner* and *Philosophy of New Music*. Unfortunately, the comparative editions cannot be reproduced here for legal reasons. The chronological data, however, will be provided with kind permission of the *Theodor W. Adorno Archiv*. In order not to overburden the footnotes, the author decided to print the entire chronology at the end of the text.

There is reason to assume ideological motives behind the withholding of a chronology for the *Gesammelte Schriften* and the half-hearted application of historical-critical methods in the edition of the *Nachlaß*. The editors, who had virtually exclusive access to the *Theodor*

3 Martin Jay, *Adorno*, Cambridge, MA 1984, 57.

4 Rudolf Stephan, 'Adorno und Hindemith: Zum Verständnis einer schwierigen Beziehung', *Adorno und die Musik*, ed. Otto Kolleritsch, Graz 1979, 180-201.

W. Adorno Archiv until the late 1990s, were probably intent on concealing a fact which anyone will immediately hit upon when faced with the sources, namely that Adorno was a master in manipulating his reputation for posterity. Indeed, Adorno can in this respect only be compared with Richard Wagner. Ironically, this makes the philological methods, introduced above as conservative, appear quite progressive. The author would again like to express his gratitude to the new generation in the administration of the *Theodor W. Adorno Archiv*; without their support, it would not have been possible to introduce into Adorno scholarship modern scholarly techniques which Adorno himself would have repudiated.

The hermetic surface of Adorno's texts will be attacked with another methodological principle, one that Adorno would have found especially disconcerting because it concerns a sacred cow of his theory, the constellations into which he organises his concepts. Despite all due admiration for Adorno's paratactic writing style, the author deems it necessary for means of analysis to relinearise the constellations. This technique is by no means as innovative and heretical as it may sound; implicitly, and often unconsciously, it is used by almost all Adorno scholars because constellations become in fact only analysable through relinearisation. Discussing them in their original paratactic form results only in tautological reproductions that are usually inferior to the original – an experience that can, incidentally, be made with Heidegger's idiolect in much the same way as with Adorno's constellations. Of course, relinearisations must neither depart from concepts that are foreign to Adorno's discourse nor enforce on it an arbitrary logical order. The author will counteract the danger of such semantic mutilation by analysing only constellations containing at least one temporal-philosophical concept, which can then be connected

linearly with the other conceptual elements of the constellation. In the case of a constellation with two or more temporal concepts, a decision will need to be taken about the logical priority of one of them.

Since the author seeks the greatest possible proximity to the primary texts, he feels that some compromises in the treatment of secondary literature are justified. Of course the author knows the contributions by other Adorno scholars; all material that has been consulted in the preparatory phase is listed in the bibliography. Most of these contributions, however, can for reasons of space not be discussed in the text. This in no way implies a criticism of colleagues' work. As in Theodore Kiesel's well-known study on *Being and Time*, which both returns to the sources and does 'away with secondary literature',⁵ it is exclusively for practical reasons that only secondary literature with strict relevance to the hypothesis of the present study can be considered. In order not to encumber the often complex and dense analysis of the primary texts, the secondary literature will be discussed in the footnotes. Authors such as Jürgen Habermas, Michael Theunissen and Diether de la Motte will not receive any different treatment.

No compromise, however, will be made with translations of Adorno's texts. According to an early Adorno translator, Samuel M. Weber, translating Adorno means 'Translating the Untranslatable'.⁶ Quite rightly, Weber points out that philosophical terms such as *Erkenntnis*, *Begriff*, *Aufhebung* lose when put into English the concreteness which they have in German.⁷ He is wrong, however, in his claim that 'the German sentence is a dynamic continuum' whereas

5 Theodore Kiesel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Berkeley, CA 1993, 11.

6 Samuel M. Weber, 'Translating the Untranslatable', translator's foreword to Adorno, *Prisms*, London 1967, 9-15.

7 Ibid., 12.

'sentences in English tend to be stillborn'.⁸ The inadequacy of cognition, concept, sublation as equivalents for *Erkenntnis*, *Begriff*, *Aufhebung* is one we have to live with; at the same time, we must at least in Adorno scholarship attempt to dynamicise the supposedly stillborn English sentences. It has been shown by subsequent Adorno translators such as Robert Hullot-Kentor, who recently provided an almost impeccable retranslation of *Aesthetic Theory*, that what Weber says is not true of English in general, but only of *his* English. And Simon Jarvis has revealed in an introduction that surpasses all available German ones that dialectical thought is possible in the English language. If Adorno is to be put on the map again, these efforts have to be continued. The author has therefore consulted existing translations and in almost all cases felt the need to modify them. To enable the reader to test the accuracy of his translations and to look up the German words for necessarily inadequate English equivalents, he has provided the original German text in the footnotes.

Structure

The first chapter, *Time and Musical Materialism*, will trace Adorno's first steps towards a concept of materialist critique. To begin with, the way Adorno adopts and adapts Lukácsian and Benjaminian ideas to overcome Heidegger's and Kant's philosophy of time will be explored. Then will be proved in a chronological flashback that the concepts essential to this critical manoeuvre were coined already in the journalistic texts on music that Adorno published before *Being and Time* came out. Finally, the convergence of Adorno's early philosophical and

⁸ Ibid., 13.

musico-critical theorems in a metaphysics of transitoriness will be revealed. The second chapter, *Presence in Wagner*, examines Adorno's endeavour in the 1930s to define more precisely the categories he developed in the 1920s through an emphasis on temporal-dimensional aspects. Here the influence of Hegel will become evident for the first time. Because of the lack of published sources described above, the typescript of *Versuch über Wagner* from 1937/1938 will be used. The third chapter, *Modernity as Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, introduces Nietzsche and Freud into the narrative via an analysis of Adorno's major works from the 1940s, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, *Minima Moralia* and *Philosophy of New Music*. Once more, the usefulness of exact philology will be demonstrated.

The last two chapters are dedicated to Adorno's mature writings. Chapter IV, *Writing Time*, will elaborate a linear narrative from the Middle Ages to the Darmstadt School in order to reveal the temporalising strategies of Adorno's music historiography. This chapter will ultimately prove the hermeneutic potential of the method of relinearising. Some of the findings presented in this chapter might astonish even expert readers of Adorno. Not many will know, for instance, that Adorno had something to say about music before Bach. Incidentally, the author is well aware that the master himself would have found it quite impertinent to see the historiographical data, which he scattered methodically over his oeuvre, forced into linear form. The fifth and final chapter, *'Overcoming' Time*, will strike a more respectful note. The late philosophical major works, *Negative Dialectics* and *Aesthetic Theory*, the unexpected musicality of which came as a gratifying surprise to the author, will be analysed to determine the metaphysical telos of Adorno's philosophy of time.

Chapter I

Time and Musical Materialism (1920-1932)

Adorno's writings predating his emigration in 1933 document an ambitious quest for intellectual orientation. Besides a substantial body of original philosophical texts, Adorno churned out academic essays in neo-Kantian thought and numerous critical articles on music, predominantly in a journalistic vein. The literary genres covered in those years are heterogeneous and the quality varies; nonetheless one prominent theme can be discerned: the establishment of a musical materialism via negative temporal concepts. Thereby Adorno positions himself against Heidegger and Kant, as the first section shows with reference to the philosophical writings from 1929-1932. The second section proves that Adorno developed his temporal-philosophical concepts already before he read *Being and Time* (1927), namely in his music criticism. The third section analyses the convergence of Adorno's philosophical and musico-critical reflections in a metaphysics of transitoriness.

Adorno's Opposition to Heidegger and Kant

In all probability, Adorno was first made aware of Heidegger by close colleagues from the inner circle of the later Frankfurt School who had come into contact with Heidegger's thought already in the early 1920s. On Gershom Scholem's recommendation, Walter Benjamin read Heidegger's early writings, which ultimately led to his plan to 'reduce Heidegger to rubble' in a reading group with Brecht;¹ Max Horkheimer attended Heidegger's lectures when he studied for one semester in Freiburg in the early 1920s;² Ludwig Marcuse experienced his seminars;³ and Paul Tillich knew him from the Marburg circle of theologians.⁴ Adorno recognized Heidegger's importance at the latest in 1927 when *Being and Time* came out, which reportedly made a strong impression on him then.⁵ The first and only personal encounter of the two philosophers took place on 24 January 1929 in Frankfurt after Heidegger's talk on *Philosophical Anthropology and the Metaphysics of Being*. They were introduced to one another on this occasion, but did not embark on a conversation or discussion.⁶

Soon after reading *Being and Time*, Adorno went into opposition to Heidegger. Adorno's line of reasoning is hardly adequate to Heidegger's thought, but reveals much about the formation of his own

1 'den Heidegger zu zertrümmern' (Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno, eds., *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin*, tr. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson, Chicago 1994, 370, tr. modified; cf. also *ibid.*, 168, 172, 359-360).

2 Herrmann Mörch, *Adorno und Heidegger: Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung*, Stuttgart 1981, 139-140.

3 Martin Jay, *Adorno*, 33.

4 Mörch, *Adorno und Heidegger*, 140.

5 *Ibid.*, 31.

6 *Ibid.*, 13.

temporal-philosophical concepts. In *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic* (1929/1930, first published 1933), Adorno's second attempt at a *Habilitation*, the position is already clearly demarcated. Adorno here remarks that Heidegger was 'deluding himself with the *fata morgana* of static ontology in which the promises of autonomous reason are left unfulfilled',⁷ and that 'all phenomenology attempts to constitute ontology directly, on the basis of autonomous reason'.⁸ Particularly the latter point should be explicated in detail rather than inclusively and generally stated. In the given context, however, it serves merely to protect Kierkegaard from phenomenological annexation, as the continuation of the passage reveals: 'Kierkegaards psychology ... is aware that ontology is not directly accessible for reason'.⁹ Already here it is evident that Adorno levels the subtleties of Heidegger's project in his reading of Kierkegaard. Adorno's treatment of the only direct quotation from *Being and Time* in the Kierkegaard book supports this assumption. Heidegger's key formulation, '[t]he ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological', can according to Adorno not be associated with Kierkegaard's thought.¹⁰ However, Adorno does not

7 'an der Fata Morgana statischer Ontologie sich bezauberte, deren Versprechen der autonomen ratio sich nicht erfüllen' (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, GS 2, 7-213, here 48; *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis 1989, 35, tr. modified).

8 'alle Phänomenologie ... kraft autonomer ratio Ontologie unvermittelt zu konstituieren' (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 40; *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 26, tr. modified).

9 'Kierkgaards Psychologie ... weiß zuvor Ontologie der ratio verstellt' (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 40; *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 26, tr. modified).

10 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 10.

italicise the verb form 'is' in his quote, thus falsely attributing a tautological meaning to Heidegger's formulation.

Such semantic distortions and philological inaccuracies tell a great deal about the thrust of Adorno's early Heidegger critique. Via concepts which imply a core of timelessness – 'static' and 'tautology' in the examples from the Kierkegaard book quoted above – Heidegger is being construed as an adherent of 'autonomous reason', and that means in Adorno: as an adherent of idealism.¹¹ Adorno's inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University on *The Actuality of Philosophy* (1931) provides further evidence for this. Adorno here asserts that fundamental ontologists had induced him 'for the first time to formulate a theory' which he had until then 'only observed in the praxis of philosophical interpretation'.¹² In this text, too, Adorno remains faithful to his method of exposing a substratum of timelessness in Heidegger's thought in order to characterise it as idealistic. Polemically reversing the fundamental-ontological paradigm, Adorno contends that Heidegger does not set out from historical facticity, but rather gives priority to the ontological invariants.¹³ Even more polemically, Adorno condemns the radical question for Being to be 'the least radical of all'. This question, he continues, 'formed the basis of the idealistic systems, despite all contradictions', whilst it was actually 'nothing more than an empty

11 Cf. for instance Adorno, 'Die Aktualität der Philosophie', GS 1, 325-344, here 326.

12 'Immerhin darf ich vielleicht noch ein Wort zu den aktuellsten Einwänden sagen ... wie Repräsentanten der Fundamentalontologie sie aussprachen und die mich erstmals zur Formulierung einer Theorie brachten, nach der ich bislang lediglich in der Praxis der philosophischen Interpretation verfuhr' (Adorno, 'Die Aktualität der Philosophie', 342).

13 Ibid.

formal principle'.¹⁴ Adorno concludes that in Heidegger, not only Being is such an empty formal principle, but also time; with the complete temporalisation of the sphere of possible experience, time is 'ontologised' and conceived as the 'constituent of the essence of man'.¹⁵

Evidently, the inaugural lecture merely furnishes additional programmatic consolidations of Adorno's basic assertions contra Heidegger. A more elaborate, but no less polemical and reductive account can be found in a lecture from 1932, 'The Idea of *Naturgeschichte*'. Again, Adorno begins with his basic assumption that Heidegger quests for Being from the perspective of autonomous reason.¹⁶ He understands Being, without differentiation between the branches of phenomenology, as static nature which underlies or inheres history, whilst at the same time forming its unmediated opposite.¹⁷ Enlarging upon a theme from the earlier texts, Adorno argues that the ontological quest for Being was necessarily tautological,¹⁸ 'less of a self-examination of the mythic depths of language ... than a new guise for the classical notion of identity'.¹⁹ Adorno substantiates this with reference to the antithesis of history and historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), which he considers merely as 'a transposition of some ontic qualities ...

14 'jener Frage, die man heute die radikale nennt und die doch die unradikalste von allen ist ... wie sie trotz aller Gegensätze auch den idealistischen Systemen zugrunde lag ... mehr nicht als ein leeres Formalprinzip' (Ibid., 325).

15 'Konstituens des Wesens Mensch' (Ibid., 330).

16 Adorno, 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte', GS 1, 345-365, here 347, 352.

17 Ibid., 355; cf. also 345-346.

18 Ibid., 351-353.

19 'weniger ein sich selbst Ergründen der mythischen Tiefe der Sprache ... als eine neue Verdeckung der alten klassischen These der Identität' (Ibid., 354).

into the sphere of ontology ... in order to supplement explanations of something that is in fact just said again'.²⁰

Heidegger's answers to his own question thus contain, according to Adorno, nothing new. They are simple repetitions of that which is already expressed in the question itself. This lays the foundation for the central temporal-philosophical point of Adorno's early Heidegger critique, which relates to future and present, or, in Heidegger's terms, possibility and actuality. Adorno opposes Heidegger's prioritisation of possibility through the concept of project (*Entwurf*), of the self-projection of subjectivity based in the future. Heidegger is, according to Adorno, unable to do justice to facticity; things have to be slotted into the allegedly static structures predetermined by the project, just as in idealism, where the empirical phenomena have to conform to the demands of the system.²¹ This line of reasoning allows Adorno to establish an audacious association of Heidegger and Kant: 'In the predominance of the realm of possibility, I see idealistic moments, for the opposition of possibility and actuality is, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, no other than that of the categorial subjective structures and empirical diversity'.²²

This passage is the only one in the early writings where Adorno draws explicit parallels between Heidegger's and Kant's philosophy of time. However, it gains an important status when the critical motives

20 'als daß irgendwelche am Dasein beobachteten Seinsqualitäten ... transponiert werden in das Bereich der Ontologie und ... zur Auslegung dessen beitragen sollen, was im Grunde nur noch einmal gesagt wird' (Ibid., 351).

21 Ibid., 353.

22 'In der Vorherrschaft des Reiches der Möglichkeiten sehe ich idealistische Momente, denn der Gegensatz von Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit ist im Rahmen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft kein anderer als der des kategorialen subjektiven Gefüges gegenüber der empirischen Mannigfaltigkeit' (Ibid.).

elaborated so far are isolated. Then one understands that Adorno's Heidegger critique focuses on aspects which also determine Kant's philosophy of time: autonomous reason as guarantor of totality, cognitive finitude, static-immediate ontology and priority of subjective structures. This observation seems all the more plausible because 'The Idea of *Naturgeschichte*' was presented to the Frankfurt chapter of the Kant society, and it makes understandable why Adorno's Heidegger critique is at the same time reductive and inadequate, and why his counter-concepts seem loose in comparison with Heidegger's own theory. A preliminary interpretative conclusion about the development of Adorno's own intellectual position can now be made: subsequent to his somewhat unwillingly orthodox involvement in neo-Kantian thought (cf. chapter I.3), Adorno seems to have received a negative impulse from *Being and Time*, perhaps also *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), which resulted in his liberation from neo-Kantianism. On this account, his first original philosophical deed was the construction of an 'axis of idealism' spanning from Heidegger to Kant, from modernity back into enlightenment. By enforcing a parallel of Heidegger and Kant in order to leave Kant behind, however, early Adorno severely vulgarises both Heidegger and Kant.

Adorno's interest in idealism, or rather the constitution of idealism through autonomous reason with its apparatus of timeless concepts, forms the point of departure of the theory which he promised to formulate in his inaugural lecture. In the early writings and in his work as a whole, this theory is often designated 'logic of disintegration'. This is a specifically materialist theory, constituted through negative temporal concepts, i.e. through concepts relating to transitoriness. At the time of the inaugural lecture, Adorno was, as he admitted himself,

'aware of the impossibility ... to accomplish that program'.²³ Beginnings of a formulation of this theory can again only be discerned in 'The Idea of *Naturgeschichte*', where Adorno, setting out from the idealist antitheses discovered in his critique of Heidegger (and Kant), searches for materialist qualifications.

Adorno examines the antitheses of possibility/actuality and nature/history in close conjunction. Both pairs of concepts, he insists, need to be mediated in a way that is not oriented by their opposition. This is only feasible when '*historical being is itself understood as natural being ... at that point where it is most historical*', and when '*nature is understood as historical being at that point where it seems to be most immobile*'.²⁴ This point where nature and history can be seen to converge is, according to Adorno, their inherent transitoriness, or material disintegration.²⁵ Close reflective attention to transitoriness is deemed apt by him to dissolve the idealist antitheses and to dynamicise the static structures of autonomous reason. In constellation with the actual, a genuinely materialist logicity emerges, opening up a horizon of possibility which fundamental ontology does not attain due to its preference of possibility over actuality. Subjectivity so gains a mutually dynamic rapport with objectivity: it is changed by, and also has the power to change, the objective world. With this theoretical approach, Adorno hopes to supersede the allegedly repetitive relationship of

23 'der Unmöglichkeit bewußt ..., das Programm auszuführen' (Adorno, 'Die Aktualität der Philosophie', 339).

24 '*das geschichtliche Sein ... da, wo es am geschichtlichsten ist, selber als ein naturhaftes Sein zu begreifen, oder ... die Natur da, wo sie als Natur scheinbar am tiefsten in sich verharret, zu begreifen als ein geschichtliches Sein*' (Adorno, 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte', 355, italics by Adorno).

25 Ibid., 358.

question and answer in fundamental ontology and its generally tautological character; in contrast to the ontological game of question and answer, Adorno's negatively temporalised thought generates the emphatically *new*.²⁶

One might assume that Adorno is already influenced by Hegel in his attempt to establish a materialist dialectic via negative temporal concepts. With regards to later developments (cf. chapter II.2 and III.2), however, it is important to note that he first came into contact with Hegelian ideas through the writings of Georg Lukács,²⁷ particularly *The Theory of the Novel* (written 1914-1915, first published 1920), from which the concept of disintegration is taken.²⁸ Yet Adorno considers Lukács's approach to be severely flawed: while Lukács aptly portrays how history disintegrates into a 'charnel-house of long-dead interiorities', for which he coins the concept of 'second nature',²⁹ he resorts to a quasi-transcendental eschatology to redynamise second nature into history.³⁰ Presumably Adorno here reacts to an interpretation of Kant like Dilthey's or Simmel's, a weakness which Lukács himself admits in the preface to the 1962 version of *The Theory of the Novel*.³¹ A possible solution is seen by Adorno in Walter Benjamin's adaptation of the concept of disintegration in *Origin of German Baroque Drama* (1919-1925, EA 1928). In Adorno's view, the philosophical interpretation of second

26 Ibid., 354-365.

27 Cf. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research*, London 1973, 174-175.

28 Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, tr. Anna Bostock, Cambridge, MA 1971, 20, 37, 43, 55, 64, 124.

29 'Schädelstätte vermoderter Innerlichkeiten' (Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, 64; Adorno, 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte', 357).

30 Adorno, 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte', 357.

31 Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, 12, 15.

nature proceeds in Benjamin in such a way that second nature is itself represented as transitory, i.e. as history.³² It is hard to see where Adorno's own contribution to the discourse about a negatively temporalised hermeneutics lies; perhaps it is only in his effort to dissolve remnants of a polarising understanding of nature and history.³³

'The Idea of *Naturgeschichte*' – clearly the most important of Adorno's early philosophical texts – closes with the concession that 'one needs to show that these ideas are merely an explication of certain core elements of a materialist dialectic'.³⁴ This task took Adorno the span of his entire active life; it is really accomplished only with *Negative Dialectics* (1966). There Adorno stresses that 'The Idea of *Naturgeschichte*' already contained motives of *Negative Dialectics*. He also states, without mentioning Lukács and Benjamin, that the logic of disintegration was 'the oldest of his philosophical conceptions',³⁵ also forming the logic of *Negative Dialectics*.³⁶ Considering these later references, it would be a grave interpretative mistake to underestimate the significance of the logic of disintegration.³⁷ In the course of this study, much evidence will

32 Adorno, 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte', 358.

33 Ibid., 359.

34 '[Es] wäre zu zeigen, daß das Vorgetragene nur eine Auslegung von gewissen Grundelementen der materialistischen Dialektik ist' (Ibid., 365).

35 Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 409 (omitted in Ashton's translation of *Negative Dialectics*).

36 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 145.

37 The logic of disintegration has hitherto not been interpreted adequately. Werner Lüdke and Joseph Schmucker relate the logic of disintegration primarily to Adorno's reading of Beckett (Werner Martin Lüdke, *Anmerkungen zu einer Logik des Zerfalls: Adorno – Beckett*, Frankfurt 1981; Joseph F. Schmucker, *Adorno – Logik des Zerfalls*, Stuttgart/Bad Canstatt 1977). Paddison's attempt to grasp the systematic function of the logic of disintegration fails completely, although he realises that the logic of disintegration can be seen as Adorno's method. Paddison's definition of the concept of disintegration – 'Adorno saw the "crisis of modernism" as a breakdown of established meanings' – remains vague and

be marshalled for its centrality to Adorno's thought. First, however, its real origins need to be uncovered.

Adorno's Early Writings on Music

Moving back from Adorno's first original philosophical texts by about half a decade, into the mid 1920s, one is at first confronted by an apparent contradiction that Adorno later pointed out himself. 'A great deal of what I wrote in my youth', Adorno stated in a letter to Ernst Bloch from 1962, 'bears the character of dreamlike anticipation, and only subsequent to a shock, which probably coincided with the outbreak of Hitler's *Reich*, do I believe to have performed my duty in the right manner. I matured very late in life, as do most so-called child prodigies, and I feel even nowadays that the duty for which I am cut out still lies ahead of me'.³⁸ Only one year later, in the preface to *Moments musicaux*,

does not explain its logical nature. Nor does Paddison's characterisation of the process of disintegration as 'slippage between concept and referent' resolve his hermeneutic problem, not only because of the blatant insufficiency of structuralist terminology in an Adornian context. Issues of transitoriness and the relation to Heidegger and Kant are not addressed by Paddison (Max Paddison, *Adorno's Aesthetics of Music*, Cambridge 1993, 16). Mörchen knows that Heidegger is latently present when Adorno writes about a 'logic of transitoriness'. However, Mörchen does not make clear that Adorno's concept of transitoriness differs crucially from Heidegger's (Mörchen, *Adorno und Heidegger*, 145-147).

38 'Sehr vieles von dem, was ich in meiner Jugend geschrieben habe, hat den Charakter einer traumhaften Antezipation, und erst von einem gewissen Schockmoment an, der mit dem Ausbruch des Hitlerschen Reiches zusammenfallen dürfte, glaube ich eigentlich recht getan zu haben, was ich tat. Ich bin eben, wie meist sogenannte Wunderkinder, ein sehr spät reifender Mensch, und habe heute noch das Gefühl, daß das, wofür ich

Adorno asserts that 'most of what he ever wrote about music was conceived already in his youth, before 1933'.³⁹ The contradiction between these sources is not accidental. The letter to Bloch, written on occasion of the republication of the Kierkegaard book, refers to Adorno's early philosophical writings, the preface to *Moments musicaux*, however, to his early music criticism.

Until 1933, there exists a notable qualitative discrepancy between Adorno's philosophical and his critical writings on music. This is mainly for institutional reasons: his early philosophical works were formulated in an academic environment which seriously interfered with his creative development. The agenda for Adorno's dissertation, 'The Transcendence of the Phenomenal and the Noematic in Husserl's Phenomenology' (1924),⁴⁰ and for his first failed attempt at a habilitation, 'The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Soul' (1927),⁴¹ was set by Hans Cornelius, an advocate of a peculiar neo-Kantianism, which Adorno had to conform to – in transcendental-critical fashion. In the doctoral study on Husserl, Adorno effortlessly achieved this, despite his aversion, not to say diametrical opposition, to dogmatic transcendental critique. Three years later, however, in 'The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Soul', Adorno's critical nature showed through, which resulted in Cornelius's advice not to insist on a formal

eigentlich da bin, alles erst noch vor mir liegt' (Cited after the editorial notes to Adorno, GS I, 384).

39 'Das meiste von dem, was er je über Musik schrieb, ist bereits in seiner Jugend, vor 1933, konzipiert' (Adorno, *Moments musicaux*, GS 17, 9).

40 Adorno, 'Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen und Noematischen in Husserls Phänomenologie', GS 1, 7-77.

41 Adorno, 'Der Begriff des Unbewußten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre', GS 1, 79-322.

examination. As a music critic, however, Adorno developed positions that he could not possibly have represented at the university. In these texts, his central temporal-philosophical concepts are latently present; they form the 'praxis of philosophical interpretation' which according to the inaugural lecture preceded the theoretical formulation.⁴² Whether Adorno here already writes against Heidegger is hard to say, because prior to the publication of *Being and Time* there were only Heidegger's dissertation, habilitation and a few minor texts that could have served as a basis for such a critical enterprise. In his early music criticism, Adorno mainly reacts against Kant; the preliminary conclusion introduced above, that Adorno's anti-Heideggerianism is in fact a covert anti-Kantianism, thus gains further plausibility.

Adorno's opposition to 'timeless' thought stems from experiences with music, the most transitory of all the arts, and his materialism is by origin a *musical* materialism. This becomes particularly evident after Adorno read Benjamin in 1925. Experiments with temporal concepts and an intense antipathy against timelessness, however, can already be discerned at some points in Adorno's writings on music from 1920-1924, the years preceding his doctorate. In a text from 1921, a review of the opera *Die Hochzeit des Faun* by his then composition teacher Bernhard Sekles, Adorno defines the essence of music via temporal concepts:

42 The state of research on Adorno's early writings can only be described as desolate. Mörchen and Pettazzi consider only the early philosophical writings, although the writings on music had already been published. (Mörchen, *Adorno und Heidegger*, Stuttgart 1981; Carlo Pettazzi, *Th. Wiesengrund Adorno. Linee di origine e di sviluppo del pensiero* (1903-1949), Florenz 1979). Susan Buck-Morss, among the early Adorno researchers the only one that had access to Adorno's manuscripts, sees links between Adorno's Cornelian scholarship and his later writings. She substantiates this claim with reference to only a small number of texts, which are not central to Adorno's work (Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, Hassocks 1977, S. 7-11).

music is 'the most fleeting of all the arts', it is 'immanently dynamic'.⁴³ Effects from this understanding of the music's essence can be found in abundance in Adorno's music criticism. In a review of Egon Kornauth's *Violin Sonata* op. 9 from 1922, for instance, Adorno condemns the composer for violations against the immanently temporal character of music: 'Sonorous ideas without a dynamic core are placed into forms which are, so to speak, finished and inapt for expansion ... This music as a whole is based upon the ephemeral, ineffectual moment, and thus it is inevitable that its effect remains bound to the moment and that it cannot, like necessary music, master time in its form, but falls into a mere juxtaposition of meaningless, solely sensual appearances'.⁴⁴ Already in his earliest publications Adorno operates with an opposition of 'necessary' and 'contingent' music, i.e. of music that masters time in its form and music that yields to the empty course of time.

From the start, the idea that time can be mastered in musical form has metaphysical implications. This clearly emerges from a text that Adorno wrote in 1924 on the occasion of Richard Strauss's sixtieth birthday, wherein Adorno charges his temporal concepts with metaphysical content through a critique of Bergson's philosophy of time. First Adorno gives his critical view on vitalism, where 'life

43 '[Musik ist] die flüchtigste aller Künste ... [ihr ist] ein Bewegungsantrieb wesensimmanent' (Adorno, "'Die Hochzeit des Faun': Grundsätzliche Bemerkungen zu Bernhard Sekles' neuer Oper', GS 18, 262-268, here 263-264).

44 'Klangeinfälle ohne Bewegungskern werden in gleichsam fertige und der Ausweitung unfähige Formen hineingestellt ... Diese ganze Musik ist auf den einmaligen, wirkungslosen Augenblick gestellt, und so kann es nicht ausbleiben, daß sie auch in ihrer Wirkung am Augenblick haften bleibt und nicht, wie notwendige Musik, in ihrer Form die Zeit bewältigt, sondern in der Zeit in ein bloßes Nebeneinander bedeutungsloser, ganz nur sinnlicher Erscheinungen zerfällt' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Februar 1922', GS 19, 14)

exhausts itself in the meaningless course of time'.⁴⁵ Strauss, too, grapples with the problem of contingency; his music may 'nowhere break out of its confines towards a beyond'.⁴⁶ Adorno then argues, in a passage strongly reminiscent of Lukács, that Strauss was aware of the historical condition to which the self and the forms are subject, which was critically expressed in the musical forms that he created: 'Eulenspiegel, who continually returns, mortal-immortal like the colourful appearance of life, assumes rondo form, and the strange infiniteness of Don Quixote's attempts to find meaning in the detached world is cast into variations'.⁴⁷ Adorno seems certain that Strauss achieves to break the spell of pure immanence with such musical allegories. The text concludes with metaphysical pathos: 'He [Strauss] has absorbed all the shine of the temporal, reflecting it in the mirror of his music; he has perfected the appearance of music and made music as transparent as glass; the end of appearance may well be suggested by his works'.⁴⁸

In 1924, Adorno wrote, in close conjunction with the article on Strauss, another on *Gebrauchsmusik*. Whereas in Strauss a dialectic of

45 'Überall hier soll Leben, für sich des Sinnes noch bar, selbst der letzte Sinn sein; überall hier erschöpft sich Leben in der sinnleer ablaufenden Zeit' (Adorno, 'Richard Strauss: Zum 60. Geburtstage: 11. Juni 1924', GS 18, 254-262, here 254).

46 'die Musik des psychologischen Subjekts [vermag] an keiner Stelle ihr Bereich unmittelbar nach oben zu durchstoßen' (Ibid., 255).

47 'Eulenspiegel, der stets wiederkehrt, sterblich-unsterblich gleich dem bunten Schein im Leben, schickt sich ins Rondo, und die komische Unendlichkeit von Don Quixotes Versuchen, in der abgetrennten Welt den Sinn aufzuspüren, gerinnt zu Variationen' (Ibid., 258).

48 'Er [Strauss] hat allen Glanz des Zeitlichen gesammelt und läßt ihn strahlen aus dem Spiegel seiner Musik; er hat die Scheinhaftigkeit der Musik vollendet und die Musik durchsichtig gemacht wie Glas; das Ende der Scheinhaftigkeit mag auch mit seinen Werken gemeint sein' (Ibid., 262).

interiority and form, of subjective and objective time, intimates an eventual 'end of appearance', appearance is perpetuated in those compositions by Stravinsky and Hindemith that submit to use. Time in *Gebrauchsmusik* is organised statically; where it appears dynamic, it is in fact pseudo-dynamic. *Gebrauchsmusik* absolutises 'the exteriority of dumbly flowing sonorous processes, which are dictated by chance', it spins in 'dead regularity' around the self.⁴⁹ Where there is pure immanence, *Gebrauchsmusik* feigns transcendence, 'its presence lies only in the time in which it sounds'.⁵⁰ One might be puzzled by the crudely polarising schemata that Adorno outlines in this text. Yet, the fact should not be overlooked that Adorno is here laying the foundations of the theory of Culture Industry, which was worked out in the 1940s (cf. chapter III.3). The theme of a critical *Gebrauchsmusik*, enlarged upon in Adorno's late writings (cf. chapter IV), is also formulated *in nuce* in this text; anticipating a central concept of his materialist theory, Adorno writes that *Gebrauchsmusik* gains 'actuality' where it 'reveals the horror of inactuality'⁵¹.

After 1925, there is a noticeable qualitative leap in Adorno's music criticism, probably resulting from his studies with Alban Berg in Vienna and the impulse of Benjamin's *Origin of German Baroque Drama*.⁵² The

49 'Sie setzt ... die Äußerlichkeit taub ablaufender, von der Gelegenheit diktierter Klangverläufe [absolut] ... Die Projektionsfläche des Ich schrumpfte ihr zum Punkt zusammen, um den tot regelhaft die Bewegung sich dreht' (Adorno, 'Gebrauchsmusik', GS 19, 445–447, here 447).

50 'ihre Gegenwart liegt allein in der Zeit, in der sie ertönt' (Ibid., 446).

51 'Wirklichkeit [wo sie] das Grauen der Unwirklichkeit enthüllt' (Ibid.).

52 In Adorno scholarship it is usually assumed that Adorno read the *Trauerspiel* book after the first publication in 1928 (cf. Rolf Tiedemann, editorial notes to GS 1, 383; Jay, *Adorno*, 31; Paddison, *Adorno's Aesthetics of Music*, 34). This is unlikely, since Adorno met Benjamin for the first time in 1923 while he was working on the *Trauerspiel* book. Adorno

intention of a materialist music aesthetic now clearly manifests itself. Concurrently, several assiduously mediated sub-theories emerge: theories of the musical artwork, historiography, performance, technical reproduction, and listening. These sub-theories are so closely linked that they almost form a system. Even 'On the Social Situation of Music' (1932),⁵³ Adorno's most comprehensive historiographical article on music of that time, is structured according to these sub-theories. In 'On the Social Situation of Music', they appear under sociological labels: production, reproduction and consumption of music. These sub-theories will now be elaborated, while avoiding Adorno's narrowly sociological definitions.

Most striking with regards to Adorno's concept of the musical artwork is his increasingly critical stance against its being turned into an ideology. According to Adorno, the idea of the 'timeless', 'supposedly unalterable natural qualities of the work is nothing but a lazy *Grenzbegriff* belonging to idealist aesthetics';⁵⁴ the constancy of the work in the course of time is an idea devised by romantic aestheticians to deify the creative genius,⁵⁵ and furthermore a reactionary ideology of a social class that cannot accept 'that its esteemed assets, the eternity of which is supposed to guarantee the eternity of its own existence, could

certainly read the manuscript soon after its completion in 1925. An early example of the effect the *Trauerspiel* book had on Adorno, 'Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck' (1925), will be discussed further down in the present section (Adorno, 'Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck', GS 18, 456-464). In July 1926 the *Trauerspiel* book is also mentioned in a concert review (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Juli 1926', GS 19, 75).

53 Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', GS 18, 729-777.

54 'die anscheinend unveränderten Naturqualitäten des Werkes sind ... nichts als ein fauler *Grenzbegriff* idealistischer Ästhetik' (Adorno, 'Nachtmusik', GS 17, 52-59, here 55).

55 Adorno, 'Neue Tempi', GS 17, 66-73, here 66.

ever disintegrate'.⁵⁶ Adorno's music criticism, by contrast, rests on the premise that the musical artwork is substantially changeable, that it is subject to the powers of time. *Le sacre du printemps*, for instance, was already deemed materially aged by Adorno in 1928; *Pierrot lunaire*, by contrast, was seen by him as 'confirmed by history';⁵⁷ Mozart's Bassoon Concerto in Bb K191 (1774) appeared to him as if it 'had been kept in a leather case, carefully and without light, for one hundred and fifty years; merry music saddened by time'.⁵⁸ Formulations that relate more closely to the logic of disintegration can be found in two early texts on Berg's *Wozzeck*, namely 'Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck' (1925) and 'Die Oper Wozzeck' (1929). The libretto for *Wozzeck*, Georg Büchner's *Woyzeck* (1836), is characterised by Adorno as a *Trauerspiel*, whose original features have disintegrated in the century of the work's existence. Time has torn the *Woyzeck* into fragments, corrugated its surface and silenced it as a spoken drama. Only in its most actual layer, uncovered by disintegration, may the *Woyzeck* be understood; only as a fragment and in a new medium – in the medium of music – may it be set.⁵⁹

In 'Nachtmusik' (1929) Adorno strikes an exceedingly programmatic note. First he states that 'the disintegration of the illusory interiority' –

56 'daß ihre hohen Güter, deren Ewigkeit die Ewigkeit des eigenen Bestandes garantieren soll, jemals zerfallen können' (Adorno, 'Nachtmusik', 56).

57 'bestätigt von Geschichte' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Januar 1928', GS 19, 122).

58 'aus einem Fagottkonzert wurden zwei Sätze gespielt, die klangen, als wären sie in einem Lederetui sorgsam und ohne Licht hundertfünfzig Jahre aufgehoben worden; heitere Musik, die die Zeit traurig gemacht hat' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Februar 1928', GS 19, 125).

59 Adorno, 'Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck', GS 18, 456–464; 'Die Oper Wozzeck', GS 18, 472–479.

i.e. of romantic subjectivity, or synthetic reason in general – ‘restores the real exteriority of music’. Then he postulates that for this reason one may ‘in historical actuality ... more justifiably and more profoundly speak of a *musical materialism* than of a non-historical material conditionedness of music’.⁶⁰ These statements explicitly constitute a musical materialism, which, as in the later writings, is conceived as a dynamic mutual relationship of subjective and objective structures – the ‘illusory interiority’ and the ‘real exteriority’. The materialist critic does not assume a neutral stance towards the disintegrating works. Rather, he seeks intimate proximity to their material core, and changes the works’ substance.⁶¹ A historical force, critique accelerates the process of disintegration, thus leading the works to truth.⁶² The metaphysical implications of Adorno’s concept of critique, which were only vaguely alluded to in the text on Strauss from 1924, are thus much more precisely qualified. This can again be ascribed to the effect of the *Trauerspiel* book. There Benjamin had written that philosophical critique was ‘mortification of the works’, transforming the historical content, which any work contains, into philosophical truth-content. Through this transformation, the disintegration of the work in the course of time becomes ‘the basis of a rebirth, in which all ephemeral beauty is completely stripped off, and the work prevails as a ruin’.⁶³

60 ‘Der Zerfall des scheinhaften Innen hat das wirkliche Außen von Musik restituiert. Es dürfte in geschichtlicher Aktualität mit größerem Rechte und tieferen Sinnes von musikalischem Materialismus zu reden sein als von einer geschichtsfreien Materialbestimmtheit der Musik’ (Adorno, ‘Nachtmusik’, 59, italics added).

61 Adorno, ‘Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik’, 766.

62 Adorno, ‘Nachtmusik’, 56-57. Cf. also Adorno, ‘Drei Dirigenten’, GS 19, 453-459, here 453.

63 ‘Kritik ist Mortifikation der Werke ... Es ist der Gegenstand der philosophischen Kritik zu erweisen, daß die Funktion der Kunstform eben dies ist: historische Sachgehalte, wie

The application of Adorno's temporal concepts to compositional praxis is effected through analogous pairs of concepts: static and dynamic on the one hand, repetition and variation on the other. Around these pairs of concepts, Adorno constructs an audacious historiographical trajectory from Viennese Classicism to new music. Classical formal patterns, and tonality, Adorno argues, quite simplistically, are static, and correspond therefore to the bourgeois-idealist ideology.⁶⁴ In a process launched by Beethoven, however, material and form are dynamised. Adorno concedes that there exists a static element in Beethoven, since in his work thematic motives are still repeated in the reprise after their variation according to the rules of the form. Nonetheless, Beethoven undermines, through developing variation, the practice of abstractly positing themes, so inducing the disintegration of the traditional formal canon. After Beethoven, free positing and repetition of motives becomes impossible.⁶⁵

This is, according to Adorno, the main challenge for new music. Form may after Beethoven not be constituted additively, by juxtaposing sections that are 'accomplished in themselves', and therefore of static nature; rather, form is to be developed dynamically, i.e. through developing variation, out of the 'motivic monad'.⁶⁶ In the early writings, Adorno differentiates between composers who either face or avoid this

sie jedem Werk zugrunde liegen, zu philosophischen Wahrheitsgehalten zu machen. Diese Umbildung der Sachgehalte zum Wahrheitsgehalt macht den Verfall der Wirkung in dem von Jahrzehnt zu Jahrzehnt das Ansprechen der früheren Reize sich mindert, zum Grund einer Neugeburt, in welcher alle ephemere Schönheit vollends dahinfällt und das Werk als Ruine sich behauptet' (Benjamin, *Origin of German Baroque Drama*, tr. John Osborne, London 1998, 182, tr. modified).

64 Cf. Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', 775.

65 Cf. Adorno, 'Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck', 459-460.

66 Cf. *ibid.*, 459.

challenge. The scapegoat for the second group is, at that time, particularly Hindemith, who not only flees out of time into 'illusory realms of eternal playfulness', but also recurs to forms the basis of which has disintegrated, and conceals structural problems behind a seemingly coherent musical surface.⁶⁷ In works such as the *Quartett* op. 16 (1920) and the *Kammermusik Nr. 1* op. 24 (1922), Hindemith attempts to generate formal totality through arbitrary repetitions, instead of developing it out of the material through variations. The obtrusive dynamic of Hindemith's music is pretentious, and hardly appropriate to disguise the static character of the musical texture.⁶⁸

Most likely, Adorno adopted his intransigent attitude towards Hindemith from Alban Berg,⁶⁹ and it is hardly surprising that Adorno employs Berg as an example for dynamic composing. In Berg's *Klaviersonate* op. 1 (1907-1908), the contrast of theme and variation is dissolved, and replaced by 'the themes' genesis in variation'. Likewise in the *Streichquartett* op. 3 (1910), where Berg generates formal totality through constant metamorphosis.⁷⁰ Interestingly, Berg ranked higher in Adorno's early historiography than Schoenberg. What Berg achieved already in his early works required, according to Adorno, a longer process of development in Schoenberg. The *Kammersymphonie* op. 9 (1906) represents a less advanced state of temporal organisation than Berg's *Klaviersonate* op. 1, since the development section requires sonata

67 Cf. Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: August 1928', GS 19, 129.

68 Cf. Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Februar 1925', GS 19, 48, 'August 1928', 128-133; 'Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - II', GS 17, 217-222.

69 Cf. Rudolf Stephan, 'Adorno und Hindemith: Zum Verständnis einer schwierigen Beziehung'.

70 Cf. Adorno, 'Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck', 458-459.

themes that can be repeated.⁷¹ In the *Orchesterstücke* op. 16 (version of 1909), no musical phenomenon may be repeated; yet, Schoenberg still works with clear-cut themes.⁷² Only when Schoenberg finally abandoned tonality, which Adorno sees as the warrant of repetition, in favour of dodecaphony, did constant change become the principal constituent of form.⁷³

Adorno's discussion of Webern appears to belie the static/dynamic pattern. The criteria of development and musical dynamic, Adorno writes, do not apply to Webern's music.⁷⁴ Yet, it is not of static character, since there are no repetitions, let alone repeatable themes.⁷⁵ Closer scrutiny reveals that Adorno attempts, even with respect to Webern, to formulate a specific temporal-dynamic character. Not through the dialectic of theme and variation, but in images that paraphrase the entwinement of *Augenblick* and extension in his works and in his creative process. 'Webern's way', writes Adorno, 'cannot be characterised more aptly than as extreme lyricism, which by virtue of its concision is so closed in itself that it unfolds only in time and not in the moment of delivery'.⁷⁶ '[Webern's music] is not temporal in itself and knows no temporal mediation; it is quasi simultaneous and only

71 'Sonatenthemen ... die in einiger Breite exponiert, melodisch geschlossen und nach dem Gebot der Form wiederholbar sind' (Adorno, 'Schönberg: Fünf Orchesterstücke, op. 16', GS 18, 335-344, here 336).

72 Cf. *ibid.*, 337.

73 Cf. Adorno, 'Zur Zwölftontechnik', GS 18, 363-369, here 366-367.

74 Cf. Adorno, 'Anton von Webern', GS 17, 204-209, here 208.

75 Cf. *Ibid.*, 207.

76 'Nichts könne genauer die Art Weberns als die extreme von Lyrik charakterisieren, welche von ihrer Prägung derart in sich verschlossen wird, daß sie erst in der Zeit und nicht im bloßen Augenblick des Erklingens sich entfaltet' (*Ibid.*, 204).

transposed into time'.⁷⁷ With reference to Webern's compositional process, Adorno writes: 'Webern knows development only as an unfolding of an entirely present idea, posited and seized at the outset'.⁷⁸

The analogy between Adorno's music historiography and the logic of disintegration is somewhat forced in the early writings. This is in large part due to the limitations which the genre of music criticism sets for historical and theoretical reflection. Within the confines of this genre, Adorno could of course pursue issues relating to the performance of music much more profoundly; thus his expositions on this subject are especially interesting. Adorno grants a high theoretical status to musical performance, namely the status of historic-dynamic realisation. Performance is historical insofar as its object, the musical artwork, changes and disintegrates in the course of time; performance is dynamic since it changes its object and accelerates its disintegration; performance is realisation since it allows insight into the object's historical situation. This is undoubtedly implied in the following statement on Bruckner's *Quintett* in F-major (1879): 'the performance of the *Quintett* by Bruckner was a critique, ... which rendered the work and its cracks perfectly visible'.⁷⁹ At the end of a review of a performance of Emilio de Cavalieri's *Rappresentazione di anima e di corpo* (c1600), Adorno states, in a similar fashion: 'Today, the *Rappresentazione* without changes would be unbearable; change, however, undoes the work. Performance

77 '[Weberns Musik] kennt keine Zeit in sich und keine zeitliche Vermittlung, keinen Übergang; sie ist gleichsam simultan und erst in die Zeit transponiert' (Ibid., 207-208).

78 'Webern kennt Entwicklung bloß als Entfaltung einer unverrückt gegenwärtigen, im Beginn gesetzten und bewußten Idee' (Ibid., 206).

79 'vor dem Bruckner-Quintett gar wurde die Aufführung zur Kritik, ... die das Werk und seine Risse vollendet sichtbar machte' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Juli 1926', GS 19, 76).

indicates factual disintegration'.⁸⁰ Particularly telling are Adorno's remarks about the conductor Hermann Scherchen: 'Through historical actuality, Scherchen aims at furthering the truthful reality of the works. Its *organon* is historical realisation: not the passive one of the historian, but that one which is passionately present and devoted to the material, that one which estimates the state of truth in the works ... [Scherchen] renders ... the works according to the concrete measure of that which they used to contain and which now emerges from them'.⁸¹

Performance that changes and actualises the work is not subjectivist 'free' performance. On the contrary: Adorno believes that freedom is only possible within the confines set by the musical material. These confines have narrowed in the course of time. The freedom of figured bass performance and Beethoven's often improvisatory piano playing – in terms of idealist aesthetics: his autonomous spontaneity⁸² – were possible because the subject was at that time still embraced by tradition. The binding character of the forms, however, has disintegrated in history. Progressive performance thus limits freedom, thereby applying the same strict standard that distinguishes the progressive composition

80 'Heute wäre die Rappresentazione unverwandelt unerträglich; die Verwandlung löst sie auf. Interpretation zeigt den faktischen Zerfall an' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: August 1926', GS 19, 80).

81 'Der Aktualität Scherchens aber ist es um die Wirklichkeit der Werke wahrhaft zu tun. Deren Organon ist geschichtliche Erkenntnis eben: nicht die zuschauerhafte des Historikers, sondern die leidenschaftlich gegenwärtig im Material geleistete, die den Stand der Wahrheit in Werken ermißt ... [Scherchen stellt] die Werke dar nach dem konkreten Maße dessen, was in ihnen war und nun aus ihnen heraustritt' (Adorno, 'Drei Dirigenten', 455–456).

82 Cf. on Beethoven's autonomous spontaneity: Adorno, 'Nachtmusik', 58.

of the second Viennese school.⁸³ Strict performance is a consequence of historic dynamic, which leads the works to their death and performance to its end: 'Let us imagine the disintegration of the works. Those that communicate would slowly become dumb; their intention would become visible, discernible from afar and concurrently unrealisable. ... The performer ... would find himself facing the work without mediation; his freedom would be broken by the compulsion to reproduce the hard surface of the estranged, already cold work, which he discovers between the layers of tradition. ... [I]n a work detached from tradition, the personality of the performer could not be communicated by any means other than by eliminating itself for the sake of truth. The end of the possibility of performance would so be indicated'.⁸⁴

Adorno has made some effort to extend the theory of performance into the realm of performance practice. He believes, for instance, that tempi of non-contemporary music need to be accelerated, for he sees fast tempi as a necessary consequence of the disintegration of the forms. Adorno attempts to prove this association of the logic of disintegration

83 Cf. Adorno, 'Zum Problem der Reproduktion', GS 19, 440-444, here 440-442; 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', 752-756; 'Neue Tempi', GS 17, 66-73, here 66-69; 'Metronomisierung', GS 17, 307-310, here 307.

84 'Gesetzt, es begänne der Bestand der Werke zu zerfallen. Es verstümmten langsam die redenden; sichtbar würde ihre Intention, die fern erkannte unrealisierbar zugleich. ... Der Interpret ... fände sich unvermittelt dem kahlen Werk gegenüber; seine Freiheit würde gebrochen vom Zwang, durch die zerbröckelnden Zwischenschichten des Traditionsgeschiebes hindurch auf das fremde, bereits erkaltende Werk zu stoßen, seinen harten Umriß zu reproduzieren. ... [I]n dem aller naturwüchsigen Gemeinschaft künstlerischer Übung enthobenen Werk könnte die Person des Interpreten sich anders nicht mitteilen als durch die Kraft, mit der sie sich um der Wahrheit willen eliminiert. Das Ende der Möglichkeit von Interpretation zeigte sich an' (Adorno, 'Drei Dirigenten', 453 Cf. on the end of interpretability also Adorno, 'Nachtmusik', 56-57).

and the issue of performance tempi with reference to notation: 'The power of the longa and the breve dwindles; the former has fallen into oblivion, the latter leads a miserable existence in archaic-sacred compositions. The semibreve as an undivided note has become suspicious since Beethoven, and only the neo-classicist reaction tries to persuade us of it again. That music which realises its historical state in the most sincere manner, can be notated in demisemiquavers; Schoenberg's *Erwartung* reveals it. Consequences for performance must be drawn from this, and have long been as a matter of course. Even under the presupposition of absolutely equal tempi, early music must today be performed faster in relation to the notated values'.⁸⁵ This equation of note values and tempi fails to convince. The note values have never been absolute measures, which Adorno has to presume in order to treat the tempi as variables. In fact, both elements of Adorno's equation are variables, and cannot be forced into a linear proportion. More convincing is Adorno's attempt to justify fast tempi with reference to the effect of harmonic progressions on the listener's time sense: 'In a sarabande by Handel, at the time when it was composed, the bass progressions, due to the harmonic principle which had only been developed for one-hundred years, bore such intensity that the transition from the tonic to the second inversion of the dominant seventh, bound

85 'Die Größenmacht der Longa und der Brevis schrumpft zusammen; jene ist längst vergessen, diese fristet ihr Dasein kümmerlich in Kompositionen archaisch-sakraler Haltung. Die Semibrevis ist uns als ganze Note seit Beethoven verdächtig geworden, und erst die neoklassizistische Reaktion versucht wieder, sie uns aufzuschwatzen. Wo unsere Musik am aufrichtigsten ihren geschichtlichen Stand realisiert, läßt sie sich in Zweiunddreißigsteln notieren; ein Blick auf Schönbergs *Erwartung* zeigt es. Daraus sind Folgerungen für die Interpretation zu ziehen und als selbstverständlich längst gezogen. Selbst unter Annahme absolut gleicher Tempi muß ältere Musik heute relativ auf die notierten Werte rascher gespielt werden' (Adorno, 'Neue Tempi', 68).

with a suspension, built up a tension which the listener wished to experience, and which required time to be experienced ... For us, however, this progression has worn out in history to such an extent that it could not, illuminated by tempo, be endured any more'.⁸⁶

Adorno's conviction of the disintegration of interpretative freedom and the resultant necessity of interpretative strictness lead him to surprising judgements about the metronome and the gramophone. The metronome, in the nineteenth century decried as an aid for the philistines among the performers, is assessed quite positively by Adorno. Arguing with strong antiromantic bias, as always in the early writings, he believes that arbitrary performance could be impeded by the metronome, and that it might reduce the lead of composition over performance in terms of rational and constructional clarity. The disintegration of tradition might eventually even necessitate metronomic fixation of the tempi of early works, because a clear idea of tempi might not otherwise be preserved.⁸⁷ The gramophone, however, is rejected by Adorno, since the practice of reproducing technical reproductions presupposes the idea of an unchangeable work, and the 'performer's right of freedom, which the gramophone accompanies with

86 'In einer Händelschen Sarabande etwa hatten, als sie entstand, die Fundamentschritte kraft des seit hundert Jahren erst ausgebildeten harmonischen Prinzips solche Macht, daß der Übergang von der ersten zum Terzquartakkord der fünften Stufe, durch den Vorhalt gebunden, eine Spannung bedeutete, die nachgefühlt werden wollte und Zeit brauchte, nachgefühlt zu werden ... Für uns jedoch ist die Fortschreitung durch Geschichte so abgenutzt, so ausgeschliffen und verbraucht, daß sie als solche, durch Tempo beleuchtet, nicht mehr erträglich wäre' (Ibid., 69).

87 Cf. Adorno, 'Metronomisierung', GS 17, 307-310.

devoted machine noise'.⁸⁸ With the latter point Adorno does not mean that performers in the recording studio feel necessarily entitled to free performance. Rather, he is saying that the gramophone does not add anything to the work, apart from the machine noise, that it does not interfere with, and change, the process of reproduction. Technical reproduction, Adorno believes, is static, and regresses to the bourgeois ideology of the timeless musical artwork.⁸⁹

Music criticism has, apart from performance, another specific subject: listening. For the critic assesses performances primarily as a listener – unless he behaves like the critic caricatured by Schoenberg, who is physically absent, but mentally all the more present.⁹⁰ Indeed, Adorno refers at many points in the early writings to 'historical ears' as an instrument for, and a guarantor of, the realisation of musical-temporal phenomena. 'One needs to listen to sacred music in order to realise that it does not exist any more. One needs to listen to it under such skilful direction as Scherchen's in order to realise its material disintegration', he wrote, for instance, on a performance of Honegger's *Roi David* (1921).⁹¹ Listening was deemed by Adorno as a more precise instrument for realisation than words. 'Leave yourselves to listening', he advised

88 'Solche Praxis setzt den in sich fraglosen Bestand der Werke voraus, und das Recht des Interpreten zu jener Freiheit, die die Maschine mit andächtigem Rauschen begleitet' (Adorno, 'Nadelkurven', GS 19, 525-529, here 526).

89 Ibid., 526, 527.

90 Arnold Schönberg, 'Sleepwalker', *Style and Idea: Selected Writings of Arnold Schoenberg*, ed. Leonard Stein, New York 1975, 197-198.

91 Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: August 1926', GS 19, 81. Cf. zu den historischen Ohren auch Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Mai 1928', GS 19, 127; 'Alban Bergs frühe Lieder', GS 18, 465-468, here 466; 'Opernprobleme: Glossiert nach Frankfurter Aufführungen', GS 19, 470-475, here 470; 'Marginalien zur "Sonata" von Alexander Jemnitz', GS 18, 296-303, here 303.

the audience in an introduction to a radio programme, 'the acoustic image will convey questions and answers of the works far more precisely than verbal explanations could'.⁹² In his monograph on Schoenberg, which Adorno devised in 1937 (see chronology), he even planned to replace music examples with listening examples to be sold along with the book – a remarkable fact in view of his antipathy to technical reproductions of music.⁹³

Listening has not yet reached the progressive status of composition and interpretation. Adorno criticises the listening habits of his time as static; he considers the consciousness of the listeners as ideologically preformed by the ruling class, which, in the consumption of their canonic eternal works, reproduces itself without change.⁹⁴ In listening, the structures of synthetic reason persist. To collapse these structures through a dynamisation of listening is Adorno's aim. This, he believes, may be accomplished within the institutional confines; shoulder to shoulder with Schoenberg, he writes that concerts 'are to be developed as domains of a radical consciousness ... [T]he concert hall is, even socially, not the most inappropriate place for this. For there are moments in the social evolution when the driving dialectical impetus moves from the large collectives – for instance, when these are ideologically befuddled – to small groups ... In the musical realm, such groups might emerge in the concert hall. In order for this to happen, full

92 'Überlassen Sie sich dem Hören; das akustische Bild wird Ihnen Fragen und Antworten der Werke präziser vermitteln, als das deutende Wort es vermöchte' (Adorno, 'Zum Rundfunkkonzert vom 7. November 1930', GS 18, 557-564, here 564.

93 Adorno, 'Exposé zu einer Monographie über Arnold Schönberg', GS 19, 609-613, here 612.

94 Adorno, 'Musikalische Aphorismen 28: Asozial', GS 18, 30-31, here 30; 'Bewußtsein des Konzerthörers', GS 18, 815-818; 'Warum ist die neue Kunst so schwerverständlich?', GS 18, 824-831, here 828-831; 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', 759-777.

clarity must first be reached about the disintegration of the concert itself. They [the small groups] will only be able to dwell in the ruins of the concert hall'.⁹⁵

A Metaphysics of Transitoriness

Embodied in the musical material is death; musical artworks disintegrate and die; critique, composition, interpretation and listening advance disintegration and death of the works and thus of themselves. Underlying all sub-theories is the idea of *processual-dynamic transitoriness*. This, however, is not a mere being-towards-death, not a mere temporalisation of time. Death is for Adorno not the 'most authentic possibility' of subjectivity, but constitutes with its radical actuality a domain where transitoriness is paradoxically reconciled with eternity. In the moment of death, hope is supreme. Such dialectical constellations of transitoriness and eternity abound in Adorno's music criticism. The ending of Honegger's *Pastorale d'été*, Adorno writes in 1926, 'lets the music, which is of such an emphatic temporal character

95 '[die Konzerte sind] als Zellen eines radikalen Bewußtseins auszubilden ... Dabei brauchten sie, selbst sozial, nicht einmal so gänzlich am falschen Orte sich zu befinden. Denn es gibt auch in der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung Momente, wo die treibende dialektische Kraft von den großen Kollektiven – etwa wenn sie ideologisch umnebelt sind – an kleine Zirkel übergehen ... Im musikalischen Bereich werden solche Zirkel im Konzertraum sich schließen können. Daß es geschehe, ist freilich zunächst rückhaltlose Klarheit über die Zerfalls-Situation des Konzertes selber gefordert. Sie werden allein in den Ruinen des alten Konzertbaues hausen können' (Adorno, 'Bewußtsein des Konzerthörers', 818).

that it may not sustain it any longer, fade timidly into eternity'.⁹⁶ In 1927 he noted that Ravel's *String Quartet* sounded 'so transitory that one could not possibly think that it could expire'.⁹⁷ A similar constellation of transitoriness and eternity is intended in a passage from 1929 on the third act of *Wozzeck*: '[T]he music contracts and counts the minutes until death. Then it precipitates into the orchestral epilogue. In the *Kinderszene* at the end it is so distantly reflected as the blue sky in the depth of a well shaft. This reflection alone suggests hope in *Wozzeck*'.⁹⁸ Precipitation and depth denote transitoriness in this passage, the blue sky denotes eternity; it is of utmost importance that hope is not articulated directly, but 'distantly reflected'.

That two of the passages cited here pertain to endings is not coincidental. Adorno's thinking about musical metaphysics is often induced by endings, particularly in the early writings. It was only much later, in his interpretation of Beethoven, that he began to understand the need to discuss beginnings (cf. chapter IV.3). It is significant in this context that in Adorno's opinion, Hindemith is incapable of composing endings,⁹⁹ that he understands death, like the existentialists, as eternal, and not as a springboard into eternity. This implementation of

96 'läßt wahrhaft eine Musik zag ins Unendliche verzittern, die im Endlichen ihr bestes Teil besaß, ohne es länger halten zu dürfen' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Februar 1926', GS 19, 64).

97 'Dies Stück endlich klingt auf eine Weise von der Vergänglichkeit, daß man nicht denken kann, daß es vergehe' (Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Mai 1926', GS 19, 73).

98 '[D]ie Musik zieht sich zusammen und zählt die Minuten bis zum Tode. Dann stürzt sie in den orchestralen Epilog und wird in der Kinderszene des Endes so ferne reflektiert, wie in der Tiefe eines Brunnenschachtes die Bläue des Himmels erscheint. Dieser Reflex allein zeigt im *Wozzeck* Hoffnung an' (Adorno, 'Die Oper *Wozzeck*', 479).

99 Adorno, 'Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: April 1925', GS 19, 57.

Hindemith into a reductive critique of existentialism, probably aimed primarily at Heidegger again, merits closer examination, for Adorno draws later, in *Philosophy of New Music*, very similar parallels between Heidegger and Stravinsky (cf. chapter III.4). The key question arising here is which musical category enables the association of Hindemith with existentialism. It is a category whose application to both Hindemith and Heidegger was already observed above: repetition. According to the Kierkegaard book, the constellation of repetition and the inability to close – or to die – is an allegory of modernity as hell: ‘In despair’ – the despair of death – ‘the primeval figures of existential repetition flash up demonically: Sisyphus and Tantalus as the bearers of the myths of repetition. In death a realm of imagery silently reveals itself ... the inability to die as negative eternity’.¹⁰⁰ Such notions of death form the negative background to the endings of Adorno’s texts. In order to reveal that the lines of Adorno’s thought necessarily lead into a metaphysics of transitoriness diametrically opposed to Heidegger, Adorno’s endings will regularly be addressed in the course of the present study.

Already the first book that Adorno published, the Kierkegaard book, has such a redeeming ending; to understand this, a brief look needs to be taken at Adorno’s interpretation of Kierkegaard’s attempt to associate eternity and transitoriness. In his Kierkegaard book, Adorno offers a critique of the famous theory of the ‘moment in which time meets eternity’, and of his applications of this theory to music in general

¹⁰⁰‘In Verzweiflung leuchten dämonisch die Urgestalten der existentiellen Wiederholung auf: Sisyphus und Tantalus als Träger von Wiederholungsmysen. Unterm Tode eröffnet sich stumm ein Bilderreich ... das Nicht-Sterben-Können als negative Ewigkeit’ (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 119; Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 83).

and to Mozart in particular. The 'moment in which time meets eternity', Adorno believes, is the realm into which the existentialist withdraws, in which eternity is gained through abandoning time. Adorno argues that not only time is abandoned in this realm, in the existentialist 'moment', but also eternity. In this sense, Kierkegaard's philosophy is mythic-idealistic. Its application to music leads to an equally mythic-idealistic aesthetic. Kierkegaard's 'assertion that music "is merely when it is repeated"', is thought by Adorno to be 'completely nonsensical'.¹⁰¹ Completely nonsensical, presumably, because repetition, which Adorno deems static, cannot account for music's essentially dynamic nature. In a comparably harsh manner, Adorno criticises Kierkegaard's abstract analogies between the arts, the schematisations known from idealistic systems, his notions of the eternal musical artwork and of the genius. The two latter points of critique are concretised by Adorno with Kierkegaard's glorification of *Don Giovanni* as the one and only musical masterwork, which he removes from history through abstraction.¹⁰²

The Kierkegaard book is interspersed with remarks as to how time and eternity relate to each other in Adorno's view. Here it becomes apparent for the first time that Adorno does not aim to dissolve the temporal in the eternal, but rather that he lets the temporal revert dialectically into eternity at that point where transitoriness can be felt most intensely. Thus the following passage is to be understood: 'not that which is removed from time' – as, for instance, in Kierkegaard's 'moment' – 'lasts truly in artworks ... Those motives last whose

¹⁰¹ 'vollends widersinng ... Behauptung, daß Musik "bloß existiert, sofern sie wiederholt wird"' (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 31; Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 19, tr. modified).

¹⁰² Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 35-36; Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 22).

concealed eternity is most deeply imbued in time, most faithfully preserved in its ciphers'.¹⁰³ Finally, at the end of the last chapter, where, according to its title, the 'construction of the aesthetic' is carried out, Adorno conjures up with quotations from Kierkegaard's love letters and the *Stages on Life's Way* images of 'fulfilment without sacrifice' and an 'inconspicuous hope' of finite existence, which are supposed to overcome 'even the enormous image of death'.¹⁰⁴

Such paradoxical constellations of transitoriness and eternity find the most profound expression in a text on Schubert, written on the occasion of the centenary of his death in 1928. Central ideas from the Kierkegaard book and 'The Idea of *Naturgeschichte*' are anticipated in this text, which forms therefore one of the most striking examples of the emergence of key philosophic theorems from Adorno's reflection about musical time. Already the epigraph, some lines by Louis Aragon, indicate death and eternity: '*Peu à peu le corps se fit lumière. ... Et l'homme ne fut plus qu'un signe entre les constellations*'.¹⁰⁵ To account for the temporal character of Schubert's music, Adorno employs the metaphor of landscape. This is anything but a revival of the nineteenth-century Schubert myth. Schubert is not 'the dreamer of the *Vormärz* epoch, who sits at the brook all the time, listening to its trickling'.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Schubert's nature

103'nicht was abstrahierend der Zeit entzogen ist, dauert wahrhaft in Kunstwerken ... Es behaupten sich die Motive, deren verborgene Ewigkeit am tiefsten der Zeitlichkeit eingesenkt, am treuesten in deren Chiffren bewahrt ist (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 34; Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 21, tr. modified).

104'opferloser Erfüllung ... Der unscheinbaren Hoffnung dieses Bildes weicht selbst selbst das gewaltige des Todes' (Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, 200; Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, 141, tr. modified).

105Adorno, 'Schubert', GS 17, 18-33, here: 18.

106'der vormärzliche Träumer, der immerzu am Bächlein sitzt, das er rauschen hört' (Ibid., 21).

is not timeless in the sense of German Idealism. Adorno admits that there is in Schubert's landscape no development, no Beethovenian dynamic, not even organicist teleology; nonetheless it is temporal, albeit in a different sense, strongly suggestive of Proust, whom Adorno alludes to in the final part of the text.¹⁰⁷ Fragments of lyrical subjectivity, left over after the process of material disintegration, stand in configurations in this landscape, organised around one central point of reference, death.¹⁰⁸

Extended passages of the Schubert text read like exercises in mimetic-poetic stylism. The resulting web of morbid imagery, however, which Adorno himself later found slightly inept,¹⁰⁹ contains groundbreaking ideas about Schubert's form. The specific temporal character of Schubert's themes, which are often repetitive and never substantially transformed, is captured with great subtlety by Adorno's landscape metaphors; in each repetition, Adorno explains, the thematic characters appear in different colouration, 'all change' was accidental, a 'change of light'.¹¹⁰ Form is constituted in the circular experience of these light changes, much in the way a wanderer experiences nature.¹¹¹ Decisively for Adorno, this experience is not one of negative eternity as in the examples from the Kierkegaard book quoted above, but one with a specific directionality: the circularly arranged semantic elements precipitate into death.¹¹² In this movement the domain of death is transcended: 'The allegorical image of death and the maiden declines ...

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 32.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁹Adorno, preface to *Moments Musicaux* from 1963, GS 17, 10.

¹¹⁰Adorno, 'Schubert', GS 17, 25.

¹¹¹Ibid., 26.

¹¹²Ibid., 29.

only to raise and find salvation, after its decline, out of the musical representation of grief'.¹¹³ As can be expected, Adorno sees such signs of hope especially in Schubert's finali,¹¹⁴ and the finale of his Schubert text emphasises the reconciliatory potential of grief yet again: 'We weep', Adorno writes, 'because we are not yet as this music promises, and because of the nameless happiness that this music merely needs to be as it is to assure us that we will once be so. We cannot read this music; but it presents to the dwindling, tearful eye the ciphers of eventual reconciliation'.¹¹⁵

113'Das allegorische Bild vom Tod und dem Mädchen geht unter ... um nach seinem Untergang aus der musikalischen Gestalt der Trauer gerettet sich zu erheben' (Ibid., 24-25).

114Ibid., 28, 31.

115'Wir weinen, weil wir so noch nicht sind, wie jene Musik es verspricht, und im unbenannten Glück, daß sie nur so zu sein braucht, dessen uns zu versichern, daß wir einmal so sein werden. Wir können sie nicht lesen; aber dem schwindenden, überfluteten Auge hält sie vor die Chiffren der endlichen Versöhnung' (Ibid., 33).

Chapter II

Presence in Wagner (1933-1940)

Presence forms the temporal dimension of Adorno's materialist music criticism, as the previous chapter has shown. Only if the historical agent assumes the perspective of critical presence does music criticism become a genuine historical force; only if the writer, composer, performer or listener, to adopt Adorno's characterisation of Scherchen's conducting, is 'passionately present' does he gain the capacity of causing change, that is, of affecting the material substance of musical artworks and of advancing the process of disintegration. Despite its significant status, however, the concept of presence remains unqualified in Adorno's early writings. He thoroughly reflected upon, indeed skilfully exploited, its discursive potential only in the 1930s. The first section of the present chapter traces the historical roots of Adorno's understanding of presence and determines its place in the nexus of temporal categories that constitute the logic of disintegration. Thereby a 'temporal-dimensional figure' will be developed. The second and third sections prove the effect of the temporal-dimensional figure in the 1937/1938 version of *Versuch über Wagner*. The third section turns to Adorno's Wagner analyses to investigate further the crucial issue of the formation of analogies between philosophical and musicological terminology.

Adorno's Temporal-Dimensional Figure

Adorno's theoretical stance on presence and the other temporal dimensions, past and future, can be extrapolated from texts and notes on Berg and Beethoven from 1935-1938. Immediately after Berg's death, Adorno published a number of articles,¹ where he describes his composing as a cognitive process in which present and past are related in such a way that the possibility of a better, utopian future opens up. For this specific relation of present and past Adorno uses the concept of remembering. He writes that 'with memory's long, veiled gaze', Berg was 'sunk into the past, which his music, even in its most daring moments, never forgets to consider'.² Berg's consideration for the past, however, is not an affirmative one. Adorno emphasises that in Berg the past becomes part of the present only in the sense that it is, in remembering, 'retrieved as something irretrievable, through its own death'.³ This qualification of cognitive presence with a negative temporal concept – the strongest one that philosophy has at its disposal, that of death – is of extraordinary significance for Adorno's thought. Through refraction of the past at the pole of an emphatically transitory present, Berg achieves an anticipation of the future; his music, Adorno

1 Willi Reich, ed., *Alban Berg zum Gedenken*, 23: *Eine Wiener Musikzeitschrift* (1 February 1936); *Alban Berg: Mit Bergs eigenen Schriften und Beiträgen von Theodor Wieselgrund-Adorno und Ernst Křenek*, Wien 1937. Text from these publications of articles will here be cited according to the edition of Adorno's Berg monograph in GS.

2 'mit dem langen, verhüllten Blick der Erinnerung ins Vergangene eingesenkt, um das zu sorgen seine Musik noch im kühnsten Augenblick nicht vergißt' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, GS 13, 321-494, here 376; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, tr. Juliane Brand and Christopher Hailey, 41, tr. modified).

3 'als unwiederbringlich wiederbringt, durch seinen Tod hindurch' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 350; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 21).

explains, does not express contemplation but expectation,⁴ and 'every new thing he ventured emerged from the total variation of something remembered'.⁵

In a note on Beethoven from 1938, Adorno constructs a temporal-dimensional movement that is structurally similar to the one sketched above, whilst emphasising remembering and the transitory present even more strongly. 'The close of the *Arietta Variations*', Adorno writes, 'has such a force of backward-looking, of leave-taking, that ... what has gone before is immeasurably enlarged'.⁶ The concepts of 'backward-looking' and 'leave-taking' establish an association of present and past. At the same time Beethoven's cognitive presentness is ascribed enormous power, the power of changing the past in its dimensions through remembering. In the continuation of this passage, Adorno indulges in, and embellishes, this point and introduces the concepts of the new and utopia: '[Beethoven's music] can invoke what has not been as something past and non-existent. Utopia is heard only as what has already been. The music's inherent sense of form changes what has preceded the leave-taking in such a way that it takes on a greatness, a presence in the past which, in music it could never achieve in the present'.⁷

4 Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 412; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 71, tr. modified.

5 'alles Neue ... aus der totalen Variation eines Erinnerten hervorgegangen' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 419; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 76).

6 'Der Schluß der Arietta-Variationen ist von solcher Gewalt des Rückschauenden, des Abschiednehmenden, daß ... das Vorhergegangene ins Ungemessene sich vergrößert' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 252; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, tr. Edmund Jephcott, Cambridge 1998, 175).

7 '[Die Musik vermag] als Vergangenes und Nicht-Seiendes aufzurufen ... was nicht da war. Die Utopie klingt allein als schon Gewesene. Der Formsinn der Musik verändert die dem Abschied vorausgehende Musik so, daß ihr eine Größe der Präsenz in der (Adorno,

Berg and Beethoven will be discussed in greater detail below (cf. chapter IV), for it is by no means coincidental that Adorno develops this temporal-dimensional structure with reference to these two composers. At the end of the present study¹ will emerge that their work forms in a certain sense the most important source of inspiration for Adorno (cf. chapter V). Here Adorno's temporal-dimensional concepts need to be placed into a Hegelian context before we can turn to Adorno's critique of Wagner's metaphysics of presence. Reconstructing Adorno's early reading of Hegel is somewhat problematic due to the lack of direct sources. Yet, it is evident from texts and letters that Adorno studied Hegel systematically in the 1930s. Moreover, his temporal-dimensional theorems relate closely to Hegel, so closely in fact that it appears plausible to hypothesise that their historical roots are to be sought in the latter's work.

Hegel's account of the processual transition from sense-certainty to absolute spirit, from knowing to knowledge, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1801-1807) has significant temporal-dimensional implications. Hegel clearly assigns the primacy to the dimension of presence: on all levels of realisation, the spirit is in the mode of presentness; its new qualities always emerge as if refracted at the pole of presence; and all mediation of temporal dimensions is effected through presence. Early in the *Phenomenology*, at the point where the initial sensual immediacy is overcome, the spirit, without yielding its presentness, unfolds into the temporal dimensions of past and future. Two possible temporal-dimensional relations result from this: the relation of present and past, and the relation of present and future. Hegel operates exclusively with

(Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 252; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 175-176, tr. modified).

the relation of present and past, which he determines dynamically: under the sway of presence, that which passes changes, and is sublated, again in the mode of presentness, as a new quality on a higher level. Thus, new qualities continually evolve in this dynamic process of mediation. The new, however, is not thought as genuinely futuristic by Hegel, but accredited to the present from which it emanates. At the point in the *Phenomenology* where the absolute spirit finally comes to know itself, the present is eternalised at the expense of the other dimensions, and time in general is 'abolished' (*getilgt*).⁸ For in Hegel, as he notes in the concluding chapter of the *Phenomenology*, time is ultimately nothing more than 'the destiny and necessity of the spirit, so long as the spirit is not complete within itself'.^{9 10}

Left-Hegelians and Marxists adopt the primacy of the present, the conviction of its capacity of change and the dynamic relation of present and past. They also adhere to the mediation of present and future, i.e. the idea that the future depends upon a process of change induced in and by the present. Unorthodox Marxists, particularly in the twentieth century, however, have attempted to conceive of a non-deterministic future. Adorno clearly belongs to these thinkers. Yet he holds that a

8 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes, Theorie Werkausgabe* (hereafter TWA) 3, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt am Main 1970, 584, tr. my own.

9 'das Schicksal und die Notwendigkeit des Geistes, der nicht in sich vollendet ist' (Ibid., tr. my own)

10 Cf. Gabriella Baptist, 'Das absolute Wissen, Zeit, Geschichte, Wissenschaft', G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Dietmar Köhler and Otto Pöggeler, Berlin 1998, 243-259; Oscar Daniel Brauer, *Dialektik der Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Metaphysik der Weltgeschichte*, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1982; Joseph C. Flay, 'Time in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*', *International Philosophical Quarterly* 31 (1991), 259-273; Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time*, London 1995, 42, 108-109; Ludwig Siep, *Der Weg der 'Phänomenologie des Geistes'*, Frankfurt am Main 2000, 249-251.

future both open and bound up with the present cannot, as in Bloch, be invoked with baroque pathos, but only be thought in consequent opposition to Hegel's eternalised present. Adorno's solution to the problem of futurity is efficient and wholly consistent with the logic of disintegration (cf. chapter I.2): he defines the dialectical movements or processes of change induced by presence with concepts pertaining to transitoriness. Change is understood by Adorno primarily as passing, as material disintegration. As a result of such negative temporalisation, the tension between presence and future, which Hegel levels, is maintained. Presence cannot posit itself as eternity; the future is saved from determination by, and coincidence with, the present, thus becoming possible as utopia. Syntheses of present and future are admitted by Adorno only as momentary experiences (*Augenblickserfahrungen*) within the critical process, which are immediately driven into dissociation again to keep the future open and to counteract possible ideologisation.

Only with such an interpretation does the logic of disintegration gain the full meaning that Adorno ascribes to it when he defines the logic of negative dialectics as 'one of disintegration' (cf. chapter I.2). It would, however, be rash to conclude from this that Adorno simply confers the principle of transitoriness onto Hegel's work. It can be argued that the sections on time in Hegel's later writings which relate critically to the *Phenomenology*, namely the *Science of Logic* (first publication 1812-1816) and the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (first publication 1817), invite negativistic interpretation. Adorno certainly knew these sections not only from the original, but also from § 82 in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, wherein Heidegger attempts to prove that 'Hegel's concept of time presents the most radical way in which the vulgar understanding of time has been given form conceptually, and one that has received too

little attention'.¹¹ It was probably Heidegger's fundamental-ontological critique of Hegel's concept of time that provoked Adorno to write the negative-dialectical counter-critique which *Versuch über Wagner* is based upon. Already this early work, and not only *Negative Dialectics*, one could argue, is written against Heidegger.

In order to verify that Hegel's concept of time is 'vulgar', Heidegger first methodically ignores the relevant passages in the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*. This enables him to unravel Hegel's concept of time in reverse chronological order, namely from the 'Philosophy of Nature' in the second part of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, which has always been regarded as the weakest link in the system. From this perspective, Hegel does in fact appear to develop time in Aristotelian fashion through abstract negations from the concepts of location and motion.¹² Heidegger cites only at the end of his deduction the famous passage at the beginning of the *Logic*, where the cognitive dynamics of the now are described as a complementary dialectical movement of being and nothingness, and nothingness and being.¹³ Adorno connects this passage, according to Tiedemann, to the beginnings of Beethoven's formal processes;¹⁴ Heidegger, by contrast, holding on to his idea that Hegel's concept of time is narrowly naturalistic, believes that in these relations time is only grasped as 'the transition that is not thought, but simply presents itself in the succession of nows'.¹⁵ Heidegger's next

11 'Hegels Zeitbegriff die radikalste und zu wenig beachtete begriffliche Ausformung des vulgären Zeitverständnisses darstellt' (Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh, Albany 1996, 392).

12 Ibid., 392-394.

13 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, TWA 5, 82-114.

14 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 281-282; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 199.

15 'Übergang, der nicht gedacht wird, sondern in der Jetztfolge sich schlicht darbietet' (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 394).

citation is obviously prone to negative-dialectical interpretation; please note Hegel's emphasis on the transitory character of the now: 'The now is enormously privileged, – it is nothing but the individual now, but this now, an excluding force in its expansion, is dissolved, diffused and pulverised at the moment when I express it'.¹⁶ Even more interesting in temporal-dimensional terms is the subsequent passage, which Heidegger presents merely as another instance of Hegel's vulgar concept of time: 'Only the present is, the before and after are not; but the concrete present is the result of the past and it is pregnant with the future'.¹⁷ Heidegger unwittingly proves that one should clearly distinguish between nature and consciousness when dealing with Hegel's philosophy of temporal dimensions: 'Incidentally, in nature where time is now, no "*persisting*" difference between those dimensions occurs'.¹⁸ The continuation of this citation, which Heidegger withholds with good reason, certainly made an impression on Adorno: 'they [the dimensions] are necessary only in subjective imagination, in *recollection* and in *fear or hope*'.¹⁹

16 'Das Jetzt hat ein ungeheures Recht, – es ist nichts als das einzelne Jetzt; aber dies Ausschließende in seiner Aufspreizung ist aufgelöst, zerflossen, zerstäubt, indem ich es ausspreche' (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, TWA 9, 50, tr. my own; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 394. Cf. on the transitoriness of the now also Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, TWA 5, 215).

17 'Nur die Gegenwart ist, das Vor und Nach ist nicht; aber die konkrete Gegenwart ist das Resultat der Vergangenheit und sie ist trüchtig von der Zukunft' (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, TWA 9, 55, tr. my own; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 394).

18 'Übrigens kommt es in der Natur, wo die Zeit Jetzt ist, nicht zum "*bestehenden*" Unterschiede von jenen Dimensionen' (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, TWA 9, 52, tr. my own; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 394).

19 'sie [die Dimensionen] sind notwendig nur in der subjektiven Vorstellung, in der *Erinnerung* und in der *Furcht* oder *Hoffnung*' (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, TWA 9, 52, tr. my own).

As explained at the outset of this section, the analyses of *Versuch über Wagner* will prove that Adorno uses a modified Hegelian concept of temporal dimensions. Its most essential features shall here be reiterated. First and foremost, presence holds the capacity of change. This capacity is cast in negative terms by Adorno; thus one can, with reference to the logic of disintegration, say that presence subjects its material to disintegration. Since presence is never positively established and only fleetingly synthesised, one can also say that presence is itself subject to disintegration. Within the temporal-dimensional context presence forms the pivot of a movement from the past towards a different, utopian future. This movement shall hereafter be called Adorno's 'temporal-dimensional figure'.

The Sources of *Versuch über Wagner*

In accordance with this study's claim to exact chronology, the 1937/1938 and 1952 versions of *Versuch über Wagner* will in the present chapter be distinguished as clearly as possible. The earliest source of *Versuch über Wagner* that has survived, a typescript produced by Adorno's wife Gretel in 1937/1938, probably represents already a second version. It consists of originals and carbon copies of the ten chapters, and of some single pages with inserts that can be dated to 1952 on the grounds of bibliographical references in the footnotes. Pagination is inconsistent, probably because the chapters were not dictated successively. There are corrections and annotations in two different handwritings, Adorno's and his wife's. The originals contain corrections in ink and ballpoint pen in conspicuously neat Latin script, mostly in Adorno's hand, and annotations, written in pencil by Adorno in hardly

decipherable *Sütterlin* (old German script). Gretel Adorno's impact was restricted to modest corrections in neat Latin script on the carbon copies.

The philological data allows only hypothetical reconstruction of the writing process of *Versuch über Wagner*. Subsequent to dictation, Adorno and his wife presumably checked the text, whereby Gretel Adorno entered minor stylistic corrections into the carbon copies on her husband's instructions. Adorno later copied these corrections into the originals, which he then subjected to further revision. Thereby he used neat Latin script, a habit that he and Gretel Adorno developed in the United States in order to facilitate the work of his secretaries and typesetters. When Adorno returned to Germany in the early 1950s, he reread the typescript. The pencil annotations in *Sütterlin* almost certainly date from that time. A major revision process ensued, whereupon Adorno dictated the fair copy on which the version printed in 1952 is based. The proofs contain only a few corrections of typesetting mistakes.

Citations in this chapter follow a text assembled on the grounds of this hypothesis. Due to the inconsistent pagination, archive numbers (Ts + number) are given instead of page numbers whenever reference is made to the 1937/1938 version of *Versuch über Wagner*.

Temporal-Dimensional Movements in Wagner

In both versions of *Versuch über Wagner* Adorno attempts to reveal movements in Wagner's work that result from manipulations of the temporal dimensions. These movements depart from the dimension of presence, which in Wagner gains primacy not through mediation, but

through supposition of pureness, i.e. independence from past and future. Adorno investigates both the objective and subjective sides of this hypothesis. Objective independence from the past, Adorno argues, is pretended in Wagner's work by denying the genesis of the music, the fact that it is made. The product's appearance, its immediate presentness, conceals production; this Adorno considers to be Wagner's 'formal law'.²⁰ In one of the audacious, yet striking analogies in *Versuch über Wagner*, he claims that on just the same formal law is based modern commodity exchange: 'In Wagner's day the consumer goods on display turned only their phenomenal side towards the customers', Adorno writes. 'Similarly', he continues, 'Wagner's operas tend to become commodities and assume in their tableaux the character of wares on display'.²¹

The subjective side of the concealment of the past remains unresolved in this approach from 1937/1938. To fill this apparent gap, Adorno inserted a whole passage when revising *Versuch über Wagner* in 1952. He states in the insert that the cognitive relation of present and past, remembering, is damaged to the same degree that music is commodified through concealment of its genesis. Wagner is aware of this side effect; his music is 'designed to be remembered, it is intended for the forgetful, and if the capacity for musical understanding is equated to a great extent with the ability to remember and anticipate then the old anti-Wagner slur that he was writing for the unmusical can

20 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2866; *In Search of Wagner*, tr. Rodney Livingstone, London 1981, 85.

21 'Wie die ausgestellten Konsumgüter von Wagners Epoche den Käufern bloss noch ihre phänomenale Seite verlockend zukehren ..., so tendieren die Wagnerschen Opern ... zur Ware und nehmen in ihren tableaux Ausstellungscharakter an' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2870; *In Search of Wagner*, 90, tr. modified).

be said to have a certain critical justification, alongside its reactionary message'.²² This passage also imparts consequences for the dimension of future. Along with the objective past, Wagner's pure presence denies the objective future, and as the subjective capacity of appropriating the past is lost, the capacity of anticipation also deteriorates. Apparently Adorno's argument about the manipulation of the future is similar to that concerning Wagner's treatment of the past. In order to create the impression of pure presentness, Wagner objectively and subjectively damages the relation of presence to both of the other dimensions. Thus there is in Wagner no change in the sense of Adorno's temporal-dimensional figure. The price that Wagner pays for the impression of pure presentness is considerable: he loses not only the creative prospects of a truly dynamic presence, but has to sacrifice utopian content and the horizon of possibility.²³

As a consequence of the denial of temporal-dimensional mediation, Adorno argues, the presentness that Wagner pre-emptively so emphatically in aesthetic theory and praxis becomes mere ideological appearance. Adorno clearly associates presentness and appearance in the 1952 version of *Versuch über Wagner*, where he speaks of the 'blinding presence' or the 'illusory presence' of Wagner's work.²⁴ The adjectives 'blinding' and 'illusory' are often substituted by Adorno with the concept of 'phantasmagoria'. This concept first surfaces in

22 '[Wagners Musik ist] aufs Behaltenwerden angelegt, vorweg für Vergeßliche gedacht, und wenn man die Fähigkeit musikalischen Verstehens in weitem Maße der Kraft der Erinnerung und des Vorblicks gleichsetzt, so hat an dieser Stelle die alte antiwagnerische Parole, er schreibe für Unmusikalische, neben ihrem reaktionären Element auch ihr kritisches Recht' (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 29; *In Search of Wagner*, 31, tr. modified).

23 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2811; *In Search of Wagner*, 41-42.

24 'blendenden Gegenwart' und 'illusionären Präsenz' (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 93; *In Search of Wagner*, 98, tr. modified).

Schopenhauer, in whose writings it designates the 'illusion [*Blendwerk*] of the objective world'.²⁵ With reference to Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, Benjamin assigned an important role to the concept of phantasmagoria in his analyses of nineteenth-century commodity exchange. Adorno employs the concept as a predicate of presence, not only in the version of *Versuch über Wagner* printed after World War II, but already in the draft from 1937/1938. There he writes, to mention just one particularly telling example, of 'phantasmagorical *Vergegenwärtigung*'.²⁶

These theories about past, present and future form the temporal-philosophical core of Adorno's Wagner critique. Already at this point the issue of analogies between philosophical and musicological terminology comes to the fore. Problems of that kind shall be addressed in the next section; first the conceptual frame, which has as yet merely been demarcated with temporal-dimensional coordinates, needs to be filled out. Of particular significance with respect to temporal dimensions are the concepts of spatialisation and false eternity. Wagner, admitting only pure presence and not even attempting a mediation of temporal dimensions, spatialises musical time. For the existence of musical phenomena in the mode of pure presence, i.e. their simultaneity, can only be thought in space. Even the theoretical possibility of change and history is thus ruled out. This line of argument is equally important in both versions of *Versuch über Wagner*; again a condensed formulation can only be found in the version of 1952,

25 Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, Werke I*, ed. Wolfgang Freiherr von Löhneysen, Stuttgart/Frankfurt am Main 1968, 567; 'Fragmente zur Geschichte der Philosophie', *Werke IV*, 43-170, here 106; 'Zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Natur', *Werke V*, 123-210, here 166.

26 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2878.

wherein Adorno defines Wagner's musical space as an 'unhistorical-chronometrical system'.²⁷ Such a system could only be counteracted with an understanding of presence as ceaselessly negating itself and as being constituted dynamically through mediation of temporal dimensions. Only thus could the appearance of false eternity – the impression of a standstill of time resulting from Wagner's spatialisation of the present – be undermined. Adorno has, with keen critical intention, interpolated into his text metaphors that associate spatialisation and standstill of time. He uses, for instance, the image of Fata Morgana to describe the acoustic illusion of 'distant sound ... in which music stands still and is made spatial'.²⁸ And at the end of the chapter on phantasmagoria, he constructs a tableau in which belief and asceticism revert to decadence and destruction. Above the scene hovers, in 'phantasmagorical standstill',²⁹ the sacred spear, as if it were a Sword of Damocles.

The argument presented so far may be summarised in one sentence: Wagner's presence, broken out of the temporal-dimensional context and thought as 'pure', entails the spatialisation of musical time and the impression of false eternity. If the composer, setting out from such a state of affairs, quests for formal unity, a totality comes about that can only be apparent – the totality of the *Gesamtkunstwerk*. It goes without saying that Adorno understands this as a provocation. His scrutiny of

27 'ungeschichtlich-chronometrischen System' (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 35, omitted in Livingstone's translation).

28 'fernen Klages ..., in welchem Musik verräumlicht innehält' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2866; *In Search of Wagner*, 86, tr. modified. The concept of 'distant sound' alludes to Schreker. In 1959, Adorno has elaborated the association of distant sound and phantasmagoria in Schreker (cf. Adorno, 'Schreker', GS 16, 369-381, here 370-372)).

29 'wenn der heilige Speer phantasmagorisch innehält über Parsifals Haupt' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2874; *In Search of Wagner*, 96, tr. modified).

the methods used by Wagner to achieve totality reflects this. Adorno concentrates on two aspects: the identification of the specialised arts with each other, and the identification of music and drama. With reference to the first aspect Adorno reiterates a basic property of phantasmagoria, namely the concealment of production: the 'unity of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* [is] one of mere concealment', he writes, and the 'quid pro quo of the arts in the *Gesamtkunstwerk* aims at concealing the element of production which is still perceptible in the specialised arts'.³⁰

The critique regarding the second aspect of totalisation, the identification of music and drama, is more complex. Adorno's point of departure is Wagner's simplistic dialectic of the idea [*Gedanke*] and the emotional [*Gefühl*], of poetic content and musical expression. In this opposition the idea is seen as unpresent and the emotional as immediately present. Wagner concludes from this, quite predictably, that music fulfils the function of a 'pure *Vergegenwärtigung*' of poetry.³¹ Adorno passionately defends music against such functionalisation in the context of a zealous aesthetic of emotion. Far from synthesising music and drama, he argues, Wagner's pure *Vergegenwärtigung* creates a gulf between them.³² The ideological content of poetry is concealed and dissolved in subjective actuality by 'the phantasmagorical process of

30 'die Einheit des Gesamtkunstwerks [ist] eine des blossen Abblendens', und das 'quid pro quo der Künste im Gesamtkunstwerk verfolgt den Zweck, die Momente von Arbeit vollends zu verdecken, die in den arbeitsteiligen Künsten stets noch zu Tage liegen' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2877; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 97).

31 Richard Wagner, *Schriften* IV, 202 f.; Adorno cites this passage in both versions of *Versuch über Wagner* (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2878; *Versuch über Wagner*, 93; *In Search of Wagner*, 98).

32 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2883; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 112.

Vergegenwärtigung to which music supposedly subjects poetry',³³ or as he says in a crucial insert from 1952: '... to which music supposedly subjects poetry at the expense of musical time'.³⁴ The deciding critical blow against the praxis of *Vergegenwärtigung* is dealt by Adorno with the concept of repetition. With regards to the section on Adorno's Wagner analyses further down in the present chapter, the supreme rhetorical function of the concept of repetition cannot be overestimated: 'Critical objection', writes Adorno, is in Wagner 'replaced with the tautology of subjective expression. The music merely repeats what the text states'.³⁵

At this point Adorno causes the argument to revert. That presence which Wagner invokes so volubly, which he attempts to captivate and eternalise in space, which he totalises in the *Gesamtkunstwerk*, that presence slips out of his hands and regresses into the past – despite, or rather because of, the concealment of the past as the music's genesis and the composer's anxiety to demand from the listener a confrontation with the past in the form of productive remembering. Adorno here operates with the inversion of the temporal-dimensional figure: instead of progress from the past via the pole of presence into an altered future, there is in Wagner a regressive movement from pure presence into the 'ever-same' past and a complete betrayal of the future. Whereas

33 '[Ideologische Gehalte der Dichtung werden durch die] phantasmagorische *Vergegenwärtigung*, die Musik an Dichtung vollziehen soll, [verdeckt und in] subjektive Aktualität [aufgelöst]' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2878; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 99).

34 'auf Kosten der musikalischen Zeit' (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 94; *In Search of Wagner*, 99).

35 'Anstelle des Einspruchs tritt [bei Wagner] die Verdoppelung, nämlich die des subjektiven Ausdrucks. Musik wiederholt, was die Worte ohnehin sagen' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2882-2883).

presence in Adorno possesses the capacity of change, it is in Wagner a merely repetitive force; whereas Adorno's progressive process is driven by the subject's consciousness of presentness, Wagner's regression, by contrast, is motivated by the disposition of his phantasmagorical presence which is inimical to consciousness. Critically referring to Nietzsche's judgment that Wagner's music conveys the feeling of rapturous indulgence in an ocean of music, Adorno speaks of the 'rapture of dissolution which is inimical to consciousness'³⁶ and 'rapture as "oceanic regression"' which 'the musico-dramatic form ... in the promiscuousness of its elements invites at any moment'.³⁷ Evidently, the music drama can only ironically be called the 'drama of the future' in an Adornian context.

Adorno links to the inversion of the temporal-dimensional figure some of his most incisive political statements. The constellation of regression into the past, tautological presence and betrayal of the future is in *Versuch über Wagner* interpreted as the prototypical bourgeois attitude. Thus one of the central ideas of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, namely that 'enlightenment reverts to mythology',³⁸ is anticipated here. Adorno argues that the progress of bourgeois society, the mythical archetype of which can be studied in *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, is necessarily regressive, due to the same deficits that characterise Wagner's phantasmagoria, namely the illusory concealment of the past

36 'bewußtseinsfeindliche Rausch der Vermischung' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2878).

37 'Rausch als "thalassaler Regression"', dem 'die musikdramatische Form ... in der Promiskuität ihrer Elemente jeden Augenblick ... offen [ist]' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2878-2879; *In Search of Wagner*, 100, tr. modified).

38 'Aufklärung schlägt in Mythologie zurück' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 16; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, tr. John Cumming, New York 1972, xvi).

and the avoidance of the genuinely new: 'Each of bourgeois society's steps forward is at the same time a step into the remote past. As bourgeois society advances it finds that it needs its own camouflage of illusion simply in order to subsist. For it ventures to look the new in the face only by recognising it as old'.³⁹

Bourgeois regression is in both versions of *Versuch über Wagner* not only defined as a collective attitude, but also directed against Wagner's personality, or his 'social character', to use Adorno's expression. When Adorno describes Wotan's negative action – renunciation of the revolutionary present and betrayal of a future utopia⁴⁰ – he obviously means Wagner himself, the disappointed revolutionary. In the whole section on Wotan, whom Adorno at one point calls 'the phantasmagoria of the betrayed revolution',⁴¹ the name Wotan could be replaced with Wagner. Yet, the reproaches in *Versuch über Wagner* regarding betrayal of the revolution could also be turned against its author, for the theme of revolution has lost a great deal of its significance in the 1952 version. At six prominent points in the text, Adorno has deleted the word 'revolution'.⁴² The most interesting one of these deletions is the following. In 1952, Adorno ascribed to the beginning of *Das Rheingold* a kernel of hope, with the words: 'These depths, as a refuge, at the same

39 'Jeder Schritt nach vorwärts ist ihr zugleich einer ins Urvergangene. Die fortschreitende bürgerliche Gesellschaft bedarf ihrer eigenen illusionären Verdeckung, um fortzubestehen. Sie wagt dem Neuen anders nicht ins Auge zu sehen, als indem sie als alt es wiedererkennt' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2873; *In Search of Wagner*, 95, tr. modified).

40 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2913-2918; *In Search of Wagner*, 132-138.

41 'die Phantasmagorie der verratenen Revolution' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2914; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 134).

42 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2916, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2928; *In Search of Wagner*, 136-137, 137-138, 139, 141, 142, 152.

time conceal everything that the work “falsely and faint-heartedly” betrayed’.⁴³ In the early version Adorno wrote: ‘These depths, as a refuge, are at the same time the refuge of revolution that the work “falsely and faint-heartedly” betrayed’.⁴⁴ Whether it is false and faint-hearted or just amusing that Adorno condemns Wagner as a renegade whilst at the same time deleting the word ‘revolution’ from his text, has to be decided by the reader.

More seriously, and quite surprisingly, Adorno’s argument reverses again, now from the ideological to the true elements of Wagner’s work, from regression into the past to progress into a utopian future. After all the critique in *Versuch über Wagner*, this reversal comes not only as a surprise, but as an enigma; and indeed no convincing interpretation of Adorno’s idea that there is utopian potential in Wagner’s music despite its regressive character, has hitherto been suggested. One easily gets the impression that after the reversal from the present into the past, Adorno arbitrarily posits this second dialectical reversal, or succumbs to a kind of dialectical mechanism. Such assumptions seem to be the only way to make sense of the last chapter of *Versuch über Wagner*. There the utopian motives condense; in the final sentence Adorno writes that Wagner’s orchestra, ‘by voicing the fears of helpless people, could ... renew the promise contained in the age-old protest of music: life without fear’.⁴⁵

43 ‘Diese Tiefe, als Refugium, birgt zugleich alles, was das Werk, “falsch und feig”, verriet’ (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 142; *In Search of Wagner*, 152, tr. modified).

44 ‘Diese Tiefe, als Refugium, ist zugleich das der Revolution, die das Werk, “falsch und feig”, verriet’ (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2928).

45 ‘Indem es [das Wagnersche Orchester] die Angst des hilflosen Menschen ausspricht, könnte es ... aufs Neue versprechen was der uralte Einspruch der Musik versprach: Ohne Angst Leben’ (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2931; *In Search of Wagner*, 156, tr. modified).

In view of this seemingly affirmative finale it is important to note that the utopian motives do not only appear at the end of *Versuch über Wagner*, but are methodically scattered over the text so that they remain in the background. The utopian motives are already introduced in the fifth chapter, however only briefly and allusively: when the 'artwork in its specifically Wagnerian form conceals the process of its production', Adorno writes, 'then its ideological concealment is also the measure of its progress'.⁴⁶ This theme is picked up and developed only two chapters later. Regressive and progressive traits, Adorno now explains, are entwined in the sense that the music drama, by concealing its production, takes on the ideological appearance of the world of commodities.⁴⁷ Here, too, Adorno takes great care not to let the utopian moments dominate. And considering the ending of *Versuch über Wagner* more closely, one notices that Adorno deliberately uses the subjunctive mood. In the final sentence he does not write that Wagner's orchestra 'renews the promise', but that it 'could ... renew the promise contained in the age-old protest of music'.

Only such a shift of perspective from Wagner's work to Adorno's critical procedure renders the dialectical reversal from regression to utopia interpretable. By scattering the utopian moments over the text, by juxtaposing them to particularly critical passages and by using subjunctive formulations where they threaten to come to the foreground, Adorno observes postulates of the logic of disintegration. Wagner's durational presence is undermined with the fleetingness of

46 'wenn aber das Kunstwerk in seiner spezifisch Wagnerischen Gestalt sich selber gegen den Prozeß der eigenen Produktion abblendet ... so ist eben seine ideologische Abblendung auch das Maß seines Fortschritts' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2864; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 84).

47 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2875-2876.

the moment in which Adorno lets the moments of truth appear. The concepts of fleetingness and of the moment are intentionally applied by Adorno at points that intimate truth. About the association of redemption and destruction in Wagner's endings, he writes: 'For transcendence it [phantasmagoria] substitutes the illusion of the enduring upward-soaring subject who fleetingly emerges at the moment of its annihilation'.⁴⁸ About death and awakening in *Tristan und Isolde*: 'Tristan's "How could that vision leave me?", which refers to the presentiment of nothingness as something, seizes hold of the moment in which complete negativity grasps in its determination the chimera of utopia'.⁴⁹ That utopian moments can only be extracted from Wagner's work through critical reception becomes most evident in the last formulations of *Versuch über Wagner*, which shall here be cited again and in full: 'Anyone able to snatch such metal from the deafening surge of the Wagnerian orchestra would be rewarded by its altered sound, for it would grant him that solace which, for all its rapture and phantasmagoria, it consistently refuses. By voicing the fears of helpless people, it could signal help for the helpless, however feebly and distortedly, and renew the promise contained in the age-old protest of music: life without fear'.⁵⁰ Obviously, this 'new Orpheus' who feels


48 'Anstelle der Transzendenz setzt sie [die Phantasmagorie] das Trugbild des fortlebenden, aufschwebenden Subjekts, das flüchtig entspringt im Augenblick von dessen Vernichtung' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2925; *In Search of Wagner*, 149, tr. modified).

49 'Das "wie schwand mir seine Ahnung" Tristans, das die Ahnung des Nichts als eine vom Etwas ausdrückt, hält den Augenblick fest, in dem die vollkommene Negativität im Umriss der eigenen Bestimmung die Chimäre der Utopie beschliesst' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2927; *In Search of Wagner*, 151).

50 'Wer es aber vermöchte, den Wogen des Wagnerschen Orchesters solches Metall zu entreissen, dem vermöchte sein veränderter Klang zu dem Trost zu verhelfen, den es mit

capable of changing the way we experience Wagner’s music and of banishing rapture and phantasmagoria is Adorno himself, the ‘passionately present’ materialist historian.

Table 1: Temporal-Dimensional Movements in Adorno and Wagner



Adorno’s Wagner Analyses

‘Passionate presentness’ does not dispense the materialist historian from the need to empirically substantiate the ideas arrived at through conceptual analysis. Adorno thereby relies wholly on temporal-analytical categories that he experimented with already in his early writings, repetition and variation (cf. chapter I.3). In order to understand how these concepts relate to the temporal-dimensional figure, it is useful to return briefly to the texts and fragments on Beethoven that were written at the same time as *Versuch über Wagner*. In ‘Zweite Nachtmusik’ (1937), Adorno construes via the concepts of

Rausch und Phantasmagorie beharrlich verweigert. Indem es die Angst des hilflosen Menschen ausspricht, könnte es den Hilflösen, wie immer schwach und verstellt, Hilfe bedeuten, und aufs neue versprechen was der uralte Einspruch der Musik versprach: Ohne Angst Leben’ (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2931; *In Search of Wagner*, 156, tr. modified).

repetition and variation a fairly schematic opposition of Wagner and Beethoven. Only in Beethoven, he writes, does the motive appear as ever new, and only in Beethoven is the motive subjected to genuinely variational principles even where it is repeated. In Wagner, by contrast, the motives are only apparently varied, but actually merely repeated with different degrees of intensity. Hence, Adorno concludes, the superiority of Beethoven's form.⁵¹

If one also consults the Beethoven fragments discussed at the beginning of the present chapter, it emerges that repetition and variation have a great deal of non-technical meaning in Adorno. In the fragment about the end of Beethoven's piano sonata op. 111, Adorno ascribed utopian power to remembering, the power to 'invoke what has not been as something past and non-existent'.⁵² Now, in the context of Adorno's analyses, one also needs to ask how such remembering proceeds musically. Adorno does not give an extensive answer to this question, but he indicates the direction an answer would take: 'The music's inherent sense of form changes what has preceded the leave-taking in such a way that it takes on a greatness, a presence in the past which, in music' – in *Wagner's* music, one could interject here – 'it could never achieve in the present'.⁵³ The 'inherent sense of form', the *Formsinn*, which is supposed to effect such change, is easily determined, for the second movement of op. 111 is a variational movement.

51 Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 52.

52 'als Vergangenes und Nicht-Seiendes aufzurufen ... was nicht da war' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 252; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 175).

53 'Der Formsinn der Musik verändert die dem Abschied vorausgehende Musik so, daß ihr eine Größe der Präsenz in der Vergangenheit zufällt, die sie als präsente in Musik nimmer zu behaupten vermöchte'. (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 252; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 175-176, tr. modified).

The opposition of Wagner and Beethoven shows that the concepts of repetition and variation are of enormous referential and semantic profundity in Adorno. Even at points in his work where these concepts do not stand in constellations with temporal-philosophical concepts, they are charged with meaning. Within these constellations, however, there exists a hierarchy. Adorno does not constitute philosophical and musicological concepts in mutual dependence, nor does he conclude inductively from the results of musical analysis. Rather, temporal-philosophical assumptions take priority over his analyses. In *Versuch über Wagner* this is camouflaged by the chapter structure. *Social Character*, the introductory chapter, is succeeded by four chapters with analytical focus. The substantive philosophical themes are introduced only from the sixth chapter onwards, as if they emerged from analytical observations. Most interestingly, however, Adorno did not select any of the analytical chapters for the pre-publication in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1939. He published these chapters only in 1952, with considerable revisions, whereas the chapters published in 1939 – *Social Character* (I), *Phantasmagoria* (VI), *God and Beggar* (IX) and *Chimera* (X) – were hardly altered. Thus four of the six philosophical chapters of *Versuch über Wagner* were ready for the press when the analytical chapters were still at draft stage. The following examination is dedicated to these chapters. In accordance with the structure of *Versuch über Wagner*, Adorno's analyses of form, motivic structure, harmony, and instrumentation shall be examined one by one. On all these levels shall be asked if and how Adorno succeeds in verifying in strictly analytical fashion Wagner's 'formal law', i.e. the concealment of the music's genesis; to demonstrate with reference to the score how the impression of pure presentness comes about; and to delineate in

technical categories the movement from pure presence via regression towards utopian content.

In order to prove that Wagner's form is constituted through repetition, Adorno devises a chain of deductions setting out, but eventually deviating far, from the analyses of Alfred Lorenz. In *Das Geheimnis der Form bei Richard Wagner* (1924), Lorenz attempted to expose Bar forms on all compositional levels in Wagner's work. In *Versuch über Wagner* and other texts from the 1930s, Adorno emphasises, or rather defends, the importance of Lorenz's contribution; in an obituary to Moritz Bauer, with whom both Adorno and Lorenz had studied, he even claims that Lorenz was 'the man... to whom current Wagner scholarship owes the most'.⁵⁴ Whether this is true must be left open, for Lorenz's analyses have always been a matter of contention. Yet there can be no doubt that Adorno owes the most to Lorenz when he claims that the secret of Wagner's form may be revealed with the concept of repetition.

In what way Wagner temporally shapes the Bar is exemplified by Adorno with reference to a section at the beginning of the second act of *Tannhäuser*. Adorno's description is very much in the spirit of Lorenz. Adorno stresses, however, what he calls the 'gestural' dimension of the Bar. The motive implemented in the first *Stollen* of the *Tannhäuser* example, Adorno says, is in the second *Stollen* only slightly varied, that is, extended in length and transposed to a higher register. As a whole the two *Stollen* and the *Abgesang* form a gesture made up of two complementary movements: expansion and return to the point of

⁵⁴ 'der Mann ..., dem die gegenwärtige musikalische Erkenntnis Wagners das meiste schuldig ist' (Adorno, *Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Februar 1933* [obituary to Moritz Bauer], GS 19, 235-237, here 236; cf. also *Notiz über Wagner* (1933), GS 18, 204-209, here 205).

departure. At the climactic point, on a second inversion dominant chord, the movement comes to a standstill.⁵⁵ From this description one can conclude that Adorno understands the Bar gesture as an internally repetitive, circular, quasi spatial movement that never extends beyond its radius. The Bar gesture can ‘be repeated and intensified but not actually “developed”’;⁵⁶ it revokes ‘itself and time’.⁵⁷ The principles of the Bar gesture – avoidance of development and eventual return to the point of departure – pertain not only to the local level, but also to large-scale formal dimensions. Adorno suggests this when he writes that ‘the final statement both of Wagner’s wisdom and his music’ are ‘the Rhine maidens who are playing with the gold at the start of the opera and receive it back at the end to play with’.⁵⁸ From this point in the argument it is only a small step to the topoi of spatialised presence and false eternity. If one is willing to accept Adorno’s semantic charging of the concept of repetition and to follow his deduction, one will consider the gap between the empirical and the conceptual to be bridged.

Adorno’s claim regarding the Bar gesture’s internal repetitiveness forms the pivot of his deduction and also its weak spot. Adorno knows well how daring it is to contend that Wagner constitutes form through repetition, for Wagner himself has anticipated this reproach. Yet, the ‘psychological variation’, i.e. the dramatic contextualisation of repeated musical material as described by Wagner in ‘Über die Ouvertüre’

55 Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2810-2811; *In Search of Wagner*, 39-40.

56 ‘[Die Bargeste kann] wiederholt und verstärkt, nicht aber eigentlich “entwickelt” werden’ (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner* Ts 2809; *In Search of Wagner*, 34).

57 ‘[Die Bargeste widerruft] sich selbst und die Zeit’ (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2811; *In Search of Wagner*, 40, tr. modified).

58 ‘Die Rheintöchter, die zu Beginn mit dem Golde spielen und es am Ende zum Spielen zurückerhalten, sind der letzte Schluß von Wagners Weisheit und Musik.’ (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2811; *In Search of Wagner*, 40, tr. modified).

(1841),⁵⁹ is not granted the status of genuine variation by Adorno. A particularly incisive critique can be found in the 1952 version of *Versuch über Wagner*: 'The repeated gestures founder amidst the currents from which only a transformation could rescue them: transformation by virtue of which they would cease to be gestures. Thus the attempt to constitute forms by repeating expression-laden gestures is a blind alley. Every repetition of gestures evades the necessity to create musical time; they order themselves, as it were, in space ... and fall out of the temporal continuum that they seem to establish'.⁶⁰

What leads into an impasse on the level of form will hardly be more successful on the level of motivic and melodic structure. As can be expected, Adorno plays Beethoven against Wagner, developing against psychological variation, mastery of time in the symphony through motivic-thematic work against filling of time through repetition of gestures in the music drama. Adorno's critique of the infinite melody is a case in point; again, this example proves the central role of the concept of repetition. The infinite melody is, according to Adorno, certainly not infinite, but 'that which one can remember'.⁶¹ It forms Wagner's technical concession to the listener, of whom he does not dare

59 Richard Wagner, 'Über die Ouvertüre', *Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen in sechzehn Bänden I*, Leipzig 1911-1916, 194-206.

60 'Die wiederholten Gesten versinken in dem Strömen, aus dem einzig Verwandlung sie erheben könnte: Verwandlung, kraft welcher sie aufhörten, Gesten zu sein. So führt der Versuch, die Form durch Wiederholung ausdrucksgehaltener Gesten zu konstituieren, allenthalben ins Ausweglose. Alle Wiederholung von Gesten entzieht sich der Notwendigkeit, musikalische Zeit zu stiften; sie ordnen sich gleichsam im Raum ... und fallen aus dem zeitlichen Kontinuum heraus, zu dem sie sich doch scheinbar zusammenfügen.' (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 34-35; *In Search of Wagner*, 37, tr. modified).

61 'was man behalten kann' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2819).

to demand productive remembering, i.e. active confrontation with structures that change whilst passing through the temporal dimensions. Thus Wagner forsakes whole strata of compositional devices, and that means in Adorno: the devices of developing variation. All that is left for him are 'repetitions, spun-out continuations and over-extensions'.⁶² Accordingly, the infinite melody is 'mostly built through that kind of sequence which is rather repetition than development and thus remains more finite than it appears. The infinite melody dares to keep on going only because it knows that it will never change'.⁶³

All analytical examples cited so far illustrate only how Wagner creates through repetition that phantasmagorical presence which, severed from the temporal-dimensional continuum, regresses necessarily into the mythic past. Yet Adorno does not fail to provide an example of progressive composition amidst the regressive context of Wagner's work. He chooses the prelude of *Tristan und Isolde*. Its first fourteen bars constitute a Bar with two *Stollen* of four bars length and an *Abgesang* of six bars. The property that transforms the Bar into a gesture, namely the sequential repetition of the motives, is there. Moreover, the apparently chromatic sequential units, as Adorno scrupulously proves, refer to the tonal centre of a minor. Tonality, however, warrants the possibility of repetition (cf. chapter I.3, IV.2); in the chapter entitled *Motive in Versuch über Wagner*, Adorno even goes as far as calling tonality – inelegantly, and hence only in the 1937/1938 version – a

62 'Wiederholungen, Fortspinnungen und Überdehnungen' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2820; *In Search of Wagner*, 57).

63 '[Die unendliche Melodie ist] meist durch jene Sequenzen hergestellt, die mehr als Wiederholungen denn als eigentliche Fortsetzungen ansprechen und darum endlicher bleiben, als sie sich geben. Die unendliche Melodie wagt nur darum, immerzu weiter zu

gestural-regressive device.⁶⁴ Thus, the structure of the beginning of *Tristan* is repetitive in a twofold sense. But exactly the contradiction between chromatic sequence and tonal unification entails, according to Adorno, the variation of crucial intervals: the minor sixth in the initial motive is augmented in the first sequence, which is retained in the *Abgesang*, but varied again through inserting another falling semitone step. The only matter that remains unclear in this otherwise very convincing example is why Adorno makes no mention of the rhythmic variation of the initial motive and the phrase extension resulting from the insertion of the falling semitone in the *Abgesang*. Probably Adorno did not want to point out that variations of this kind only occur between the *Stollen* and the *Abgesang*, whilst the second *Stollen* forms in terms of rhythm and phrase structure an exact repetition of the first.

Adorno's analysis of the first bars of *Tristan und Isolde* is not just a compulsory contribution to the musico-literary genre of the *Tristan Analysis* that has been flourishing for more than a century now. Rather, Adorno's analysis serves two important strategic functions. The first one concerns a historiographic cause. By emphasising the dialectic of chromaticism and diatonicism, and by exemplifying how Wagner's use of the constructional principles inherent in tonality started a movement that was eventually to contribute to the end of tonality as a formal device, Adorno assigns to Wagner a prime role in the musico-historical trajectory that he believes to lead to dodecaphony. This is confirmed by Adorno's self-quotation in the context of the *Tristan* analysis of his text *Der dialektische Komponist* (1934),⁶⁵ wherein exactly these constructional

gehen, weil sie sich als unabänderlich dieselbe weiss.' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2820; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 57).

⁶⁴ Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2816.

⁶⁵ Adorno, *Der dialektische Komponist*, GS 17, 198-203.

principles are exposed.⁶⁶ The second function of the Tristan analysis concerns the course of the argument presented in *Versuch über Wagner*. If there are passages in Wagner's work where harmonic principles function as a corrective to the repetitive motivic structure, then these harmonic principles form the progressive element of Wagner's technique. Adorno states this straightforwardly: 'The melodic element stands under the spell of Wagner's resignation; his productive element is sound' with its 'two dimensions, harmony and colour'.⁶⁷

The strategy to present Wagner's harmony and instrumentation as the progressive element of his technique at the expense of his treatment of motives, seems to bring Adorno into a double bind that he can only break with sophistic means. In the context of the theory of pure presence Adorno wrote that the primacy of harmonic and instrumental colour in Wagner was due to the phantasmagorical intention.⁶⁸ The concept of phantasmagoria, however, implies spatialised presence, false eternity and regression. Thus it is highly contradictory to claim that harmony and sound should be Wagner's progressive element. Yet exactly this contradiction is exploited by Adorno. In both dimensions of sound, namely harmony and instrumentation, 'Wagner covertly opposes time; through sound, time seems transfixed in space'.⁶⁹ The time of the music drama, however, to which Wagner opposes in the

⁶⁶ Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2816.

⁶⁷ 'Das melodische Element steht im Banne von Wagners Resignation; sein produktives ist der Klang [mit seinen] beiden Dimensionen, der harmonischen und der koloristischen.' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2834; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 63).

⁶⁸ Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2866.

⁶⁹ '[Im Klang] opponiert Wagner insgeheim der Zeit; durch Klang scheint Zeit in den Raum festgebannt.' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2834; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 63).

spatial medium of sound, is on the formal and motivic level repetitively structured. Thus as Wagner's music 'regresses into the non-temporal medium of sound, its own remoteness from time allows it to develop largely unhindered by the tendencies' – Adorno means the tendencies of repetition – 'that constantly disturb its structures within the dimension of time'.⁷⁰

With the introduction of harmony and instrumentation, the movement from pure presence through regression towards progressive elements is completed on the level of analysis too – thanks to a rather arbitrary dialectical move. It only remains for Adorno to extend some lines of argument in such a way that they converge in Schoenberg. Against Ernst Kurth, who in *Romantische Harmonik* (1923) fastened Wagner firmly to the nineteenth century, Adorno argues that in Wagner dissonances were not absolute sound effects [*Klangwirkungen*], as for instance in impressionism; Kurth's seemingly modern notion of energetic harmony [*energetische Harmonie*] were 'deeply reactionary'; and in that Kurth defined the relationship of dissonance and consonance as one of tension and resolution, he was in fact holding onto 'the academic concept of the non-harmonic'.⁷¹ Adorno, by contrast, avers that the harmonic language of the late Wagner was at many points truly dynamic. Not only were the dissonances emancipated from their resolutions, not only did the accidentals gain independence, but the dissonances themselves formed hierarchies, criticising and

70 '[Wenn Musik] ins zeitfremde Medium des Klanges [regrediert], so gestattet dafür gerade dessen eigene Zeitferne, es weithin zu entwickeln, ungehemmt von den Tendenzen, die in der Zeitdimension seine Gebilde wieder und wieder verstören.' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2834; *In Search of Wagner*, 63, tr. modified).

incapacitating the resolutions. Adorno substantiates this with a great many passages from Wagner's work since *Tristan und Isolde*; he lays particular emphasis upon motives such as the sleep motive from the *Ring* – which, ironically, predates *Tristan* – that 'resemble magic spells capable of enticing all subsequent harmonic discoveries from the twelve-tone continuum'.⁷²

The second aspect that Adorno addresses under the rubric of sound, Wagner's instrumentation, is even more remote from time and the repetitive tendencies of Wagner's motivic treatment than harmony, and can therefore be developed even more freely. Accordingly, Adorno organises his account in wide extremes. On the one hand, he writes, sharply focusing on Schoenberg, there has before Wagner never been instrumentation 'that makes colour a productive part of the work's construction'.⁷³ In terms of instrumentation, Adorno says, Wagner was ahead of himself, and reached a degree of subjective freedom that was realised on other compositional levels only by the Second Viennese School. On the other hand, exactly the means of instrumentation, along with the repetitive motivic structure, were responsible for the rapturous presentness of Wagner's music. Consequentially the theorem of the concealment of production is directly related to Wagner's instrumentation; 'Wagner's tendency', writes Adorno, 'is to render

71 'Konservatoriumsbegriff des Harmoniefremden' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2835-2836; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 65. Cf. also Adorno, *Ernst Kurths Musikpsychologie*, GS 19, 350-358).

72 'gleichen Zauberformeln, fähig, alle späteren harmonischen Funde aus dem Kontinuum der zwölf Töne hervorzulocken' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2834; *In Search of Wagner*, 63, tr. modified).

73 'als produktiven Anteil der Farbe an der Konstruktion' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner*, Ts 2850; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 71).

inaudible whatever might give a clue to the origins of sound'.⁷⁴ Evidently Adorno reiterates at the end of his analytical reflections the central argument employed to prove the ideological character of Wagner's music; not unlike the ending of *Versuch über Wagner*, or indeed the ending of the *Ring*, the ending of Adorno's analyses leaves open whether the circular movement is being closed or broken.

On the whole, Adorno's theory of temporal-dimensional movements in Wagner's work is highly original. Undoubtedly, it opens up novel musico-philosophical and hermeneutical perspectives. The temporal-dimensional figure defines very precisely the movements that Adorno designates vaguely in the early writings with the concept of 'dynamics'. Conceptual clusters such as presence/moment/transitoriness and repetition/variation are now mediated. Regression and progress, which Adorno then employed somewhat arbitrarily, are now dialectised and are assigned clear functions in the categorial framework of the logic of disintegration. Despite the problems in the application to empirical material, the logic of disintegration itself proves increasingly to be a systematic temporal-philosophical conception inspired by music, associating a metaphysics of transitoriness and a negatively temporalised epistemology in the most productive way.

However, the dialectical operations in *Versuch über Wagner* and the other texts examined above do not always run smoothly, particularly at the points of reversal. Often they are mechanistic or even arbitrary. This is most evident in the analytical sections. Wagner and Beethoven, and repetition and variation, are juxtaposed all-too-schematically. Adorno's comparatively uncritical adoption of Lorenz's formalistic analyses,

74 '[Wagner macht]' tendenziell alle Momente der Entstehung des Klangs unhörbar' (Adorno, *Ms Versuch über Wagner* Ts 2861; for a translation of the revised text from 1952 cf. *In Search of Wagner*, 82).

without the help of which he would hardly have managed to bridge the gap between the conceptual and the empirical, can in no way be justified. The most serious shortcoming in philosophical terms is that the moments of truth appear dogmatically posited, in spite of all Adorno's attempts to present them as consequences of the process of disintegration induced by materialist critique. In the following phase – the phase of the 'classical works' *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, *Minima Moralia* and *Philosophy of New Music* – such weaknesses of the dialectical method are evened out. As the next chapter will show, the temporal-philosophical model of *Versuch über Wagner* is of crucial importance for these writings, although the *Versuch* appears in their light to be just that: a *Versuch*.

Chapter III

Modernity as Eternal Recurrence of the Same (1941-1948)

From 1941-1948, Adorno contests issues pertaining to historical-political and aesthetic modernity, drawing heavily on Marxist themes. This entails changes in his temporal-philosophical model that may be analysed cogently with reference to Nietzsche, who is now drawn into Adorno's critique, and to Freud, whose influence could already be felt in the early version of *Versuch über Wagner*. To account for modernity, Adorno links temporal concepts by both these thinkers in a critical constellation. Nietzsche furnishes the mytho-poetic formula 'eternal recurrence of the same', and Freud the concept of repetitive compulsion. The following analysis falls in three sections: the first investigates *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1942-1944; co-authored by Max Horkheimer) and *Minima Moralia* (1944-1947), the second deals with *Composing for the Films* (1944; co-authored by Hanns Eisler), the chapters on the culture industry in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and some related articles, and the third turns to *Philosophy of New Music* (1941/1948) and some Beethoven fragments from 1941-1948.

Eternal Recurrence of the Same in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia*

The meaning of 'eternal recurrence of the same' as a critical constellation of concepts is best demonstrated via a dissection into elements. With the concept of the 'same', Adorno expresses in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia* that nothing new occurs in modernity, that the principle of exchange becomes universal, that all and everything is rendered fungible. The concept of 'eternity' denotes the hopelessness of the modern condition, and the concept of 'recurrence' – or repetition, as Adorno usually writes – specifies its form of constitution and internal temporal structure. Each of the three conceptual elements of the constellation denotes in Adorno a certain aspect of repetition, not only that of 'recurrence'. The constellation as a whole is, as the following exposition will show, essentially determined through the moment of repetitive *compulsion*. This, as the determining concept, blends semantically with the constellation which is determined by it; thus the concept of repetitive compulsion does not appear in the title of the present chapter.

Repetitive compulsion was described by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) as a phenomenon that can be observed in the play of children¹ and as a symptom of traumatic-neurotic victims of war and accidents.² It occurs in dreams, in the imagination and in actions as a stereotypical repetition of unpleasurable experiences. The subject gains no libidinous stimulation from repetitive compulsion. Rather repetitive compulsion pushes the subject into anxiety, which is sometimes

1 Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, tr. James Strachey, New York 1961, 8-11.

2 Ibid., 6-8.

discharged in the form of aggression against the self or the environment. Apart from displeasure, anxiety, aggression and its general regressive-circular character, repetitive compulsion is characterised by its destructive tendency. Freud took repetitive compulsion very seriously indeed; he considered it to be 'more primitive, more elemental, more instinctual than the pleasure principle'.³ Attempts at theoretical explanation led Freud to his third model of the psyche, which is built on the dualism of Eros and Thanatos, or of love drive and death drive. Through its association with the concept of the death drive, repetitive compulsion forms one of the pillars of his late cultural criticism, where it typically serves to account for subjective experience in modernity.

In Adorno's writings, all the Freudian connotations of repetitive compulsion are adopted and blended with the concept of eternal recurrence of the same to form a potent critical device. They are not applied to the whole of modernity as in Freud, but to the decades marked by a fully developed capitalist economy. This can be proved philologically: in the Kierkegaard book, the concept of repetitive compulsion does not surface, although the concept of repetition abounds there. In *Versuch über Wagner* it can be found only once, in a passage that Adorno inserted in 1952 in order to make the *Versuch* consistent with the writings from the 1940s. Crucially, this insert establishes technical links between Wagner and modernity.⁴ In a text on Bartók from 1930, the concept appears prominently,⁵ and in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia* – books that explicitly thematise

3 Ibid., 17.

4 Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 35; *In Search of Wagner*, 37-38.

5 Adorno, *Bartók*, GS 18, 291-294, here 292, 293.

modernity – it is given a central status in tandem with the concept of eternal recurrence of the same.

Although the conceptual core of Adorno's temporal-philosophical model changes in its application to modernity, it is important to note that structurally the Wagner paradigm prevails. Adorno still reconstructs repetitive-circular movements which give a false image of eternity and therefore regress into the mythical. In his writings from the 1940s, however, Adorno seems to abandon all hope for a change of the historical condition and to restrict his intellectual efforts to branding it as false. There no longer seem to be points – or rather moments – when the mythic circle breaks. Rather the circle closes hermetically to form an eternal recurrence of the same; modernity regresses into myth, consciousness becomes increasingly damaged, art and thought become tautologous.

Adorno's notion that modernity regresses into myth rests on two complex premises. The first is the dialectical circle of regression and progress around which *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is constructed: 'myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology'.⁶ The second is Adorno's definition of myth as the eternally recurring ever-same: 'Each of the mythic figures is programmed always to do the same thing. Each is a figure of repetition'.⁷ The conclusion that the same

6 'schon der Mythos ist Aufklärung; und: Aufklärung schlägt in Mythologie zurück' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 16; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, xvi, tr. modified).

7 'Eine jegliche der mythischen Figuren ist gehalten, immer wieder das Gleiche zu tun. Jede besteht in Wiederholung' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 77; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 58. Cf. also *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 31-33; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 14-17 and *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 314 (omitted in Cumming's translation from 1972 because this part of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was first published in GS 3 in 1980)).

recurs eternally in modernity is concretised and further supported by Adorno and Horkheimer via Marxist assumptions. 'Being', they write, 'is apprehended under the aspect of manufacture and administration. Everything ... is converted into the repeatable, replaceable process'.⁸ In other words: to guarantee smooth flux of commodity exchange, social and cognitive structures must comply with the ever-same economic cycles. Consciousness is thereby reduced to experiences that are most aptly described in the so-called myths of repetition, the myths of Tantalus and Sisyphus.

This directs us to Adorno's second thesis on modernity: 'consciousness becomes increasingly damaged'. Tantalus and Sisyphus are allegories of damaged consciousness; they suffer from repetitive compulsion,⁹ which according to Adorno forms the symptom and the cause of the mythic and, as a consequence of the dialectic of myth and modernity, also the modern subject. Like the experience of spare time as boredom, repetitive compulsion is considered to be a 'reflex to a production-rhythm imposed heteronomously on the subject, compulsively maintained even in the weary pauses'.¹⁰ Mimicking the ever-same rhythm of the machine, unable to muster sufficient powers of resistance, the subject 'wakes to its own futility in the face of the bad eternity of time itself. In the clock's over-loud ticking we hear the aeons' mockery for the span of our existence. ... In his state of complete powerlessness, the individual perceives the time it has left to live as a

8 'Das Sein wird unter dem Aspekt der Verarbeitung und Verwaltung angeschaut. Alles wird zum wiederholbaren, ersetzbaren Prozeß' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 103; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 84).

9 Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 77; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 58.

brief reprieve. It does not expect to live his life to the end'.¹¹ Thus, repetitive compulsion is, according to Adorno, the latent 'time disease' of the late-bourgeois subject, a failed attempt at constituting subjectivity through repetition of abstract temporal quanta.¹²

Adorno's third thesis – 'art and thought become tautologous' – could be explicated with reference to Adorno's interpretation of the Sirens episode in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. More interesting in our context than this passage, however, is a short text in *Minima Moralia* on the new in Wagner and Baudelaire. *Tristan und Isolde*, a music drama that received comparatively positive treatment in *Versuch über Wagner*, is in this text condemned as 'a soaring monument to repetitive

10 'Reflex auf den dem Subjekt heteronom auferlegten Rhythmus der Produktion, der auch in den müden Pausen zwangshaft festgehalten ist' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 199; *Minima Moralia* [English], tr. Edmund Jephcott, London 1974, 175, tr. modified).

11 'erwacht zu seiner Vergeblichkeit ... im Angesicht der schlechten Unendlichkeit von Zeit selber. Im überlauten Ticken der Uhr vernimmt man den Spott der Äonen auf die Spanne des eigenen Daseins. ... Im Stande der vollendeten Ohnmacht scheint dem Individuum, was ihm noch zu leben gelassen ward, als kurze Galgenfrist. Es erwartet nicht, sein Leben aus sich zu Ende zu leben' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 188; *Minima Moralia* [English], 165).

12 Michael Theunissen, a philosopher and theologian loosely associated with the Frankfurt School, covertly adopts Adorno's description of modernity as eternal recurrence of the same in his collection of articles entitled *Negative Theologie der Zeit* (Michael Theunissen, *Negative Theologie der Zeit*, Frankfurt am Main 1991). For reasons of empirical verification, Theunissen evaluates material about time diseases gathered by clinical psychiatrists in the 1920s and 1930s. Particularly the interviews with depressive or schizophrenic patients that also experience repetitive compulsive disorder show the most astonishing affinity to Adorno's criticism of repetition. Like Adorno, Theunissen is polemical about Nietzsche, and of course about poststructuralist Nietzscheans such as for instance Gilles Deleuze, who advocates an influential affirmative interpretation of repetition (Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, Paris 1968; English translation: *Difference and Repetition*, tr. Paul Patton, London 1994).

compulsion'.¹³ This shift of meaning is yet another example of Adorno's attempts to fine-tune his Wagner interpretation with the writings of the 1940s. This enables Adorno to couple Wagner with Baudelaire. The new which the Baudelaire reader may experience, that which, as Adorno puts it, 'flashes' at certain points in his work, 'is itself repetition';¹⁴ the new becomes 'in its sudden apparition a compulsive return of the old, not unlike that in traumatic neuroses'.¹⁵ Thus Wagner and Baudelaire are, via the concept of repetitive compulsion, characterised as key figures at the dawn of late-bourgeois modernism; regarding both, Adorno concludes: 'To the blinded vision'– Adorno here exploits the synonymy of *Blendwerk* and phantasmagoria – 'the veil of temporal succession is rent to reveal the archetypes of perpetual sameness: this is why the discovery of the new is satanic, eternal recurrence as damnation'.¹⁶

This selection of citations from *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia* suggests that Adorno no longer believes in the capability of the aesthetic to show a way out of the infernal circles of modernity. This attitude of his also extends to thought and scholarship. 'Inevitably', he asserts in the introduction to *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 'thought

13 'das ragende Monument des Wiederholungszwangs' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 270; *Minima Moralia* [English], 237, tr. modified).

14 'was [bei Baudelaire] aufblitzt, ... ist selber Wiederholung' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 270; *Minima Moralia* [English], 236).

15 '[im] jähen Erscheinen [wird das Neue] zur zwangshaften Rückkehr des Alten, nicht unähnlich den traumatischen Neurosen' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 270; *Minima Moralia* [English], 236).

16 'Dem Geblendeten zerreißt der Schleier der zeitlichen Sukzession vor den Archetypen der Immergleichheit: darum ist die Entdeckung des Neuen satanisch, ewige Wiederkehr als Verdammnis' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 270; *Minima Moralia* [English], 236, tr. modified).

becomes a commodity'.¹⁷ Scholarship dances to the unvarying rhythm of the exchange principle; since Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, intellectual work has been confined to a circle that Adorno defines as mythic-regressive through explicit comparison with the magic circles used in shamanistic rites.¹⁸ In this passage on Kant, upon whom Adorno here calls as a crown witness for modern scholarship as a whole, he also states that the philosophical judgment 'recognises nothing new, since it always merely recalls what reason has always deposited in the object'.¹⁹ The 'entirely pure reason'²⁰ of positivism, then, subjects itself completely to the strict measures dictated by modern society: 'Factuality wins the day, cognition is restricted to its repetition, and thought becomes mere tautology'.²¹

It is exactly this insistence in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia* on the bleakness of the modern condition – cast here in temporal-philosophical concepts – that has caused critics concern,²²

17 'in dem unentrinnbar der Gedanke zur Ware [wird]' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 11-12; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, xi-xii, tr. modified).

18 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 42-43; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 26.

19 'das philosophische Urteil [erkennt] ... nichts Neues, da es stets bloß wiederholt, was Vernunft schon immer in den Gegenstand gelegt' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 42-43; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 26).

20 'ganz reine Vernunft' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 139; *Minima Moralia* [English], 123, tr. modified).

21 'Das Tatsächliche behält recht, die Erkenntnis beschränkt sich auf seine Wiederholung, der Gedanke macht sich zur bloßen Tautologie' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 44; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 27, tr. modified).

22 Cf. Heinz Röttges, 'Nietzsche und die Dialektik der Aufklärung', Berlin/New York 1972; Peter Pütz, 'Nietzsche im Lichte der kritischen Theorie', *Nietzsche-Studien* 3 (1974), 103-114; Reinhart Maurer, 'Nietzsche und die kritische Theorie', *Nietzsche-Studien* 10/11 (1981/1982), 34-79. Cf. for reactions to Habermas's article Willem van Reijen and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, eds., *Vierzig Jahre Flaschenpost: Die „Dialektik der Aufklärung“ 1947-1987*, Frankfurt am Main 1987; Herbert Schnädelbach, 'Die Aktualität der Dialektik

particularly Jürgen Habermas,²³ since the republication of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in 1969. Yet, even the palette of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* – and of *Minima Moralia* – does not contain only black and shades of grey. Particularly in this period of Adorno's development, determinate negation is a potent device indeed. It is supposed to withstand the

der Aufklärung', *Die Aktualität der Dialektik der Aufklärung*, ed. Harry Kunneman und Hent de Vries, Frankfurt am Main 1989, 15-35; Josef Früchtel, 'Radikalität und Konsequenz in der Wahrheitstheorie: Nietzsche als Herausforderung für Adorno und Habermas', *Nietzsche-Studien* 19 (1990), 431-461; Karin Bauer, *Adorno's Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner*, Albany, NY 1999.

- 23 In an influential article from 1983, Habermas argues that Adorno and Horkheimer perceive cultural modernity 'from a similar experiential horizon' and 'with the same heightened sensibility', but also 'with the same cramped optics' as Nietzsche (Jürgen Habermas, 'The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno', *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, tr. Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge 1987, 106-130, here 129). Their notion that enlightenment regresses into myth is, according to Habermas, 'no less risky than Nietzsche's similarly posed diagnosis of nihilism' (ibid., 110). As a consequence, Habermas believes, the project of enlightenment as a whole is jeopardised (ibid., 116). Habermas concludes that Adorno and Horkheimer's critique eventually defeats itself, retaining merely one intention: to expose the falseness of reality through determinate negation (ibid., 127-128). In the concluding section of his article, Habermas himself discloses the strategic motive of his critique of Adorno and Horkheimer, which is to entrap *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in aporias that only his own theory, the theory of communicative action, may dissolve (ibid., 129-130). The argument presented in the present chapter can be defended against Habermas without much difficulty. Habermas applies an aesthetic concept of time derived from Mallarmé to both Nietzsche and Adorno (ibid., 122-123), thus levelling the differences between their theories of time. Eternal recurrence of the same and regressive movements in general, to mention the most important example in the present context, are in Nietzsche affirmed and in Adorno negated. If Adorno's concepts of time really squared with Nietzsche's, Adorno would need to define presence positively through repetition, which would entail an understanding of presence as durational. As a consequence, the dimension of future would close. Both is avoided by Adorno (cf. chapter II).

cognitive reification of time and, for moments of experience, to overcome that presence which the late-bourgeois subject experiences as eternal recurrence of the same. The crucial difference to the writings from the 1930s is that the dialectical operations are now of a new kind and quality. Determinate negation and the concept of the moment, which were only superficially associated in *Versuch über Wagner*, are now mediated. The metaphysical implications of the concept of critique are now derived from the constitutive moments of the object. For Adorno's project of a negative temporalisation of dialectics, this is indeed crucial progress.

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia* the moments of truth are, as in *Versuch über Wagner*, scattered over the text and – in *Minima Moralia* – placed at its end. Adorno still holds on to the principle that truth may be experienced in critical practice. He now stresses that untruth disintegrates only when it is not repeated by thought, but processed by the philosophical critic.²⁴ The following oft-cited passage in *Minima Moralia* is to be understood in this sense, and not as a document of self-defeating scepticism: 'There is no longer beauty or consolation except in the gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and in unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding fast to the possibility of what is better'.²⁵ That which is 'better', however, may only be gained in keen attentiveness to the object, as the excursus on the *Odyssey* in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* proves. Here Adorno sees the force counteracting myth within myth itself, in the opposition of its content and its formal means of representation. The agonising scene when

24 Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 142; *Minima Moralia* [English], 125.

25 'keine Schönheit und kein Trost mehr' als 'in dem Blick, der aufs Grauen geht, ihm standhält und im ungemilderten Bewußtsein der Negativität die Möglichkeit des Besseren festhält' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 26; *Minima Moralia* [English], 25).

Odysseus returns to Ithaca, Adorno argues, is rendered by Homer with cold detachment, with a 'gaze falling on horror and withstanding it'; yet in the narrative caesura that closes the scene, 'the semblance of freedom lights up which since then civilisation has not wholly succeeded in putting out'.²⁶

The dialectic of *ἀγών*²⁷ and freedom is a systematic motif that Adorno extends further on in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, in a section entitled *Elements of Anti-Semitism*, to the sphere of the animalistic. The words Adorno uses are somewhat cryptic, but it is none the less evident that he attempts to cast *ἀγών* and freedom in materialistic terms: 'In the death struggle of the creature, at the opposite pole from freedom, freedom still shines out as the thwarted destiny of matter'.²⁸ Such openly anti-Heideggerian ideas are inspired by Hegel's 'passing of the passing' (*Vergehen des Vergehens*),²⁹ which in Adorno, most importantly, occurs only for the span of a moment. This figure of a 'passing of the passing' that itself passes is of the utmost significance for Adorno's writings since *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. It is a concept of redemption that

26 '[blitzt] der Schein von Freiheit' auf, 'den Zivilisation seitdem nicht mehr ganz ausgelöscht hat' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 98; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 79, tr. modified).

27 The Ancient Greek term is employed because of its semantic scope. In contrast to the concept of agony, which denotes passive suffering, *ἀγών* stands for a more active dealing with death, an attempt at overcoming its force. Also, the Ancient Greek term serves to imply the historical depth of the dialectic of *ἀγών* and freedom, which cannot be elaborated here for reasons of space.

28 'Im Todeskampf der Kreatur, am äußersten Gegenpol der Freiheit, scheint die Freiheit unwiderstehlich als die durchkreuzte Bestimmung der Materie durch' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 208; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 183).

29 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, TWA Bd. 5, 141. The standard English translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* renders 'Vergehen des Vergehens' as 'the ceasing-to-be of the ceasing-to-be' (Hegel's *Science of Logic*, tr. A. V. Milner, London 1969, 130-131).

Adorno had already applied to art in the early writings under the Benjaminian title 'mortification of the works' (cf. chapter I.3). It surfaces briefly in *Minima Moralia* as 'impulse to self-destruction inherent in works of art'.³⁰ The passage on death and awakening in *Versuch über Wagner* is also to be mentioned in this context (cf. chapter II.2). Exactly this concept of redemption underlies Adorno's definition of the purpose of philosophy in *Towards the End (Zum Ende)*, the last fragment of *Minima Moralia*: 'The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption'.³¹

Eternal Recurrence of the Same in the Culture Industry

In Adorno's analysis of the Culture Industry, the constellation of repetitive compulsion and eternal recurrence of the same is pivotal too. Culture Industry is 'the imploring repetition of industrial production, a succession of the ever-same in the course of time, the allegory of high capitalism'.³² Its ritual is 'that of Tantalus'.³³ Yet, in order to determine how Adorno integrates the theory of the Culture Industry into his

30 Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 84-85; *Minima Moralia* [English], 75.

31 'Philosophie, wie sie im Angesicht der Verzweiflung einzig noch zu verantworten ist, wäre der Versuch, alle Dinge so zu betrachten, wie sie vom Standpunkt der Erlösung aus sich darstellten' (Adorno, *Minima Moralia* [German], 283; *Minima Moralia* [English], 247).

32 'die beschwörende Wiederholung des industriellen Verfahrens, wo Immergleiches in der Zeit sich folgt, die Allegorie des Hochkapitalismus' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 308; omitted in Cumming's translation).

33 'das des Tantalus' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 162; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 140, tr. modified).

temporal-philosophical paradigm, we need to go some way back. The conceptual basis lies in ideas that first surface in his article on 'Gebrauchsmusik' from 1924. In this early text, Adorno addressed 'the exteriority of dumbly flowing sonorous processes, which are dictated by chance', i.e. compulsory mimesis of contingent temporal structures; of movements which spin in 'dead regularity' around the self, i.e. circularity; of 'presence' which 'lies only in the time in which it sounds'; and of essentially static organisation of time, concealed by a seemingly dynamic surface (cf. chapter I.3). In this text from 1924, one can easily recognise fundamental traits of the Wagner paradigm and the constellation of repetitive compulsion and eternal recurrence of the same.

In later texts on the Culture Industry, the Wagner paradigm is adopted completely.³⁴ The temporal dimensions, Adorno argues, are manipulated in the Culture Industry in much the same way as in Wagner. In *Das Schema der Massenkultur* (1942), a posthumously published appendix to *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno states that the moment is in the Culture Industry 'reduced to abstract presence'.³⁵ In the same text, Adorno also employs the theorem of the subjective independence from the past: 'The poor memory of the consumer forms the point of departure [in the Culture Industry]: no-one is deemed capable of remembering or concentrating upon something that is not

34 The first to point out that the theory of Culture Industry is rooted in the Wagner text was Andreas Huyssen. Cf. Andreas Huyssen, 'Adorno in Reverse: From Hollywood to Richard Wagner', *New German Critique* 29 (spring/summer 1983), 8-38.

35 'Augenblick ... wird auf die abstrakte Gegenwart reduziert' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 307, omitted in Cumming's translation).

immediately presented to him'.³⁶ The theorem of the objective independence from the past through concealment of the production of music was applied by Adorno to the Culture Industry for the first time in 1952: 'The flawed nature of the whole conception of the music drama is nowhere more evident than where it comes closest to its own foundations: in the concealment of the process of production ... on which the culture industry is based'.³⁷

The complementary theorems of the subjective and objective impossibility of the future remain implicit in the texts on the Culture Industry. Here too, however, one can reasonably assume an analogy with *Versuch über Wagner*, since an emphatic concept of change, i.e. a concept of change that would affect the dimension of future, presupposes in Adorno a productive relation to the past, which he does not believe to exist in the Culture Industry. This assumption is corroborated by the fact that the temporal-dimensional movements which Adorno constructs in his critique of the Culture Industry do not incorporate the dimension of future. Apparently he is not willing to give as much credit to the Culture Industry as to Wagner; he labels Culture Industry, concisely, as 'the central agency of regression'.³⁸ Only at one point in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* does he concede a moment of truth to


36 'Ausgegangen wird [in der Massenkultur] von der Gedächtnisschwäche der Konsumenten: keinem wird zugetraut, daß er sich an etwas erinnere, auf etwas anderes konzentriere, als was ihm im Augenblick geboten wird' (Ibid. , omitted in Cumming's translation).

37 'Nirgends zeigt das Brüchige der Konzeption des Musikdramas sich schärfer als dort, wo sie ihrem eigenen Grunde, der Verdeckung des Produktionsvorgangs, am nächsten kommt..., auf der dann die Kulturindustrie eingestandenermaßen beruht' (Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 103; *In Search of Wagner*, 108, tr. modified).

38 'Zentralstelle für Regression' (Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 332, omitted in Cumming's translation).

the Culture Industry. Since the subjects ‘form, after all, the limit of reification’, he reasons, somewhat enigmatically, Culture Industry ‘needs to administer them repeatedly in bad infinity: the hopeless effort of such repetition is the only trace of hope that repetition may be futile, that human beings cannot be administered’.³⁹

Table 2: Adorno’s Use of the Concept of Repetition



To understand the adaptation of the Wagner paradigm for the Culture Industry, it is important to note that none of the passages quoted above stems from the early version of *Versuch über Wagner*. The crucial links were formulated later, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* or in the revisions of the *Versuch* in 1952. However, since the theory of time in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, as has been proved in the last section, is an association of the Wagner paradigm and the constellation of repetitive compulsion and eternal recurrence of the same, it follows that the specific difference of the temporal-philosophical paradigms of *Versuch über Wagner* and *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is also valid for the theories of

39 ‘[Die Massenkultur muß, da die Subjekte] doch stets noch selber die Grenze der Verdinglichung sind, ... in schlechter Unendlichkeit immer wieder sie erfassen: die hoffnungslose Mühe ihrer Wiederholung ist die einzige Spur der Hoffnung, daß die Wiederholung vergeblich, daß die Menschen doch nicht zu erfassen seien’ (Ibid., 331, omitted in Cumming’s translation).

Wagner and the Culture Industry. This difference will be taken into account in the following scrutiny of film music, jazz and hit tunes, the central genres of the Culture Industry (cf. table 2 for the totality of genres that Adorno's theory of the Culture Industry embraces).

Adorno dealt with film music in a concise study written with Hanns Eisler, *Composing for the Films*.⁴⁰ The study is of a rather practical character, which might be due to the co-operation with Eisler, although Adorno later claimed that he had written 95 percent of it.⁴¹ To decide whether this is true would require close scrutiny of the relevant sources, which is beyond the scope of the present study. As in the introduction to *Philosophy of New Music*, Adorno points out that *Dialectic of Enlightenment* forms the theoretical background,⁴² and the philosophical sections rely crucially upon Adorno's understanding of musical time. *Composing for the Films* is perhaps the most interesting example of the adaptation of the basic temporal-philosophical theorems of *Versuch über Wagner* in the light of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: since film is a product of high-capitalist industry, the temporal dimensions do not need to be manipulated through repetitive devices in film music. Film, unfolding as a prose-like succession of moments that are always equally present, is a medium of pure presence *per se*. Repetition is one of its inherent material features. Thus the concept of repetitive compulsion means in film music that the material itself makes repetition, for instance of leitmotives, compulsory.⁴³

From this Adorno concludes that adopting classical formal models,

40 Adorno and Hanns Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, GS 15, 7-155; *Composing for the Films*, tr. and ed. Graham McCann, London 1994.

41 Editorial Notes to *Komposition für den Film*, 406, omitted in McCann's translation.

42 Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 10, omitted in McCann's translation.

43 Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 93-95; *Composing for the Films*, 96-98.

which do not permit repetitions that are always equally present (cf. chapter IV), is possible in film only within very narrow limits.⁴⁴ Instead Adorno expects from the film composer a determinate negation of the film's temporal structure via film *music*. The composer, Adorno postulates, must be able to create musical reminiscences or anticipations, i.e. to compensate for the missing temporal dimensions. In practical terms, this means, for instance, 'to write music of a preparatory character that is also entirely present and does not utilise the stale means for creating moods, such as the repulsive tremolo crescendi or other devices of the same kind', or 'to compose concluding passages ... without a preceding purely musical development'.⁴⁵ Evidently Adorno endeavours to salvage film music from film; none the less, formulations that assign utopian potential or metaphysical dignity to film music are to be found neither in *Composing for the Films* nor in Adorno's later work.

Jazz and hit tunes, the genres of so-called 'mass music', are criticised by Adorno in much less constructive fashion than film music. In all relevant articles⁴⁶ Adorno repeats certain empirical findings, namely

44 Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 94-95; *Composing for the Films*, 98.

45 'Musik vorbereitenden Charakters zu schreiben, die aber doch zugleich präzise gegenwärtig ist, nicht mit den schalen Mitteln vorbereitender Stimmung, abscheulichen Tremolo-Crescendi und Ähnlichem operiert' ... 'Stellen zu komponieren, die "schließen", ... ohne daß ihnen eine rein musikalische Entwicklung vorausginge' (Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 95; *Composing for the Films*, 98).

46 Adorno, 'Schlageranalysen' (1929), GS 18, 778-787; 'Abschied vom Jazz' (1933), GS 18, 795-799; 'Rundfunkautorität und Schlagersendung' (c1933), unpublished; 'Über Jazz' (1936/1937), GS 17, 74-108; 'Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens' (1938), GS 14, 14-50; 'Musikalische Warenanalysen, Teil I: Neue Schlageranalysen' (1939); 'Buchrezensionen: Wilder Hobson, American Jazz Music; Winthrop Sargeant, Jazz Hot and Hybrid' (1941), GS 19, 382-399. Even later articles are

simple rhythmic and harmonic symmetries, strict adherence to the basic metre and standard repetitive forms, which are only superficially broken up in jazz with syncopations and insertions of bars that mess up the music's horizontal development. Issues pertaining to the production of mass music, however, interest Adorno to a much lesser extent than the relationship between the musical product and the subject that produces or experiences it. The underlying temporal-philosophical model is again that of *Versuch über Wagner*. As does the music of Wagner, mass music requires and furthers damaged consciousness. Producer and consumer are incapable of a cognitive mediation of the present with the past and the future. They forget easily and cannot anticipate; therefore it is vitally important that the product can be recognised without difficulty. The degree of a jazz pattern's or a hit tune's recognisability becomes a function of its emotional value; 'to like it is almost the same as to recognise it'.⁴⁷ As a consequence of the denial of temporal-dimensional mediation, mass music is, in accordance with the 'Wagner paradigm', reduced to abstract presence and regresses.

In 1937, while he was drafting *Versuch über Wagner*, Adorno introduced a polemical concept to account for the damaged consciousness of mass music's producers and consumers, the concept of the 'jazz-subject'. Its connotations anticipate psychological assumptions of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* about the condition of the modern subject: the jazz-subject suffers from ego-weakness, anxiety neuroses and

based on the same empirical framework, cf. for instance 'Zeitlose Mode: Zum Jazz' (1953), GS 10.1, 123-137.

47 'ihn zu mögen, ist fast geradeswegs dasselbe wie ihn wiedererkennen' (Adorno, 'Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens', 14-15. Cf. also *ibid.*, 36).

repetitive compulsion.⁴⁸ Its origins are localised by Adorno in the work of Wagner: 'Amfortas', he writes, is 'a monumental jazz-subject'.⁴⁹ This again corroborates the hypothesis that the temporal concepts of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* are only related back to Wagner when the potentially modern strata of his work are addressed. Here, too, Adorno takes care not to level the specific difference between the temporal-philosophical paradigms. Contrary to the tendency of jazz 'to render fungible and devalue the individuals', Adorno emphasises, with reference to Wagner's musical- and social-historical context, the dynamic function of ego-weakness and the compulsory craving to suffer of Wagner's subjects.⁵⁰ To mass music, Adorno does not ascribe truth-content, neither here nor in other texts; he merely refers to the experiments by Krenek⁵¹ and Stravinsky,⁵² which salvage some elements of jazz and hit tunes. The only real solution that he suggests lies in models of determinate negation of regressive consciousness that were developed in art music. This is the subject of *Philosophy of New Music*.

Eternal Recurrence of the Same in *Philosophy of New Music*

With the temporal-philosophical model developed so far, those aspects of *Philosophy of New Music* that are essential in the context of the present study can be explained cogently and without great difficulty. As with

48 Adorno, 'Über Jazz', 101-108.

49 'ein monumentales Jazz-Subjekt' (Ibid., 107).

50 'die Individuen ... zu beliebig auswechselbaren zu machen und zu entwerten' (Ibid.).

51 Ibid., 86.

52 Adorno, 'Abschied vom Jazz', 798.

Versuch über Wagner, however, it is worthwhile to take a step back and consider the relevant sources. The writing process of *Philosophy of New Music* is no less complex than that of *Versuch über Wagner*. The Schoenberg part was drafted in 1940/41 under the title *Zur Philosophie der neuen Musik*. This text was only known by a few, most famously Thomas Mann. A part on Stravinsky was not planned at that time. In 1948, Adorno wrote the Stravinsky part and revised the whole manuscript according to Hegelian principles. As if he wanted to indicate this unmistakably, he prefaced the two main parts with an *Einleitung* and a *Vorrede*, just as Hegel did with *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The *Einleitung* and the main parts were also given epigraphs from the *Lectures on Aesthetics* and the *Phenomenology*. Evidently, Adorno deemed it important to grant Hegel an elevated place at the beginning of structural sections; so important in fact that he deleted the original epigraph of the Schoenberg part, ‘Madame Eurydice reviendra des Enfers’ (Jean Cocteau),⁵³ which emphasises a crucial systematic motive of *Philosophy of New Music*.

The sources indicate a fact that is not to be ignored in an interpretation of *Philosophy of New Music*: Adorno strives far more conscientiously than in all his earlier writings for dialectisation. It is vital to identify the consequences of this not only at the book’s surface, but also on deeper levels. Following the model of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno constructs circular movements within main parts and in the book as a whole. The points of departure and arrival of these movements are described in the *Einleitung* and the *Vorrede* with reference to the historical preformation of the musical material. Just as film music, Jazz and hit tunes, Stravinsky’s and Schoenberg’s music is

53 Adorno, *Zur Philosophie der neuen Musik*, Ts 1302.

‘not excluded from the all-pervasive reification’.⁵⁴ It reflects the damaged consciousness of the modern subject; in the temporal-philosophical terms of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: it is compelled to an eternal recurrence of the same. Unlike the Culture Industry, however, new music does not settle in this situation, but instead attempts determinate negation – and this goes not only for Schoenberg, as most Adorno interpreters still maintain, but also for Stravinsky. In this process, however, Stravinsky and Schoenberg pursue diametrically different paths, only to fail eventually in similar ways in their attempt to overcome the ritual of Tantalus. They ‘assume ... a similarity to the essential structure of that which they oppose’,⁵⁵ and so reproduce the situation from which they departed.

Both Schoenberg’s and Stravinsky’s aesthetic quest is circular; *Philosophy of New Music* gains its dialectical complexity from the overlapping of these circles. As the circles converge in only one point, the point of departure and arrival, they need to be analysed separately. ‘Stravinsky and Reaction’ will be addressed first. Adorno here employs, as mentioned above, the conceptual organon of *Versuch über Wagner*. At a central point he says that Stravinsky’s music is ‘devoid of recollection’,⁵⁶ and in a passage which draws connections between impressionism and Stravinsky, he adds that it frustrates the listener’s expectations.⁵⁷ Thus the basic temporal-dimensional theorems of

54 ‘nicht von der allherrschenden Verdinglichung ausgenommen’ (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 9; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, tr. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley W. Blomster, xi, tr. modified).

55 ‘ähneln ... der Wesensstruktur dessen sich an, wogegen sie stehen’ (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 24; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 16, tr. modified).

56 ‘[Seine Musik weiß] von keiner Erinnerung’ (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 151; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 164).

57 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 171; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 188.

Adorno's Wagner critique can be shown to appear in the Stravinsky part of *Philosophy of New Music*. The loss of the dimensions of past and future results necessarily, as in *Versuch über Wagner*, in spatialisation of time, which becomes absolute in Stravinsky and is supposed to constitute form.⁵⁸ Even the concept of *Blendwerk*, a synonym of phantasmagoria, appears in the context of Adorno's critique of Stravinsky.⁵⁹ Adorno reveals himself that these references are intentional: 'with some exaggeration', he writes, Stravinsky 'could be called a Wagner who has found his true self by abandoning himself consciously to the latter's repetitive compulsion'.⁶⁰

In this passage one can observe the back projection of a concept that Adorno applies to Wagner only in connection with issues of modernity. More importantly, however, the crucial difference from the Wagner paradigm becomes apparent here. Never would Adorno target Wagner with a sentence like the following one, which directly refers to Stravinsky via the theory of repetitive compulsion from *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: 'The musical subject ... behaves literally like a critically injured victim of an accident which he cannot absorb and which, therefore, he repeats in the hopeless effort of dreaming'.⁶¹ Further down, Adorno avers, analogous to the expositions on subjective

58 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 173, 176; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 190, 192.

59 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 183; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 202.

60 'man könnte ihn, übertreibend, einen zu sich selbst gekommenen Wagner nennen, der dessen Wiederholungszwang ... vorsätzlich sich überläßt' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 174; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 190, tr. modified).

61 'Das musikalische Subjekt ... benimmt sich buchstäblich so wie ein Schwerverwundeter, dem ein Unfall widerfuhr, den er nicht absorbieren kann und den er darum in der hoffnungslosen Anstrengung von Träumen wiederholt' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 145; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 156-157, tr. modified. Cf. also Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 155; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 168).

praxis in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia*, that all energy in Stravinsky's work was 'absorbed in Sisyphus-like tasks'.⁶² Adorno does not fail to clarify what this might mean in technical terms; in the context of the last citation, Adorno speaks of movements that 'consist of different recurrences of the same: of the same melodic forms, of the same harmonies, indeed of the same rhythmic patterns'.⁶³

'Different recurrence of the same' is the formula by means of which Adorno adapts the constellation analysed at the outset of the present chapter to gain insight into the circles in Stravinsky's works. The formula is deliberately ambiguous: it expresses that Stravinsky knows where critical aesthetic reflexion in modernity has to commence, namely at the problem of repetition, or recurrence of the same. The formula also concedes to Stravinsky that – as the anti-Wagnerian par excellence – he is aware of the fact that the use of repetitive techniques may entail false eternity; hence Adorno replaces the predicate 'eternal' with the predicate 'different', which implies an interference of the composer with the repetitive structure. It cannot be over-emphasised that Adorno endorses Stravinsky's basic compositional approach, particularly with regards to Adorno's rebuttal of 'misunderstandings'⁶⁴ published in 1950 and the revision of his critique of Stravinsky's repetitions in his late writings (cf. chapter IV.5).

Yet, Adorno passes a severe judgment on the realisation of the project

62 'an Sisyphusaufgaben fixiert' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 164; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 178-179, tr. modified).

63 'endloser Wiederholung' ... '[Bewegungen, die in der] verschiedenen Wiederkehr von Gleichem bestehen: der gleichen Melodieformen, der gleichen Harmonien, ja der gleichen rhythmischen Muster selber' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 163-164; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 178, tr. modified).

64 Adorno, 'Mißverständnisse', GS 12, 203-206.

of 'different recurrence of the same'. He argues that while the motives in *The Rite of Spring* (1913) do recur differently, they are not substantially changed. The differences from the basic motivic model are mere external manipulations and appear 'as if they were the result of simple shaking-around'.⁶⁵ Thus subjectivity does interfere with the material of the *The Rite of Spring*, but not profoundly enough; aesthetic reflexion returns to its point of departure after an all-too-brief critical manoeuvre. Stravinsky fails to break repetitive compulsion and remains caught in the circle with his virtuosic experiments. In an audacious analogy with Freudian theory, Adorno explicitly refers to the play of traumatised children. He pushes the analogy to the point of branding this entire phase of Stravinsky's development as 'infantilistic'. *The Rite of Spring* forms the centre of this phase, around which Adorno groups other key works. Despite minor conceptual shifts, the discursive mechanism remains the same. *Petrushka* (1911) for instance is styled as the narrative of an acrobat who through break-neck repetitions of the ever-same 'seeks to escape the aesthetic antinomies', in this 'protest against commodification', however, 'turning the soul into a commodity'.⁶⁶ *Petrushka* thus becomes a 'pre-critical' work, wherein recurrence of the same is presented without external differences; the only subjective interference lies in the virtuosic gestures.

The critique of *The Rite of Spring* and *Petrushka* illustrates how Adorno attempts on the level of specific musical works to construct that circle which underlies the Stravinsky part of *Philosophy of New Music* as

65 'als hätten sie durch bloßes Herumschütteln so sich ergeben' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 140; Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 151, tr. modified).

66 'das den ästhetischen Antinomien gleichsam entronnene' ... 'die Seele als Ware zurichtet ... im Protest gegen den Warencharakter' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 132; Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 141-142, tr. modified).

a whole. The proximity to the temporal-philosophical theorems of the main philosophical works from the 1940s and the adaptation of the Wagner paradigm are obvious. In this case, it is hardly possible to prove logical inconsistencies in Adorno's argument. Yet it needs to be pointed out that Adorno's microstudies of Stravinsky's music pertain without exception to the 'Russian' phase, the only phase in Stravinsky's development which Adorno deems worth of the epithet 'avant-gardistic'. The neo-classical phase is only summarily discussed; since Adorno is convinced that any music which ignores the irreversibility of time is by definition regressive, he apparently believes that he does not need to furnish detailed evidence. All he provides are references to fundamental arguments of the logic of disintegration like the following: 'The positive return of that which disintegrated reveals itself as a more fundamental conspiracy with the destructive tendencies of the age than that which is branded outrightly as destructive. Any self-proclaimed order is nothing but a disguise of chaos'.⁶⁷

The selective character of the microstudies forced Adorno later to hedge his conceptual and analytical line of argument with historiographic points. In an insert into *Versuch über Wagner* from 1952 he explains that in Wagner 'the eternal sameness presents itself as the eternally new, the static as the dynamic'.⁶⁸ In the framework of Wagner's aesthetics such paradoxes can be truthful; one will recall the regressive-progressive character of phantasmagoria.⁶⁹ The meaning of

67 'Die positive Rückkehr dessen, was zerfiel, enthüllt sich den destruktiven Tendenzen des Zeitalters gründlicher verschworen denn das als destruktiv Gebrandmarkte. Die Ordnung, die sich selber proklamiert, ist nichts als das Deckbild des Chaos' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 10; Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, xii, tr. modified).

68 Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 59; *In Search of Wagner*, 62.

69 Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 60; *In Search of Wagner*, 62-63.

Stravinsky's repetitions, however, is different. Stravinsky's intention is not to charge the ever-same metaphysically. Rather, his work is, compared to Wagner's, immediately static. It invokes being in the Heideggerian sense, and as in fascism – already a decade before *Jargon of Authenticity* Adorno mentions Heidegger and fascism in the same breath – 'the concept of progress is repudiated in his aesthetic ideology'.⁷⁰

Adorno evaluates the meaning of Stravinsky's repetitions also from the perspective of Beethoven, whom he still thinks of as Wagner's dialectical antipode. As early as 1940 he noted in a Beethoven fragment that the 'ever-same' of the tonal chords was in the last works of Beethoven not subjectively mediated any more, but left in its abstractness, without any attempt at mediation.⁷¹ In a Beethoven fragment written between 1945 and 1947, marked 'extremely important', Adorno elaborates on this theme. He now states, in direct reference to Stravinsky, that repetition was in late Beethoven 'released' and revealed its 'mythical traits'.⁷² Both fragments, however, convey Adorno's utter conviction that Beethoven does not speak a 'jargon of authenticity' in his repetitions, but exposes the mythic-repetitive core of musical language in its abstractness, thus determinately negating it. Stravinsky's manipulated repetitions, by contrast, do not qualify as determinate negation. They remain trapped in the infernal circles of modernity.

While Stravinsky attempts with the nonchalance of the virtuoso composer to evade eternal recurrence of the same, Schoenberg confronts

70 Adorno, *Versuch über Wagner*, 59; *In Search of Wagner*, 62, tr. modified.

71 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 227-228; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 157, tr. modified.

72 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 135; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 89.

it with much greater intensity. In the temporal-philosophical passages of the Schoenberg part of *Philosophy of New Music*, which was given the title *Schoenberg and Progress* in 1948, eternal recurrence of the same forms the conceptual centre. Adorno deals with Schoenberg's entire development, which he divides into three phases: the early atonal phase; the phase when dodecaphony was developed and consolidated; and the phase when the dodecaphonic dogma was to some degree weakened. In Adorno's analysis of each of the phases, the construction of circles can be proved. In the process, the theoretical points will be given particular consideration despite the fact that they are embedded into historiographic contexts. As these are, in accordance with the great significance of history in Schoenberg's thought, far more complex than in the Stravinsky part, they need to be omitted here. They will be dealt with in some detail in chapter IV.

In the years that preceded the development of dodecaphony, Schoenberg grappled with problems of tonality. Elaborating on one of his earliest and most fundamental points, namely that tonality warrants repetition (cf. chapter I.3), Adorno writes: '[O]nly the apparent tonal or modal order, in the hierarchy of which every step assumes its position once and for all, allows repetition. Such repetition is possible only in an articulated system of relationships. ... The relationships of this system, steps and cadences, imply at the outset a continuation, a certain dynamic force. Thus repetition within such relationships does not imply standstill'.⁷³ For the young Schoenberg the tonal order is no longer

73 '[N]ur die offenbare tonale oder modale Ordnung, in deren Hierarchie jede Stufe ein für allemal ihren Platz einnimmt, erlaubt Wiederholung. Diese ist nur möglich in einem artikulierten Bezugssystem. ... Die Verhältnisse des Bezugssystems, Stufen und Kadenz, implizieren vorweg ein Weitergehen, eine gewisse Dynamik. Darum bedeutet

‘apparent’, the system with its relationships not ‘articulated’ any more. Along with tonality, repetition becomes problematic too; the licence to repeat is now experienced as compulsion. From this perspective atonality is an attempt to advance tonal principles in such a way that the compulsion to repeat is loosened and compositional dynamics may be salvaged through intensification of motivic-thematic work.⁷⁴ It is much in evidence that these experiments forced Schoenberg into an intellectual spin, and also that they led him inevitably towards a more radical enterprise.

In dodecaphony, the full power of rationality is set against repetitive compulsion: repetition is rigidly ordered according to the principle of the row and interlocked with variation in the development of the twelve-tone matrix. Compared to atonality this approach is more radical because there is a profound interference with the musical material already on an elementary level. Adorno proves in great detail that this approach fails. As regards repetition, he argues that its compulsive character cannot be overcome by ‘fleeing forward into order’.⁷⁵ This can be seen in the problem of the twelve-tone themes, which are dependent upon the pitch sequence of the row: ‘With every new pitch the choice of remaining pitches diminishes, and when the last one is reached, there is no longer any choice at all. The compulsion inherent in this is

Wiederholung in ihnen keinen Stillstand’ (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 90; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 92-93 tr. modified).

74 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 58-60, 95; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 55-58, 97-98; cf. also Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 44-45; *Composing for the Films*, 38-39.

75 ‘Sie flieht nach vorwärts in die Ordnung’ (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 108; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 112, tr. modified).

unmistakable'.⁷⁶ This dilemma cannot be solved by ascribing thematic status to one of the parameters that are not determined by the row, such as for instance the parameter of rhythm, because 'as the melodic space of these rhythmic themes is determined in each case by the row ..., they take on an obstinate rigidity'.⁷⁷ If one pursues the problem of twelve-tone themes to the end, Adorno believes, it also becomes explicable as to why dodecaphony cannot bring forth new forms. The eternal recurrence of the same inherent in the row and the thematic rhythms result in formal relationships of symmetrical nature and evoke therefore 'the ghosts of pre-critical forms'.⁷⁸

The principle of extracting derivatives from the row with techniques of variation in order to weaken repetitive compulsion, is also doomed to fail. In dodecaphony, variation becomes a procedure prior to the act of composing. There, in the development of the twelve-tone matrix, it is totalised: 'Everything, yet nothing, is variation'.⁷⁹ It follows from this that variation is excluded from the actual compositional process. If variation is attempted at that stage, for instance in the form of freely imitating counterpoint, the effect will be tautological.⁸⁰ Thus variation is caught by repetition, which it was supposed to hold in check. As a

76 'Mit jedem neuen Ton wird die Auswahl der Resttöne kleiner, und beim letzten ist überhaupt keine Wahl mehr gelassen. Unverkennbar der darin gelegene Zwang' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 72-73; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 72, tr. modified).

77 'da ... der melodische Raum dieser rhythmischen Themen durch die Reihe jeweils definiert ist..., so nehmen gerade sie obstinate Starrheit an' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 75; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 75, tr. modified).

78 'die Geister der vorkritischen Formen' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 94; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 97, tr. modified).

79 'Alles und Nichts ist Variation' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 63; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 61. Cf. also *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 312, omitted in McCann's translation).

80 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 90, 96; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 92, 99.

result there is no concept of the new in the realm of dodecaphony; '[e]ither it retains its pure formal immanence or the new is arbitrarily superimposed upon it'.⁸¹ To make the most out of the critical possibilities offered by this compositional-technical paradox, Adorno translates it into philosophical language. With reference to Hegel's adaptation of the principle from the *Critique of Pure Reason* according to which thought cannot progress without preserving an element of identity, Adorno writes about totalised variation in dodecaphony: 'As soon as it [Hegel's 'spirit'] ... has integrated the last heteronomous and material factors, *it begins to circle aimlessly, imprisoned within itself*, released from every element of resistance upon whose permeation it was solely dependent for its meaning. The fulfilment of intellectual freedom occurs simultaneously with the spirit's emasculation. [I]ts hypostatisation as a mere form of reflection becomes evident when it frees itself from its last dependence upon that which is not spirit ... Non-conforming music is not protected from such indifferentism of the spirit, that of means without purpose'.⁸²

In his late dodecaphonic works, Schoenberg attempts to curb the supremacy of variation by restoring repetition and mediating

81 '[Die Zwölftontechnik] verbleibt entweder in purer Formimmanenz, oder das Neue wird ihr unverbindlich eingelegt' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 99; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 103, tr. modified).

82 'Sobald er [Hegels 'Geist'] ... das letzte Heteronome, Stoffliche ganz bewältigt, *beginnt er gefangen in sich zu kreisen*, abgelöst vom Widerstrebenden, aus dessen Durchdringung er seinen Sinn einzig empfangt. Die Vollendung der geistigen Freiheit fällt zusammen mit der Emaskulierung des Geistes. [S]eine Hypostasierung als die einer bloßen Reflexionsform wird offenbar, wenn er der letzten Abhängigkeit von dem ledig ward, was selber nicht Geist ist ... Die nicht konformierende Musik ist vor solcher Vergleichgültigung des Geistes, der des Mittels ohne Zweck, nicht geschützt' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 28; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 20-21, tr. modified, italics added; cf. also Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 66; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 66).

dodecaphonic and tonal principles. Although Schoenberg thus offends against the irreversibility of time, Adorno is not adamant from the start about this approach, on the one hand because it is realised with utter dialectical earnestness, on the other because of the 'great moments' in Schoenberg's late works that 'have been attained despite the twelve-tone technique as well as by means of it'.⁸³ Nonetheless Adorno traps this approach in internal aporias. After the disintegration of tonality, only the gesture of tonally conceived motives and themes can be adopted.⁸⁴ Their 'specific "characters"' – variability and repeatability – 'do not simply arise autonomously out of twelve-tone technique ... but are rather imposed upon the technique by the relentless will of the composer'.⁸⁵ From this situation follows firstly that variation is utilised to organise material that objects to such treatment,⁸⁶ and secondly that the composer, since the possibility to repeat tonal material has been lost, is forced to posit its repetition arbitrarily. Thus Schoenberg's attempt at solving the problem of repetitive compulsion is in his late work as circular as it is in the atonal and in the more strictly dodecaphonic period.

In all creative periods that Adorno distinguishes, Schoenberg attempts in the service of musical progress to find a viable mediation of repetition and variation. Despite the ingenious approach and the immense intellectual energy involved, the lines of progress, which were

83 'großen Momente ... gegen die Zwölftontechnik so gut wie durch sie gewonnen' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 70; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 69, tr. modified).

84 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 100; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 104-105.

85 '[D]ie spezifischen "Charaktere" der auferstandenen Themen ... [gehen] nicht autonom aus der Zwölftontechnik [hervor] ... [sondern werden dieser] vom rücksichtslosen Willen des Komponisten aufgezwungen' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 98; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 101, tr. modified).

86 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 77; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 77.

supposed to converge in a better future, curve to form circles. The circle of dodecaphony closes especially firmly. Adorno expresses this with a quasi-mathematical definition: 'In all its moments such music maintains the same distance from a central point'.⁸⁷ This formula allows Adorno to apply elements of the Wagner paradigm to Schoenberg. He laments, for instance, the loss of temporal dimensions in dodecaphony: 'At one time, all musical meaning was unmistakably determined by intervals: the not-yet, the now, and the afterward; that which was promised, fulfilled, and missed'.⁸⁸ He also employs the concept of spatialisation; Schoenberg's music, he writes, 'threatens to ossify in space' just as Stravinsky's.⁸⁹ The large-scale circle described by the Schoenberg part as a whole thus closes, and the gap between Schoenberg and Stravinsky is bridged conceptually, despite the 'totally different levels of formulation' that Adorno explicitly draws attention to in an insert into the Schoenberg part from 1948.⁹⁰

It is probably due to the 'totally different levels of formulation' that only the Schoenberg part has a typically Adornian ending. Adorno's seemingly conciliatory formulation in the last lines of the Stravinsky part, that Stravinsky was fascinated by 'the image ... of salvation from

87 'In allen ihren Momenten ist eine solche Musik gleich nahe zum Mittelpunkt' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 61; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 59, tr. modified; cf. also Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 73, 98; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 73, 101).

88 'Einmal entschied sich unverwechselbar an den Intervallen aller musikalische Sinn, das Noch-Nicht, das Jetzt und das Nachher; das Versprochene, das Erfüllte und das Versäumte' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 76; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 76, tr. modified).

89 'droht die Musik im Raum zu erstarren' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 71; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 71).

90 'ganz verschiedenen Niveaus der Gestaltung' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 71; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 71).

death', emphasises this, for it is immediately undermined with a reference to the affinity of this fascination to myth.⁹¹ The Schoenberg part, by contrast, ends with the pledge that new music was 'the true message in a bottle'⁹² – a message to the imaginary witness whom Adorno and Horkheimer also address in one of the last fragments of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.⁹³ Thus a utopian horizon is intimated which cannot of course be spelt out. It can, however, be integrated into Adorno's theory of time via reference to other passages in *Philosophy of New Music*. Adorno argues that Schoenberg invokes the image of salvation from death far more successfully than Stravinsky, despite the failure of his attempt to overcome the compulsive mimesis of the abstract course of time. Thus the Eurydice motive appears in the final passages of the Schoenberg part: 'Earth claims Eurydice again'.⁹⁴ The epigraph of the early version of the Schoenberg part – 'Madame Eurydice reviendra des enfers' – was certainly not only deleted in 1948 because a quotation by Hegel was then deemed more suitable by Adorno, but also because it would have appeared somewhat ostentatious at such an elevated point in the beginning of the text. It is all the more significant that Adorno kept the following universal formulation at the end of the Schoenberg part: 'The gesture of return, not the sensation of expectancy, characterises the expression of all

91 'Bild ... der Rettung vorm Tode' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 196; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 216-217).

92 'die wahre Flaschenpost' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 126; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 133, tr. modified).

93 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 294; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 256.

94 'So hat die Erde Eurydiken wieder' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 122; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 129).

music'.⁹⁵

Salvation from death occurs in Adorno, as we saw in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia*, paradoxically through transitoriness. Thus Adorno's idea that the expression of all music is an overcoming of death conforms to the concept of redemption described above as a momentary 'passing of the passing'. Analogously Adorno writes that 'in the world of total appearance ... all harmony of unrequited happiness' – i.e. twelve-tone harmony – 'longs for its fatal chord as the cipher of fulfilment'.⁹⁶ This passage, imported literally from *Zweite Nachtmusik*, contains all motives that make up Adorno's concept of redemption: the passing of the abstract time in the world of total appearance is supposed to pass in the 'fatal chord'; yet such fulfilment comes to pass in the present only as a transitory cipher, a constellation whose meaning cannot be fixed. In this context, the cryptic words at the end of the Schoenberg part become interpretable. New music, Adorno writes, 'dies away unheard, without echo' and 'falls into empty time like a destructive bullet. New music spontaneously aims towards this last experience, towards absolute oblivion'.⁹⁷ Aiming towards its end, its dissolution in absolute oblivion, new music explodes the empty,

95 'Die Geste der Zurückkehrenden, nicht das Gefühl des Wartenden beschreibt den Ausdruck aller Musik' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 122; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 129).

96 'in der Welt des vollkommenen Scheins sehnt alle Harmonik des verweigten Glücks ... ihren tödlichen Akkord herbei als Chiffre der Erfüllung' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 81; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 82, tr. modified).

97 '[Die neue Musik] verhallt ungehört, ohne Echo ... fällt ... in die leere Zeit wie eine verderbliche Kugel. Auf diese letzte Erfahrung hin ... ist die neue Musik spontan angelegt, auf das absolute Vergessensein.' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 126; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 135, tr. modified).

eternally recurring course of time. But new music only aims *towards* this last experience; in the present society, its message is not heard.

Chapter IV

Writing Time

Adorno's Historiography of Music

Adorno's temporal concepts change in the application to different historical epochs. This was exemplified in the previous chapter with reference to the Wagner paradigm, from which developed through subtle internal shifts of meaning a temporal-philosophical paradigm for modernity. With particular attention to Adorno's mature writings, which were hitherto bracketed out for methodological reasons, these paradigms now need to be placed into a historiographic context. Thereby their overall importance for Adorno's project will become evident, and further paradigms that have so far only been roughly sketched or not addressed at all, will emerge. The historiographic account in the present chapter will be linear; caesuras between epochs will be made where a new form of consciousness with a distinctive temporal substratum can be discerned in the musical material. In this construction of history, 'minor composers' will not be represented because Adorno dedicates to them only short, introductory texts, reserving temporal-philosophical issues exclusively for the canonical figures of Western Art Music. Thus neither French music will be considered nor the Eastern-European tradition, for which Adorno

coined the highly problematical term 'music on the periphery'.¹ The first section discusses pre-Beethovenian music in the widest sense, the second Beethoven, the third the romantic period, the fourth inter-war modernism, the fifth the post-1945 avant-garde movements and Adorno's utopian idea of a musical composition yet to come.

Before Beethoven

In Adorno's writings, there are only a few, mostly indirect sources about medieval and Renaissance music that hardly distinguish between the two epochs. Adorno's main interest lies in the phenomenon of a polyphonic technique with immediate societal use-value² wherein 'a relatively homogeneous, static, and closed society ... represents and disciplines itself'.³ According to an early historiographical schema in 'Zweite Nachtmusik' (1937), the voices in music and society, tied to a strict *ordo*, attain meaning only in 'salvation-historical articulation',⁴ that is, in relation to a heteronomous authority transcending the sphere of the temporal. For Adorno, time does therefore not constitute an emphatic problem in the music of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Consequently, he only alludes to questions concerning, for instance, the

1 'Musik am Rande' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 41; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 35).

2 Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, GS 14, 169-433, here 420; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, tr. E.B. Ashton, New York 1976, 217.

3 'eine in sich relativ homogene, statische und geschlossene Gesellschaft ... repräsentiert und diszipliniert' (Adorno, 'Die Funktion des Kontrapunkts in der neuen Musik', GS 16, 145-169, here 149; 'The Function of Counterpoint in New Music', *Sound Figures*, tr. Rodney Livingstone, Stanford, CA 1999, 123-144, here 126, tr. modified).

4 'heilsgeschichtlichen Artikulation' (Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 51).

temporal characteristics of modality in relation to tonality.⁵ Another interesting idea of his, that the combinatorial gambits beloved by the *ars nova* and the Franco-Flemish composers indicate a rousing of subjectivity, also remains undeveloped. For in Adorno's judgement, that which really happened in this autonomous enclave 'surpassed the composers' subjective imagination'.⁶

Only when autonomisation and detranscendentalisation begin in scepticist philosophy and the music of the 1600s does time become an aesthetic problem. Liberated from the disciplinary rule of clergy and counterpoint, it threatens man with its reifying and alienating power.⁷ Compositional subjectivity, however, is still so weak that it can merely fill empty time with repetitive melodic and harmonic conventions; attempts at variation do not go beyond paraphrases of such standardised material.⁸ Filling time with music is, according to Adorno, a praxis that established itself at absolutist courts. There an *apriori* of *Langeweile* reigns,⁹ and the metaphysics of that music is its abstract negation, *Kurzweil*.¹⁰ 'Pre-classical music', Adorno states in 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 'is supposed to kill time; it is "divertimento" and its socially determined function, that of entertainment, appears technically

5 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, GS 7, 7-533, here 297-298; *Aesthetic Theory*, tr. and ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis, MN 1997, 200.

6 'die subjektive Vorstellung der Komponisten überschritten haben' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 63; *Aesthetic Theory*, 38. Cf. also *Ästhetische Theorie*, 91; *Aesthetic Theory*, 57).

7 Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 51.

8 Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', GS 16, 68-84, here 69; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', *Sound Figures*, 54-68, here 55.

9 Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 51.

10 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 28; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 8.

as the music's fear of the course of linear time'.¹¹ In these very few, starkly generalising passages Adorno sketches nothing less than another temporal-philosophical paradigm. It is applied by him to the entire period from 1600-1750, with exception of Monteverdi, Pergolesi, Scarlatti and – Bach.¹²

Although Bach spent his creative life within the constraints of clerical and courtly authorities, Adorno attempts to show that his work denies disciplinary and entertaining functionalisation as well as transcendental meaning and the metaphysics of *Kurzweil*. Adorno is convinced that there is in Bach no static equilibrium of supplicating voices in a sacred musical space or a mere filling of time with repetitions and paraphrases. Rather, Bach is the first composer to take full subjective command of musical form through motivic-thematic devices developed in the fugue.¹³ In asserting this, Adorno directly imports a line of argument of Schoenberg, who traces developing variation back to Bach. The strategic importance of this Schoenbergian idea for Adorno is enormous: linked to the analogy of motivic-thematic and societal 'work', it allows him to construct Bach as a composer who belongs firmly into the enlightened era. Current Bach scholarship comes to similar conclusions, albeit in different ways; in 1951, however, Adorno's article 'Bach Defended against his Devotees' marked a counterpoint to the generally accepted view on Bach. The 'devotees' that Adorno leaves unmentioned are

11 'Die vorklassische Musik soll die Zeit totschiagen; sie ist "Divertimento" und ihre Unterhaltungsfunktion, sozial determiniert, erscheint technisch als Angst der Musik vorm Verlauf der linearen Zeit' (Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 51).

12 Ibid.

13 Adorno; 'Bach gegen seine Liebhaber verteidigt', GS 10.1, 138-151, here 142-143; 'Bach Defended against his Devotees', *Prisms*, tr. Samuel and Shierry Weber, Cambridge, MA 1981, 133-146, here 139. Cf. also 'Zum Verständnis Schönbergs', GS 18, 428-445, here 436.

probably authors such as Wilibald Gurlitt, in whose interpretations of Bach as a medieval master Adorno certainly sensed elements of a static ontology.¹⁴ Thus the sporadic invectives in Adorno's Bach article against the 'vogue of ontology' become understandable,¹⁵ for the Gurlitt School at Freiburg University was indeed influenced by Heidegger.

This confirms again that Adorno is drawn to audacious associations wherever he discerns traces of the jargon of authenticity and what he calls German ideology. It is doubtful, however, whether his interpretation of Bach constitutes a temporal-philosophical paradigm. In his construction of music history, Bach rather becomes a transitional figure, for Adorno holds that Bach's technical innovations are realised only in Viennese Classicism and in Schoenberg, Berg and Webern. One decade after the Bach article, Adorno writes in *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* (1961/1962) that although Bach universalised motivic-thematic work, 'which as "labour" already exceeds the static nature of the so-called musical Baroque', its dynamicisation was to be credited to the Viennese classicists.¹⁶ In modernity, then, the dynamic potential encapsulated in Bach's works is unveiled in Schoenberg's and Webern's instrumentations and a mode of performance oriented by their composing.¹⁷ It is particularly significant that Adorno makes only one explicit statement about the truth-content of the religious in Bach,

14 Cf. Wilibald Gurlitt, *Der Meister und sein Werk*, Kassel 1936, reprinted three times until 1959.

15 'ontologische Mode' (Adorno, 'Bach gegen seine Liebhaber verteidigt', 138; 'Bach Defended against his Devotees', *Prisms*, 135).

16 'die als "Arbeit" bereits das statische Wesen des sogenannten musikalischen Barocks übersteigt' (Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 407; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 206).

17 Adorno, 'Bach gegen seine Liebhaber verteidigt', 149-151; 'Bach Defended against his Devotees', 144-146.

namely in the context of the chorale interpolation in Berg's *Violin Concerto*: '[I]t also bears a trace of that hope which music at its Bachian heights once infused into the chorales accompanying mortals through a gateway into darkness so dense as to be capable of kindling the final light'.¹⁸

The consequences of Viennese Classicism from Bach are seen by Adorno as a further reflection of the techniques developed in the fugue in the context of symphonic form. There the treatment of motives follows consequential-logical principles, which are restricted in the fugue. Only on this level, Adorno claims, does musical composition challenge the irreversibly progressing empirical time,¹⁹ 'syncopating it in the moment of the identical, internally timeless motive, contracting it through intensification until it stands still'.²⁰ The concept of variation thus acquires an essentially new meaning: when the composition engages concretely with the course of time, the motivic material of a sonata movement can no longer be merely paraphrased, but has to be changed. In order not to level the difference between aesthetic and empirical time, variation must concurrently sustain a moment of identity. From this follows for the genesis of formal totality that the main variational section of the sonata movement, the development, may not (as later in Schoenberg's dodecaphonic phase, cf. chapter III.4)

18 '[E]ine Spur der Hoffnung lebt darin, welche einstmals die Musik auf ihrer Bachischen Höhe in jene Choräle setzte, die den Sterblichen durch ein Tor ins Dunkel geleiten, so dicht, als müßte das endliche Licht darin sich entzünden' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, GS 13, 325; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 1, tr. modified).

19 Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 51-52. Cf. also Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 58; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 55.

20 'durch den Augenblick des identischen, in sich zeitlosen Motivs synkopiert, durch dessen gespannte Steigerung verkürzt, bis sie innehält' (Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 52).

expand over the entire movement, but must lead into the repetition of the exposition. The principles of variation and repetition thus mutually qualify and determine one another in Viennese Classicism.²¹

In the context of such technical reflections, Adorno writes in the Schoenberg part of *Philosophy of New Music*: 'The concept of the classic in music is defined by this paradoxical relationship to time'.²² Evidently this is another temporal-philosophical paradigm – one of particular significance, for Adorno seems to be of the opinion that musical time in the emphatic sense is constituted only with the paradoxes of Viennese Classicism. It is for this reason that Adorno applies a whole range of temporal categories only from this point in his historiography on. In *Composing for the Films*, for instance, he writes about musical anticipation and remembering, different layers of presence and complex temporal-dimensional movements in classical sonata form: 'The very essence of the traditional sonata form is defined by the variable degree of presence of musical events, that is, their differentiation according to whether they are perceived ... as anticipated or remembered, or only prepare for or lead away from such anticipations or recollections'.²³ Such relationships, along with the dialectic of repetition and variation, also determine to a great extent Adorno's understanding of tonality.²⁴

21 Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 58; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 55.

22 'Der Begriff des Klassischen in der Musik ist durch diese paradoxe Beziehung zur Zeit definiert' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 58; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 56).

23 'In der verschiedenen Gegenwärtigkeit der musikalischen Ereignisse, also der Differenzierung danach, ob sie ... als das Erinnernte oder Erwartete wahrgenommen werden, oder nur auf ein solches Erwartetes oder Erinnerntes hin- oder von ihm weggleiten, besteht eigentlich das Leben der traditionellen Sonatenform' (Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 94; *Composing for the Films*, 97).

24 Adorno and Eisler, *Komposition für den Film*, 44; *Composing for the Films*, 38. Cf. also 'Form in der neuen Musik', GS 16, 607-627, here 608.

Encoded in the technical concepts that make up the paradigm for Viennese Classicism are, as so often in Adorno, more general temporal-philosophical problems. Barely surprisingly, Adorno establishes analogies with the philosophy of Kant. According to *Philosophy of New Music*, the relationship of repetition and variation tallies on the motivic and formal level with the relationship of thing-in-itself and appearance: 'Only as long as the development is not absolute, only as long as something that is not subjected to it, a musical thing-in-itself, is imposed upon it in a quasi Kantian way, can music, through its capacity of invocation, hold the empty force of time at a distance'.²⁵ Concurrently, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno draws parallels between the Kantian concept of time and the constitution of the modern subject;²⁶ it is certainly not too far-fetched to link this notion in turn with the constitution of musical time in Viennese Classicism. Without this assumption, it would remain unclear why Adorno can make the temporal-philosophical paradigm of Viennese Classicism dependent upon extra-aesthetic factors: 'Dynamic musical time *per se*, the idea of which was crystallised in Viennese Classicism, ... is not only genetically, but substantially the same time as that which can be felt in the rhythm of emancipated bourgeois society that interprets its own play of forces as stability'.²⁷

25 'Nur solange die Durchführung nicht total, nur solange ein ihr nicht Unterworfenen, ein musikalisches Ding an sich Kantisch gleichsam ihr vorgegeben ist, vermag die Musik die leere Gewalt der Zeit beschwörend fernzuhalten' (Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 58; *Philosophy of Modern Music*, 56, tr. modified).

26 Adorno und Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 66; *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 48.

27 'Die eigentlich dynamische Entwicklungszeit der Musik, deren Idee der Wiener Klassizismus auskristallisiert hat, ... ist nicht genetisch bloß, sondern ihrer Substantialität nach die gleiche, welche den Rhythmus der emanzipierten und das eigene Kräftespiel als Stabilität auslegenden bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ausmachte'

These analogies are important to settle the question as to how Adorno can fit Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven into the paradigm without blurring their technical and aesthetic differences. In the Beethoven fragments Adorno indicates that in Haydn's motivic work there was a mechanistic element which classes him with rising bourgeoisie; the musical relationships in Mozart never had the character of 'work' because his music balances representative function and bourgeois subjectivity; and in Beethoven, motivic work had a critical purpose.²⁸ Thus, the paradigm for Viennese Classicism is only valid for Haydn and Mozart. From their 'masterly pieces', Adorno formulates freely after the famous dictum of Waldstein, 'Beethoven could read the question in which their perfection transcended itself and called for something else'.²⁹

Beethoven

Adorno states already in his historiographical schema from 1937 that symphonic time is strictly speaking only Beethoven's.³⁰ In *Aesthetic Theory*, he still argues that it is only in Beethoven that the style of

(Adorno, 'Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik', GS 18, 149-176, here 159. Cf. also Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkompotion', 69; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 55).

28 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 62-63; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 34-35.

29 'aus den meisterlichen Stücken der beiden anderen Wiener Klassizisten, die Frage herauszulesen, in der ihre Vollkommenheit sich selbst transzendierte und ein anderes wollte' (Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 416-417; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 214).

30 Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 52.

Viennese Classicism comes into its own.³¹ Between these sources lies Adorno's abortive attempt to write a book about Beethoven. If this project with the ambitious sub-title *Philosophy of Music* had been realised, *Philosophy of New Music* would probably have lost its central position in Adorno's writings about music, for Adorno planned nothing less than to develop 'in a fully elaborated philosophy of music, the model of which would be Beethoven', a concept of musical time that would prove the inadequacy of alternatives oriented by the 'pure question for Being'.³² Concepts of time thus play an important role in the fragmentary documents of this project and in the passages about Beethoven in Adorno's published writings. Adorno devises for Beethoven's music three temporal-philosophical paradigms: one for the early and middle period, one for certain phenomena in the late middle works, and one for the late style.

An alternative formulation for Adorno's notion that the style of Viennese Classicism comes into its own in Beethoven would be that Beethoven relates to Haydn and Mozart as Hegel relates to Kant. Indeed the paradigm for Beethoven's early and middle period is best understood as a recasting of the paradigm for Haydn and Mozart in Hegelian terms. Adorno thus effects essential shifts of meaning. For the genesis of formal totality in Beethoven, he does not employ, as for Haydn and Mozart, the Kantian concept of an abstract balance of diversity and unity, but the concept of an inherently non-identical

31 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 307; *Aesthetic Theory*, 206-207.

32 'in einer durchgeführten Philosophie der Musik, die ihr Modell an Beethoven fände' ... 'reinen Seinsfrage' (Adorno, 'Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik', 159-160).

identity³³ or of a process wherein, analogously to the beginning of Hegel's *Logic*, nothing becomes something, that is, elements that are meaningless on their own generate totality.³⁴ In this process, exposition and development are no longer juxtaposed as quasi-spatial formal sections; rather, the development now follows logically from the exposition.³⁵ The motor of the formal process, developing variation, qualifies in Beethoven as determinate negation; 'from what has once been posited it ceaselessly brings forth the new and enhanced by destroying it in its immediacy, its quasi-natural form'.³⁶ Beethoven so unleashes a dynamic that dissolves the balance between variation and repetition.³⁷ In general, repetition and its corresponding constituent in tonality, 'the compulsion, for harmonic and tonal reasons, to say things repeatedly', are criticised already in early and middle Beethoven as 'a kind of mimetic naivety'.³⁸

On the macro-formal level, however, as recapitulation, repetition persists. While the recapitulation was technically and aesthetically justified in Haydn and Mozart, it appears in Beethoven as an arbitrary blocking of the determinate negations in the development section. As a

33 Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel*, GS 5, 247-381, here 366-367; *Hegel: Three Studies*, tr. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge, MA 1993, 136-137.

34 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 163; *Aesthetic Theory*, 107. Cf. also *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 416; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 214.

35 Adorno, 'Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik', GS 15, 188-248, here 198.

36 'unablässig bringt sie das Neue und Gesteigerte aus dem einmal Gesetzten hervor, indem sie es in seiner quasi-naturalen Gestalt, seiner Unmittelbarkeit, vernichtet' (Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 412; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 210).

37 Adorno, 'Form in der neuen Musik', 612.

38 'der Zwang, aus harmonisch-tonalen Gründen Dinge öfter zu sagen, zu wiederholen' ... 'eine Art von mimetischer Naivetät' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 87, 94-95; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 53, 59, tr. modified).

reconciliation qua return, it is problematic in temporal-philosophical terms,³⁹ in much the same way as re-membering (*Er-innerung*) in the final chapter of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Adorno in fact describes as a recapitulation.⁴⁰ Beethoven and Hegel both enforce immanent transcendence; both manipulate 'the natural relationship circling within it as if what recurs, by virtue of its mere recurrence, were metaphysical meaning itself, the "Idea"'.⁴¹ In the texts from the 1960s, Adorno loosens this analogy in favour of Beethoven. He now argues that the affirmative gesture of Beethoven's recapitulations was one of ironic exaggeration, as if he knew that the unity of the system is merely posited.⁴² In many passages in his later texts, Adorno thus designates Beethoven's recapitulations as 'points' or 'punch lines'.⁴³ To further undermine the recapitulation, and to save the priority of becoming over being, Adorno argues, Beethoven also attached a coda with developmental character at the end of the first movements of the *Eroica*, the *Appassionata* and the *Ninth Symphony*.⁴⁴

The paradigm for Beethoven's early and middle period is also designated 'intensive type', which Adorno contrasts with the 'extensive' or 'epic' type. Examples of the extensive type are the first movements of the *String Quartet op. 59,1*, the *Sixth Symphony op. 68*, the *Violin Sonata op. 96* and the *Trio op. 97*, all dating from the late middle period. The

39 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 33; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 12.

40 Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 412; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 210.

41 'in sich kreisenden Naturzusammenhang ..., als wäre das Wiederkehrende kraft seiner bloßen Wiederkehr mehr, als es ist, der metaphysische Sinn selber, die "Idee"' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, GS 13, 149-317, here 241-242; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, tr. Edmund Jephcott, Chicago 1992, 94).

42 Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 413; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 211.

43 Cf. for instance Adorno, 'Form in der neuen Musik', 612.

44 Adorno, 'Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik', 199.

systematic importance of the fragments relating to the extensive type is considerable because they form the conceptual basis for Adorno's interpretation of Schubert, Schumann, Mahler and Berg (cf. chapter IV.4, 5). Although the extensive type was in relation to Beethoven never fully formulated, it can be read as another temporal-philosophical paradigm, for Adorno reflects in the few relevant fragments almost exclusively about the temporal difference of the intensive and the extensive type.⁴⁵ Whilst in the extensive type, time is contracted through motivic mediation, it is granted a certain degree of freedom in the late middle works mentioned above. With the sovereign gesture of the mature composer, Beethoven allows repetitions in the development sections and abstains from forcing empirical time to an aesthetic standstill. Instead he makes time itself thematic, like the narrator in the epic or the novel. In the process of formal constitution, time regains some of the authority held by constructive phantasy in the intensive type.⁴⁶ 'The form', Adorno writes, 'draws breath'.⁴⁷

The paradox of the extensive type is how unity comes about despite the composer's concession to time. To explain this paradox, Adorno advances towards a concept of subjectivity that, through its temporal-dimensional structure, is quite distinct from the paradigms analysed so far. In a fragment from 1940 Adorno muses that 'the deepest reason why the extensive style sets time free' might lie in the expression 'of a soothing, comforting, epilogue-like sentiment – that is, of an

45 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 136; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 90.

46 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 136; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 89.

47 'Die Form schöpft Atem' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 139; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 92).

afterwards'.⁴⁸ Reiterating an idea that we know from the earliest Beethoven fragments (cf. chapter II.2), Adorno writes in a fragment from 1953 that in Beethoven 'the present in the form creates the past'.⁴⁹ At this point, however, a decade before the monographs on Mahler and Berg, Adorno substantiates this idea only on the macro-formal level. The development sections of the extensive works, which are dedynamicised to such an extent that they are not immediately recognisable, reveal their formal meaning only through the long return passages. As a result of the decreased tension between empirical and aesthetic time, the entry of the recapitulation lacks necessity: 'Fundamentally, in the epic style one simply does not know how to start again from the beginning, and every recapitulation is a *tour de force*'.⁵⁰

The late style stands in a complex relationship with the intensive and the extensive type. It 'contains both [styles]; it is certainly the result of the process of disintegration which the extensive style represents, but understands the fragments split from it according to the intensive principle'.⁵¹ Adorno does not explain this idea from the Beethoven fragments directly; it can, however, be deciphered with reference to

48 'Der Ausdruck ist der des epilogisch Begütigenden, Tröstlichen – also des *Nachher*. Vielleicht liegt hier der tiefste Grund, warum der extensive Stil die Zeit freigibt' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 140; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 92).

49 'Bei Beethoven schafft die Gegenwart in der Form die Vergangenheit' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 165; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 112, tr. modified).

50 'Im Grunde weiß man im epischen Stil gar nicht, wie man wieder von vorn anfangen kann und jede Reprise ist ein *tour de force*' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 143; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 95).

51 'Der Spätstil enthält beide [Typen]; er ist durchaus das Ergebnis des Zerfallsprozesses, den der extensive Stil darstellt, faßt aber die Fragmente, die ihm entspringen, im Sinne des intensiven Prinzips auf' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 136; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 90, tr. modified).

other passages in his work. Already in 'Beethoven's Late Style' (1937), the process of disintegration that occurs in the extensive type and in the late style is also termed 'dissociation of time'.⁵² In the extensive type, as we saw above, this takes the form of a renunciation of development and mediation, from which follows the need to restore an element of repetition. The fragmentation of form, however, was avoided in the extensive type through the epic-narrative element. In the late style, which uses the binding force of the epic only occasionally, the formal surface breaks. When Adorno writes that the fragments split from the extensive type are understood according to the intensive principle, he refers to the central paradox of the intensive type, namely the ability of the composer to bring time to a momentary standstill. Conventions, for instance, are in the late style not integrated into a dramatic or epic context, but placed as fragments in the work and for moments illuminated by subjectivity.⁵³ Again, an aesthetic process occurs in these moments, extremely compressed and as an 'ignition between extremes'.⁵⁴

In his last works, Beethoven turns not only against his earlier classical style, but also against its precondition, the system of tonality. Its laws, which according to Adorno warrant totality and identity, are understood by the mature composer as mere conventions and, in the moments of his interference, forced to testify to their untruth. Sonata form, which is intimately bound up with tonality, is treated in much the same way: the development section 'ends in a kind of draw' and the

52 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 184, 267; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 126, 189.

53 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 183; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 125-126.

54 'Zündung zwischen den Extremen' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 183; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 126).

recapitulation is treated in such a way that 'its negative aspect emerges'.⁵⁵ Adorno makes no secret of his admiration for Beethoven's late work with its compressed dissociative processes; this becomes understandable when one remembers the analogy of the classical style, against which Beethoven's self-critique is directed, with Hegel. Not only the developments and recapitulations of the composer, but also those of the philosopher fall apart when it comes to the 'ignition between extremes', when truth flashes up in the moments of disintegration. Beethoven's method is strikingly similar to Adorno's negative dialectics; the late style is in exactly the same sense the '*Selbstbewegung* of the classical Beethoven'⁵⁶ as *Negative Dialectics* emerges from the *Selbstbewegung* of Hegel's positive dialectics. This is certainly not an affinity that has been constructed later, as most of the passages cited here predate *Negative Dialectics* by decades. Yet, only the *origins* of negative dialectics have to be sought in the experience of music, for in the late 1950s, music and philosophy broke apart for Adorno after intense reflections on the *Missa Solemnis*. Adorno had to admit the absence of late-style characteristics – and negative dialectic – in this particularly important late work, and abandoned his projected major work on Beethoven. Instead he began the work on *Negative Dialectics*, a book that turns to music only rarely, whilst still preserving and elaborating experiences with music (cf. chapter V).⁵⁷

55 'mit einer Art Unentschieden endet ... ihr Negatives hervortreten lassen' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 273; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 193, tr. modified).

56 'Selbstbewegung des klassischen Beethoven' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 195; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 134, tr. modified).

57 Adorno, 'Verfremdetes Hauptwerk: Zur Missa Solemnis', NS I.1, 145-161; 'The Alienated Magnum Opus: On the Missa Solemnis', *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 141-153.

The Beethoven paradigms share two crucial structural features. First, subjectivity assumes in all three paradigms a critical stance towards empirical time. Second, form is in each of them constituted through dialectological paradoxes: in the classical style, or the intensive type, through the paradoxical standstill of time; in the extensive works through the moment of the narrative 'afterwards'; in the late style through the moment of the 'ignition between extremes'. Thus, each of the paradigms is on its reflective level truthful. Adorno underlines this by applying the metaphysical categories, which at this point in the present study need no further explanation, to all paradigms, and not just to that of the late style. An example of developing variation in the *Piano Sonata op. 31,2*, a classical work, is described in Adorno's radio lecture 'Schöne Stellen' (1965) with a variation of the Eurydice motive: 'Through the addition of the song-like second step downwards from C to Bb the seemingly extra-human theme is humanised, answered by the tears of one whom the earth has reclaimed'.⁵⁸ A few lines further down in the same text, Adorno speaks of 'dawning hope' in a return passage in op. 59,1, a work representing the extensive type.⁵⁹ About the late works he says that 'Beethoven, as a dissociative force, tears them apart in time, perhaps in order to preserve them for the eternal'.⁶⁰ Evidently, Adorno himself has contributed greatly to the eternalisation not only of

58 'Durch die Hinzufügung des gesanglich redenden Sekundschriffs abwärts von c nach b wird das gleichsam außermenschliche Thema humanisiert, beantwortet von der Träne dessen, den die Erde wiederhat' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 261; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 184).

59 'aufgehenden Hoffnung' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 261; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 184).

60 'Er reißt sie, als Macht der Dissoziation, in der Zeit auseinander, um vielleicht fürs Ewige sie zu bewahren' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 184; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 126, tr. modified).

the late, but of all Beethoven's works. The temporal-philosophical paradigms devised for these works condition in his construction of music history the entire further development up to Schoenberg.

Between Beethoven and Schoenberg

Adorno believes that there is nothing in romanticism that was not already formulated and understood in Beethoven.⁶¹ Therefore romanticism is for him in an especially profound sense the epoch after Beethoven. Its greatest representatives in particular labour around his aesthetic paradoxes. Whereas Beethoven, however, managed in all creative periods to draw true musical moments from empirical time, subjectivity 'flags' or 'fatigues' in romanticism.⁶² Dissociation of time, which had already begun but still been held in check in late Beethoven, gets out of control, and musical language disintegrates. The critical relationship of variation to repetition, central to Beethoven's technique, is loosened; step by step the romantic composers move towards repetitive compulsion. As musical language by itself does no longer impute meaning to the material, and as the composer cannot enforce moments of meaning any more, the material itself is revalued: on the motivic level as *Einfall* and on the thematic level as melody.⁶³ Yet, exactly this is for Adorno not a sign of subjective spontaneity, but of

61 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 52; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 26.

62 'erlahmt', 'ermüdet' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 115, 145; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 73, 96).

63 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 49, 95; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 24, 59. Cf. also Mahler: *Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 236; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 89; and 'Form in der neuen Musik', 609.

subjective weakness.

From Adorno's Beethovenian-Hegelian perspective, romanticism is an epoch marked by the decline of subjectivity. The genesis of the musical artwork, in Beethoven achieved through dialectical paradoxes, thus becomes antinomical. The particular material elements, Adorno believes, are too qualified in romantic music to sublate in the totality of the work. This locks the composer in a double bind: if he aims to do justice to the particular, totality will turn out to be a failure; and if he focuses on the whole, he will be forced to do violence to the particular.⁶⁴ Both alternatives, formlessness and formalism, result in reification. Adorno also describes this antinomy with reference to the concept of fungibility: 'the tendency towards fungibility – as the organising principle of a musical whole – increases together with the impossibility of fungibility, that is, with the uniqueness of the particular detail'.⁶⁵ Adorno attempts to find a kernel of truth in the antinomy only in *Aesthetic Theory*, where he ponders whether the romantics, by qualifying the particular, did not aim to preserve a mimetic moment which classicism loses because of its partiality for totality. From this point of view, however, the antinomy may not be solved since the mimetic detail either defies or submits to formal objectivation.⁶⁶ Adorno deems this antinomy valid 'up to Schoenberg';⁶⁷ we now need to trace how the romantic composers nevertheless wrote great music.

64 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 48-49; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 23-24.

65 'die Tendenz zur Fungibilität – als der der Organisation eines musikalisch Ganzen – [wächst] zugleich mit der Unmöglichkeit der Fungibilität d. h. dem Einmaligkeitscharakter des Einzelnen' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 50; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 25, tr. modified).

66 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 275; *Aesthetic Theory*, 184.

67 'bis hinauf zu Schönberg' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 50; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 25).

The first composer to whom Adorno applies the romantic model is Schubert. In his large-scale instrumental works, Adorno discerns an attempt to come to terms with Beethoven's intensive type; unfortunately, Adorno explains only with reference to Brahms how the intensive type develops in the romantic epoch (cf. this section below).⁶⁸ Adorno takes a much greater interest in those works by Schubert that, due to their epic character, can be seen to relate to Beethoven's extensive type, such as for instance the piano sonatas and the *Symphony in B minor*. Adorno observes that in all these works, the composer's attitude towards the course of time is one of resignation.⁶⁹ The 'romantic difference' is that Schubert's resignation is so great that he renounces dialectical negation of the course of time.⁷⁰ From this results, in strict accordance with the romantic model, disintegration of the musical language and reification; Adorno speaks of a certain 'threadbare quality' of Schubert's material, a 'shop-worn element'.⁷¹ However, Adorno argues that the romantic antinomy is in Schubert linked to a mimetic motive;⁷² a motive that Adorno, as we saw above, respects greatly. Thus the antinomy can with reference to Schubert be described as the problem of how a composer who is unwilling to engage dialectically with time may in a mimetic-repetitive idiom constitute form with some authority. According to Adorno's Schubert article from 1928, the solution lies in a profound affinity to death which is

68 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 49; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 24.

69 Adorno, 'Zweite Nachtmusik', 52.

70 Ibid. Cf. also *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 213-214; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 65-66.

71 'Abgegriffenheit', 'Element des Shopworn' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 68; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 39, tr. modified. Cf. also Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 51; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 25).

72 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 94-95; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 59.

experienced in the compositional process and conveys to anyone who plays or hears Schubert's music a sense of formal coherence (cf. chapter I.4). As Adorno has confirmed the validity of his early Schubert article through republication in 1963, one can safely assume that this idea forms a constant of his Schubert interpretation. <

The music of Schumann, too, is made dependent by Adorno upon Beethoven's extensive type. The line of argument is the same: Schumann follows, like Schubert, a mimetic impulse, sets out from the qualified particular and therefore has to struggle with formalistic totality.⁷³ In Schumann's creative response to the antinomy, Adorno detects, as in Schubert, a moment of transitoriness; he writes that the antinomy was in Schumann 'bound up essentially with the tendency toward disintegration'.⁷⁴ Disintegration in Schumann is further defined as an aesthetic of illness and death. Adorno contends that Schumann refuses to agree 'with that which musical tradition calls healthy'⁷⁵ and forsakes in a musical gesture of 'throwing-away of the self' the possessive nature of totality.⁷⁶ Yet, it is not evident from these passages in what way exactly disintegration functions as a formal principle in Schumann. While Adorno interestingly twists the death myth in his Schubert interpretation, he merely renews in his reading of Schumann the myth of the tone poet who literally works himself into madness and onto the verge of death. This is all the more surprising as Adorno does

73 Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 49-50; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 24-25.

74 'Bei ... Robert Schumann verbündet diese Qualität sich wesentlich mit der Tendenz zum Zerfall' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 275; *Aesthetic Theory*, 184).

75 'mit dem, was in der musikalischen Tradition gesund genannt wird' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 330; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 5).

76 'Sich-Wegschenkens' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 224-225; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 155, tr. modified).

have a concrete musical approach towards Schumann's form. In a detailed analysis of the tonal plan of the *Liederkreis nach Gedichten Eichendorffs op. 39*, he demonstrates that disintegration can in Schumann be understood as a pure construction of the antinomy of meaningful particular and abstract form.⁷⁷ This text postdates the 'mythologising' interpretation and can therefore be seen as a discreet revision of Adorno's earlier intellectual *faux pas*.

Brahms stands in Adorno's music historiography no less in Beethoven's shadow than Schubert and Schumann. In contrast to the main representatives of the older romantic generation, Brahms is of course oriented towards the intensive type. The post-Beethovenian antinomy of musical time, which is supposed to be valid 'up to Schoenberg', thus follows from different premises in Brahms. For Adorno, his project appears as one more attempt to negate the course of time through developing variation. Although Brahms greatly advances the technique of motivic mediation, the antinomy applies to his music in the strictest sense: substantial themes permit no immanently mediated totality, and imitations of Beethoven's 'trivial' themes lack on Brahms's level of reflection the dynamic impulse upon which the process of immanent mediation depends. 'The whole of Brahms's music', Adorno states, 'crystallised around this problem'.⁷⁸ Adorno furnishes no evidence for this; one learns nothing about the meaning of the sections of the sonata form in Brahms or his technical dealing with the antinomy.

77 Adorno, 'Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs – Coda: Schumanns Lieder', GS 11, 87-94; 'In Memory of Eichendorff – Coda: Schumann's *Lieder*', *Notes to Literature I*, tr. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, New York 1991, 73-79. Cf. also *Ästhetische Theorie*, 275; *Aesthetic Theory*, 184.

78 'Darum ist ... die gesamte Musik von Brahms ankristallisiert' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 49; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 24).

The truth-content of the abstract relationships of the whole and the parts is only intimated with a sociological analogy: 'Brahms, in pensively and somehow worriedly taking the standpoint of the isolated, alienated, self-submerging private individual, negates negation'.⁷⁹ Further down in the same text, this concession is relativised; the awareness of subjective isolation, Adorno postulates, must be carried so far 'that it will shed all appearance'.⁸⁰ In Adorno's view, however, this is only achieved by Schoenberg.

Schubert, Schumann and Brahms do not develop their own temporal-philosophical paradigms because their quest for musical form is closely oriented by Beethoven's extensive or intensive type respectively. Parallel to this line runs another in Adorno's historiography for which the romantic antinomy remains valid, although its representatives break with Beethoven. This line can only be reconstructed through Berlioz, Wagner and Strauss because there are no sufficiently informative sources in Adorno's writings about, for instance, Liszt and Bruckner. At the beginning of this line, in Berlioz, the break with the Beethovenian tradition occurs because poetic programs and sonata form can according to Adorno not be made to match. To lend coherence to Berlioz's programmatic form, the comparatively inflexible developing variation, originating in stricter forms, is not suitable. It gives way to the leitmotiv, which, however, is due to its poetic content already so individuated in Berlioz that it functions in fact only as a binding device.

79 'Indem Brahms den Standpunkt des Isolierten und entfremdet sich in sich selbst Versenkenden und Privaten schwermütig, gleichsam sorgenvoll einnimmt, negiert er die Negation' (Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 246; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 64).

80 'bis es allen Scheins sich begibt' (Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 247; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 65).

Thus the genesis of form is antinomic in Berlioz.⁸¹ – In Wagner, then, the only composer between Beethoven and Schoenberg who establishes his own temporal-philosophical paradigm (cf. chapter II), the leitmotiv technique ‘became under the name of psychological variation ... an unproblematic, self-explanatory, and fully worked out technique of composition, a stylistic principle’.⁸² The chain of deductions that Adorno elaborated to prove the correlation of leitmotiv technique and abstract form (cf. chapter II), is still operative here. Wagner therefore occupies no special place in Adorno’s historiography; for him, too, the romantic antinomy is valid.

Wagner, however, is also the only romantic composer, apart from Mahler, to whom Adorno dedicated a monograph and a detailed redeeming critique. In his mature writings Adorno advances this position even further, whereby he refers not only to the modern potential of Wagner’s harmonic language and instrumentation any more, but particularly to the relationship of the leitmotivic particulars and formal totality. In this context Adorno draws near to a solution for the romantic antinomy in Wagner. He writes in ‘Wagners Aktualität’ (1963-1965) that Wagner’s work was ‘the first in which the priority ... of the concretely formulated *Gestalt* over any kind of schema, any kind of externally posited form prevails completely’.⁸³ This point is remarkable

81 Adorno, ‘Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition’, 70-71; ‘The Prehistory of Serial Music’, 56-57.

82 ‘unter dem Namen der psychologischen Variation ... zur unproblematischen, selbstverständlichen und durchgebildeten Kompositionstechnik: zum Stilprinzip’ (Adorno, ‘Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition’, 71; ‘The Prehistory of Serial Music’, 57, tr. modified).

83 ‘das erste, in dem grundsätzlich die Vormacht ... der konkret durchgebildeten Gestalt gegenüber jedem wie immer auch gearteten Schema, jeder wie immer auch von außen

not only because it is at odds with *Versuch über Wagner*, but also because Adorno sees potential for a solution of the romantic antinomy in the Darmstadt School and not in the second Viennese School, as the reader of *Versuch über Wagner* would expect. This link is strengthened further in 'Wagner und Bayreuth' (1966), where Adorno, correcting the theorem about manipulation of the listener from *Versuch über Wagner*, argues that new music could only be fully understood when Wagner's postulate for integrative and active listening was realised.⁸⁴

How the antinomy takes shape in Strauss is easily described. Fundamentally Adorno employs in his critique of Strauss the regressive elements of the Wagner paradigm; he speaks about persuading repetition, calculated effects and overwhelming of the listener.⁸⁵ In the text that he wrote on the occasion of Strauss's centenary, he interprets his technique at some points according to the progressive elements of the Wagner paradigm. Generally, however, he follows Alban Berg who found Strauss's technique especially detestable.⁸⁶ On the romantic antinomy and its solution, Adorno says that the organisation of temporal succession was arbitrary in Strauss⁸⁷ and the connection between detail and totality was merely 'ordered' by the authoritarian composer.⁸⁸ Thus Adorno managed to surpass a feature of Strauss's physiognomy that he deems utterly important, namely his arrogance.

vorgeordneten Form ganz sich durchsetzt' (Adorno, 'Wagners Aktualität', GS 16, 543-564, here 548).

84 Adorno, 'Wagner und Bayreuth', GS 18, 210-225, here 219.

85 Adorno, *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, 398; *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, 197. Cf. also Adorno, 'Richard Strauss: Zum 100. Geburtstag, 11. Juni 1964', GS 16, 565-606, here 567.

86 Adorno, 'Richard Strauss: Zum 100. Geburtstag, 11. Juni 1964', 575.

87 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 319; *Aesthetic Theory*, 215.

88 Adorno, 'Richard Strauss: Zum 100. Geburtstag, 11. Juni 1964', 569.

At this point in the reconstruction of Adorno's music historiography, it becomes clear that Adorno wrote not only little, but also with little understanding about the romantic composers, except for Schubert and Wagner. His intellectual interest for most of the composers between Beethoven and Schoenberg was evidently not great. It is remarkable that it is possible at all to reconstruct this epoch from a temporal-philosophical perspective and according to a central antinomy. In Adorno's music historiography, one must conclude, this epoch is made to function as an anti-climactic parenthesis.

Before Schoenberg, however, Adorno sets a caesura: Mahler. The antinomy is valid for Mahler just as for the other romantic composers.⁸⁹ Yet, the temporal continuum is for him, as for the next generation, already so dissociated that he experiences it is a compulsive repetition of the same. Thus the relationship of the whole and the parts is for Mahler not abstract, but fragmentary: 'Each Mahlerian symphony asks how, from the ruins of the musical objective world, a living totality can arise'.⁹⁰ Mahler poses this question from an epic perspective. The subjective attitude that brought about Beethoven's extensive type is merely precursory to this,⁹¹ for Mahler cannot afford to grant a degree of freedom to time, which opposes him as a dissociating force, as could Beethoven, who in all periods was able to dominate time. Mahler therefore has to learn constructive principles from epic time itself. Thus Adorno's characterisation of Mahler's technique and form is not

89 Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 199; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 49.

90 'Jede Mahlersche Symphonie fragt, wie aus den Trümmern der musikalischen Dingwelt lebendige Totalität werden kann' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 189; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 39).

91 Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 213-214; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 65. Cf. also Adorno, 'Marginalien zu Mahler', GS 18, 235-240, here 236.

oriented by Beethoven, but by epic novelists who in his view experience and organise time in a similar way as Mahler, namely Flaubert, Dostojevskij and, first of all, Proust.⁹² Their anti-classicist impulse is according to Adorno also Mahler's. It appears as sensitivity to a remnant of reification that even Beethoven did not dissolve, 'the rigid contrast between that which is once posited, and what it becomes'.⁹³

For this reason, Mahler uses an alternative technical principle for repetition and variation which Adorno designates since 1936 with the term 'variant'.⁹⁴ According to a definition in the Mahler monograph, it forms 'the technical formula for the epic and novel-like element'.⁹⁵ Variants are modifications affecting the thematic core itself, continuous motivic alterations that cannot be reduced, but only related back through remembering to their initial form. With this technique, Mahler adopts for music the phenomenon of ageing.⁹⁶ Mahler's mimetic sympathy for such laws proper to time that were not understood in music before, also takes its effects in the mediation of the whole and the parts. The musical totality quasi presents itself in Mahler, 'the reflection of the details by the context is of the same nature as the reflection of a

92 Adorno, 'Marginalien zu Mahler', 237-238. Cf. also Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 209, 287-288; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 61, 145-146.

93 'den starren Kontrast zwischen dem einmal Gesetzten und dem, was daraus wird' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 236; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 89, tr. modified).

94 Adorno, 'Marginalien zu Mahler', 236.

95 'die technische Formel für das episch-romanhafte Moment' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 233; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 86).

96 Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 221-222; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 72.

narrated incident by the narrative'.⁹⁷ Such proximity to time also influences the relationship between formal sections. Mahler's expositions do not posit themes with authoritative gesture, but introduce them like protagonists of a novel into the course of time.⁹⁸ The development section legitimises the recapitulation, which was problematic even in Beethoven's extensive works, by presenting the main themes in variants which in many cases reveals them as such for the first time in a symphonic movement.⁹⁹

Thus the 'afterwards' in musical form, that is, productive remembering, is closely bound up in Mahler with motivic technique. Mahler so achieves to master a situation already marked by the breaches and fissures of modernity: 'From the timelessness of the unchanging Mahler releases historical time'.¹⁰⁰ Mahler succeeds in reawakening musical language that has been reified and turned into second nature.¹⁰¹ Evidently, Adorno is convinced of the truth-content of his epic composing, for he employs for the first time since Beethoven his metaphysical quality label, the Eurydice motive: 'Like Eurydice, Mahler's music has been abducted from the realm of the dead'.¹⁰² After

97 'die Reflexion der Details durch den Zusammenhang ist desselben Wesens wie die eines Erzählten durch die Erzählung' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 225; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 76).

98 Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 242; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 95.

99 Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 161; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 13.

100 'Aus der Zeitlosigkeit des Immergleichen läßt Mahler historische Zeit entspringen' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 226; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 77).

101 Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 167-169, 174-175; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 19-21, 25-26.

102 'Mahlers Musik ist wie Eurydike aus dem Totenreich entführt' (Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 205; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 56, tr, modified. Cf. also Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, 251; *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, 103).

Mahler, the dissociation of the temporal continuum advances relentlessly. Epic duration, productive remembering and mimetic love of time become problematic. The composers have only one option if they do not want to submit to repetitive compulsion: to assume a strictly antithetic position towards time.

Schoenberg and his Contemporaries

Schoenberg's attempt to master the modern situation has been analysed in depth in chapter III. The relationship of dodecaphony to the nineteenth century, however, was not discussed there because Adorno tackled this issue only later, in the context of his historiography of the Romantic epoch. In a text written specifically to close this gap in his theory, 'The Prehistory of Serial Music' (1958), Adorno argues that the principles of dodecaphony were prefigured in works such as the first Chamber Symphony and the first two String Quartets through an association of technical methods of the Beethoven-Brahms line and the Berlioz-Wagner-Strauss line. Adorno emphasises that this is not a simple adoption of the common view that dodecaphony stems from an application of advanced variation techniques to chromatic material. On his account, Schoenberg does not apply the technique of one line to the material of the other, but mediates in a reaction to the historical state of the material the technique of *both* lines, developing variation and Leitmotiv technique, in a way that points to dodecaphony. Developing variation thereby moves, in a historical trajectory set off by Beethoven and Brahms, into subcutaneous strata, it is 'removed from the surface

and becomes part of the way the material is deployed'.¹⁰³ Leitmotiv technique supplies the element of compulsion in the treatment of motives: 'The leitmotifs were authoritative in their identity, and yet, looked at from the perspective of the whole, they were radically changed against their own will and reduced to mere material. As such, they may be thought of as the first rows'.¹⁰⁴

Thus developing variation is in Schoenberg from the start infected with the principles of compulsion that make true attention to the material impossible, inducing the failure of Schoenberg's approach which *Philosophy of New Music* is so concerned with. In the phase of free atonality, this technique emancipates itself fully from traditional systems,¹⁰⁵ and in the dodecaphonic phase it is codified and rationalised.¹⁰⁶ In his mature writings, Adorno holds onto his critique of this technique, in particular when Schoenberg forces in his strictest works all elements into equidistance to the centre. From 1951, when strict serialism won through at Darmstadt, Adorno concedes that in *Philosophy of New Music*, he had focused too one-sidedly on Schoenberg's pitch organisation. He now attempts in a number of

103 'von der Oberfläche abgezogen, zu einem Vorgang der Materialdisposition' (Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', 74; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 59. Cf. also Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', 70; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 56).

104 'Man mag die in ihrer Identität verbindlichen und doch vom Ganzen her gegen ihren eigenen Willen radikal veränderten, zum bloßen Stoff reduzierten Leitmotive als die ersten Reihen ansehen' (Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', 72; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 57-58. Cf. also Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', 73; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 59).

105 Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', 69; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 55.

106 Adorno, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition', 84; 'The Prehistory of Serial Music', 68.

articles to catch up with the composer's superior musical experience. In Adorno's own words: 'Recourse to compositions corrects not only many of the mistakes that occur when one merely considers the material, but also renders visible that despite the danger of violence and alienation in the most advanced music, the only music that really counts, the possibility of successful artworks is greater than one assumes from a seemingly superior distance'.¹⁰⁷

Such insights motivated mature Adorno to analyse works of the Second Viennese School in detail. In order not to betray his temporal-philosophical convictions, he developed a concept of analysis strictly analogous to his concept of performance and listening (cf. chapter I), the so-called 'performance analysis' (*Interpretationsanalyse*) or 'listening analysis' (*Höranalyse*). Adorno practised this kind of analysis already in *Der getreue Korrepetitor* (1952/1963). The theoretical formulation followed later in a lecture entitled 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis' (1969). According to this lecture analysis is 'one of those media through which the work unfolds. Works need analysis for their "truth-content" to be revealed ... Analysis is to be understood as an organ not only of the historical momentum of the works in themselves, but also of the momentum which pushes beyond the work'.¹⁰⁸ It is clear that Adorno

107'Der Rekurs auf die Kompositionen berichtigt nicht bloß einiges von dem, was in der bloßen Betrachtung der Tendenz des Materials an Fehlern unterläuft, sondern macht auch sichtbar, daß bei aller Gefahr von Gewalttat und Selbstentfremdung in der fortgeschrittensten Musik, der einzigen, die im Ernst zählt, die Möglichkeit verbindlicher Kunstwerke größer ist, als die falsche Überlegenheit der Distanz ahnt' (Adorno, 'Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik', 169).

108'eines der Medien, durch welche die Werke selbst sich entfalten. Die Werke bedürfen der Analyse, damit ihr Wahrheitsgehalt hervortritt ... Sie ist aufzufassen als ein Organ der geschichtlichen Bewegung nicht nur der Werke in sich, sondern auch der Bewegung, die über die einzelnen Werke hinaustreibt' (Adorno, 'Zum Problem der musikalischen

makes himself quite vulnerable with such a concept of analysis; thus his analyses are here neither to be defended nor to be disproved, but to be explained. In the 'Instructions on Listening to New Music', Adorno examines with reference to the orchestral song *Seraphita* from op. 22 (1913), Schoenberg's last non-dodecaphonic work, the balance of strict motivic treatment and free phrase structure, counterpoint and instrumentation.¹⁰⁹ Adorno was certainly aware that it would have been more plausible and more elegant to trace the dependence of the melodic level upon developing variations on the rhythmic level;¹¹⁰ but he seems to have found it more important to let the reader of the 'Instructions on Listening to New Music' participate in the new insights into the complex relationship between material and composition in Schoenberg that he gained in 'listening analysis'.

Although Adorno attempts in his revision of *Philosophy of New Music* to do justice to the balance between material and composition, he does not recant his core objection against Schoenberg, namely that there remains in his work a gap between technical disqualification of the material and its qualification in the actual composition. Here exactly lies the problem that Berg and Webern belabour, each with a specific temporal consciousness. Berg avoids the need to balance dimensions that remain unmediated in the compositional process through

Analyse', *Frankfurter Adorno-Blätter* 7 (2001), 73-89, here 78-79; 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', tr. Max Paddison, *Music Analysis* 1, 2 (1982), 169-187, here 176, tr. modified).

¹⁰⁹Adorno, 'Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik', 211-217.

¹¹⁰This point is, as other ones further down in this section, taken from Diether de la Motte's article on Adorno's analyses. De la Motte identifies the idiosyncrasies of Adorno's analyses precisely, but denies Adorno for no apparent reason an adequate hermeneutic effort. (Diether de la Motte, 'Adornos musikalische Analysen', *Adorno und die Musik*, ed. Otto Kolleritsch, Graz 1979, 52-63, here 54).

remembering. As if he had not only learned positive lessons from his teacher, he refuses to forget the traces of the past sedimented in the material. This suggests a parallel to Mahler, whose ability to organise fragmented material Adorno also explains via the concept of remembering. It is important to mention this parallel because it tells a great deal about Adorno's strategy in employing the concept of remembering. The differences from Mahler, however, are equally important: Berg's remembering is in no way associated with narrative formal laws or attempts to reawaken the traditional musical language. On his historical level, Berg would become a moderate modernist with such an aesthetic. Adorno prevents this assumption by qualifying Berg's remembering with negative temporal concepts: 'Berg's remembering is lethal. Only in the sense that the past is retrieved as something irretrievable, through its own death, does it become part of the present'.¹¹¹

Adorno dispels any remaining notion that Berg might be a moderate modernist with the remark that Berg uses developing variation just as radically as Schoenberg and that 'every bar, indeed every note' is in Berg's music, as in Schoenberg's, 'equidistant to the center'.¹¹² Berg's consciousness of time, however, affects the technique inherited from Schoenberg, transforming it into the art of the smallest link: 'While he adopted the technique of "developing variation" from Schoenberg',

¹¹¹'Bergs Erinnerung ist tödlich. Nur dadurch, daß sie das Vergangene als unwiederbringlich wiederbringt, durch seinen Tod hindurch, fällt es der Gegenwart zu' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 350; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 21. Cf. also Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 351; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 21).

¹¹²'jeder Takt, ja jede Note gleich nah zum Mittelpunkt' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 393; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 55).

Adorno writes, 'he unconsciously steered it in the opposite direction. Generating, according to Schoenberg's idea, a maximum of shapes from a minimum of elements is just one level of Berg's compositional technique; the other lies deeper: that music, by its very process, dissolves. It ends in the minimum, virtually in a single note'.¹¹³ The idea of the 'self-dissolution of music' is another variant of Adorno's main metaphysical idea. In another passage of the Berg monograph, it is designated Berg's formal law.¹¹⁴ As this level is supposed to lie deeper than the technical level, one can conclude that Adorno makes Berg's technique dependent upon a metaphysical formal law. It is applied particularly efficiently by Adorno when he discusses endings: in the finale of *Lulu*, for instance, the music is said to become 'free to achieve the fatal reconciliation expressed in Geschwitz's last words'.¹¹⁵ The formal law conditions all phases of Berg's composing to the same degree; twelve-tone technique is according to Adorno in Berg 'bound up with the resources of free atonality, is, in fact, unnoticeably' – through smallest links – 'developed from it'.¹¹⁶

113 'Übernahm er von Schönberg die Technik der "entwickelnden Variation", so lenkte er sie, unbewußt, in umgekehrte Richtung. Aus einem Minimum an Elementen, nach Schönbergs Idee, ein Maximum an Gestalten hervorzubringen, ist nur die eine Schicht von Bergs Komponieren; tiefer die andere: daß Musik durch ihren Verlauf sich auflöse. Sie endet im Minimum, virtuell im einzelnen Ton' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 371-372; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 38).

114 Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 326; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 2.

115 'zu jener tödlichen Versöhnung, die in den letzten Worten der Geschwitz ausgesprochen ist' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 477; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 125).

116 'dem Material der freizügigen Atonalität verbunden, ja aus ihm unmerklich entwickelt' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 454; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 106).

Again, Adorno proves the validity of the metaphysical formal law with detailed analyses. This is of crucial importance, for Adorno claims in the lecture 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis' that he saw the necessity of developing a new concept of analysis when he was studying Berg's music.¹¹⁷ He writes about the fourth of the *Pieces for Clarinet and Piano op. 5* (1913): 'The "theme" is made up of a chord sustained over four bars in unvarying syncopated rhythm, with a chromatic opposing line in the clarinet ... A melodic motive in the clarinet proceeds as a "Gang"; its triplet closing segment comprises the remnant and is developed in imitation; then, following the procedure of the first piece, the music disintegrates through the diminution of all its elements and comes to a complete halt'.¹¹⁸ Obviously, Adorno's application of the concept of 'Gang' is historically incorrect, and with the idea that the music 'comes to a complete halt', he arbitrarily discontinues a line of developing variations that in fact continues beyond that endpoint.¹¹⁹ Yet it is not difficult in this case to find an immanent explanation for these idiosyncrasies: Adorno's assertion that 'the music disintegrates through the diminution of all its elements' refers quite unmistakably to Berg's metaphysical formal law.

The analysis of the Allegretto Scherzando theme of the *Violin*

117Adorno, 'Zum Problem der musikalischen Analyse', 87-88; 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', 184.

118'Das "Thema" wird von einem über vier Takte im gleichen synkopierten Rhythmus festgehaltenen Akkord gebildet, mit einer chromatischen Gegenstimme der Klarinette ... Ein melodisches Motiv der Klarinette setzt als "Gang" fort; dessen Triolenschlußglied macht den Rest aus und ist imitatorisch verarbeitet; dann wird, nach der Verfahrungsweise des ersten Stücks, die Musik durch Verkleinerung aller Elemente aufgelöst und bleibt gänzlich stehen' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 413; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 71, tr. modified).

119De la Motte, 'Adornos musikalische Analysen', 60.

Concerto (1935) in *Der Getreue Korrepetitor* fulfils the same purpose: 'F and G are obstinately repeated, circling around the F#, which appears only accidentally, but forms the implicit centre'. Adorno continues: 'The motive, or more correctly perhaps: the thematic model appears ... as if it was a short melody and yet only a single note – probably the latent Gb – which is omitted, but so prevalent that the theme does not quite materialise'. From these premises Adorno concludes that the theme moves towards 'nothingness, the non-existent, the differential of the single note, which it points to by omitting it'.¹²⁰ Again, Adorno's mistake is obvious: the critical F#, as a dominant third, has no disintegrating, but a forward-moving function.¹²¹ It is equally obvious, however, that this 'listening mistake' happened because Adorno treats works of the Second Viennese School in particular with temporal-philosophical creativity. After all, the 'getreue Korrepetitor' – the faithful accompanist – is according to an aside in 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis' not an impartial analytical craftsman, but an analyst for whom faithfulness is synonymous with imagination.¹²²

¹²⁰'obstinat werden die Noten f und g wiederholt, umkreisen das nur akzidentell erscheinende fis als unausdrückliches Zentrum. ... Das Motiv, oder richtiger vielleicht: thematische Modell wirkt, ... als wäre es eine kurze Melodie und doch wiederum keine, sondern nur ein Ton – wohl das latente ges –, der ausgespart wird, ohne daß das Thema seiner Vormacht gegenüber ganz auf die Welt käme. ... nähert sich das Thema dem Nichts, dem nicht Vorhandenen, dem Differential des Einzeltons, den es meint, indem es ihn verschweigt' (Adorno, *Interpretationsanalysen. Alban Berg: Violinkonzert*, GS 15, 338-368, here 342).

¹²¹De la Motte, 'Adornos musikalische Analysen', 59.

¹²²Adorno, 'Zum Problem der musikalischen Analyse', 80; 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis, 177.

Webern pursues in Adorno's view the same metaphysical intention as Berg.¹²³ His music desires to 'fall silent', to 'vanish',¹²⁴ or, according to a characteristic performance mark, to 'evanesce'.¹²⁵ His attitude to the material, however, is opposed to Berg's. Whereas Berg strives for smallest links, Webern exposes the material's fragmentary nature. He forgets the historical qualities, which Berg tries to remember, even more decidedly than Schoenberg. It is therefore only logical that Adorno discerns principles of compulsion in Webern; he writes that the brevity of his works is 'compelled from flowing abundance',¹²⁶ and that his reflective immersion in the dissociated material partakes of subjective violence.¹²⁷ This also resonates in Adorno's description of Webern's lyrical forms via Hegel's concept of contraction (*Zusammengezogenheit*).¹²⁸ In Adorno's texts about Webern, respect and fundamental critique generally blend, as the following passage exemplifies: 'Webern's short forms are admirable in themselves. They do justice to the state of the formal problem in a strict and negative way, namely through renunciation of temporal extension. But they also move back from the formal problem, because in the short forms the objectivation of the single event is incomparably easier to achieve than

123 Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 329; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 4.

124 'verstummen', 'verschwinden' (Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs*, 329; *Berg: The Master of the Smallest Link*, 4).

125 'verlöschen' (Adorno, 'Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik', 151).

126 'der strömenden Fülle abgezwungen' (Adorno, 'Über einige Arbeiten von Anton Webern', *GS* 18, 673-679, here 674).

127 Adorno, 'Das Altern der neuen Musik', *GS* 14, 143-167, here 148; 'The Ageing of the New Music', tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, *Telos* 77 (fall 1988), 95-116, here 100.

128 Adorno, 'Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik', 151.

where temporal extension calls for a kind of objectivation that goes beyond the merely subjective'. The formal problem of the Second Viennese School, Adorno concludes, is thus 'carried further' in Schoenberg and Berg 'than in Webern, who at first appeared to be the most radical of the Viennese composers'.¹²⁹

That Adorno emphasises in his late texts the rationalistic moment in Webern's composing, is best explained with Webern's popularity among the strict serialists, just as the modification of his Schoenberg interpretation has to do with Schoenberg's unpopularity in Darmstadt. The theorem according to which music that abstractly negates repetitive compulsion gets caught up in dialectical circles, which does not really fit into the new Schoenberg reading, is now applied to Webern. Already from the *Four Pieces for Violin and Piano op. 7* (1910) on, Adorno argues, repetitions are strictly forbidden.¹³⁰ In the dodecaphonic works, then, Webern avoids along with temporal extension also twelve-tone themes and thematic rhythms, which would result in openly repetitive forms.¹³¹ However, Adorno makes a substantial effort to prove that even in Webern identical elements recur and that his approach becomes circular. Although in Webern's lyrically contracted forms, 'no motivic-

129 'Weberns Kurzformen sind bewundernswert in sich und tragen streng, negativ, nämlich durch Verzicht auf die zeitliche Extension, dem Stand des Formproblems Rechnung. Sie weichen aber vor ihm zurück, weil in den Kurzformen die Objektivation des Einzelnen unvergleichlich viel mehr Aussicht hat als dort, wo zeitliche Ausdehnung eine über die lyrisch subjektive Regung hinausweisende Objektivität erheischt. ... Wohl dürfte es [das Formproblem] ... weiter getrieben sein als bei Webern, der zunächst als der radikalste der Wiener Komponisten erschien' (Adorno, 'Form in der neuen Musik', 611-612).

130 Adorno, 'Interpretationsanalysen: Anton Webern, Vier Stücke für Geige und Klavier op. 7', GS 15, 302-312, here 302.

131 Adorno, 'Interpretationsanalysen: Anton Webern, Sechs Bagatellen für Streichquartett op. 9', GS 15, 277-301, here 282.

thematic elements are repeated',¹³² there are still 'knots', minimal developments, and recapitulation effects evoked through colouristic or sonorous values. Structurally, this point is reminiscent of *Philosophy of New Music*. Adorno's conclusion corresponds to the passage where he speaks of the recurrence of the 'ghosts' of the pre-critical forms: 'Inevitably' – compulsively – 'the relationship of similarity and difference is reproduced as a formal category'.¹³³

Both Webern's metaphysical intention to dissolve music in the lyrical moment and the recurrence of traditional formal schemata is exemplified by Adorno with an analysis of the first of the *Bagatelles for String Quartet op. 9* (1911). The whole piece strives to 'evanesce completely' in its last notes.¹³⁴ For Adorno's ears, these notes are the melodically critical ones. They are 'similar to those leading from the exposition to the development; not least this brings forth the recapitulation effect, and these notes should in all tenderness be emphasised so much that the similarity becomes noticeable'.¹³⁵ An analyst who is able to hear last notes in Webern without metaphysical associations would object that where Adorno discerns similarities, Webern actually operates with pitch neighbourhoods.¹³⁶ Against Adorno, however, it must be said that the subcutaneous sonata

132'nichts Motivisch-Thematisches sich wiederholt' (Adorno, 'Form in der neuen Musik', 615).

133'Unabdingbar reproduziert sich das Verhältnis von Ähnlichkeit und Differenz als Formkategorie' (Ibid.).

134'ganz zu verklingen' (Adorno, 'Interpretationsanalysen. Anton Webern: Sechs Bagatellen für Streichquartett op. 9', 287).

135'denen ähnlich, die von der Exposition zur Durchführung geleiten; nicht zuletzt darauf beruht die Reprise Wirkung, und jene Töne wären so weit, bei aller Zartheit, zu markieren, daß die Ähnlichkeit auffällt' (Ibid.).

136De la Motte, 'Adornos musikalische Analysen', 57.

structure of the Bagatelle cannot really be revealed with reference to these supposedly critical notes. Presumably Adorno was in this case not just guided by his metaphysical ears, but also by a strategic resolve to teach the Darmstadt composers a lesson and to 'critically affect composition itself', as it says in his lecture on analysis.¹³⁷

In his continued reflection of the Schoenberg School, Adorno has not gained fundamentally new temporal-philosophical insights. His interpretation of Schoenberg and Webern primarily processes experiences with strict serialism, and he revised texts about Berg from 1937 only gently, as if he were imitating the art of the smallest link. He did, however, have serious doubts about his interpretation of Stravinsky and its temporal-philosophical basis. In *Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait* (1962/1963), he enumerates the central findings of the Stravinsky part of *Philosophy of New Music* in a quasi-analysis of his own text: the formal law of 'compulsive repetitiveness from which there is no escape',¹³⁸ mimesis of the 'hopelessly circular bonds of fate'¹³⁹ and denial of temporal-dimensional mediation.¹⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, there are also explicit comparisons with Sisyphus¹⁴¹ and covert comparisons with

137Adorno, 'Zum Problem der musikalischen Analyse', 89; 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', 185.

138'zwangshaften, ausweglosen Wiederholung' (Adorno, 'Strawinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', GS 16, 382-409, here 386; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', *Quasi una fantasia*, tr. Rodney Livingstone, London 1992, 145-175, here 150).

139'hoffnungslos kreisenden Schicksalszusammenhang' (Adorno, 'Strawinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 386; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 150, tr. modified. Cf. also Adorno, 'Strawinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 393; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 158).

140Adorno, 'Strawinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 388; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 152.

141Adorno, 'Strawinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 388; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 152.

Heidegger.¹⁴² Adorno does not abandon his critical position, but he ponders whether there might be an alternative reading. He is particularly concerned about the possibility that Stravinsky's radical exposure of regression might not point towards an end of regression, that 'the taboo that Stravinsky's music imposes on life' might be 'a manifestation of negative truth'.¹⁴³

These reflections are of enormous importance for Adorno's temporal-philosophical project, for he attempts here for the first time to think repetition as determinate negation within the context of new music. Closer examination of texts from that time, however, reveals that it was not the work of Stravinsky that showed Adorno the pressing need of such reflection, but the work of Beckett. 'On the old piano edition of Stravinsky's *Ragtime for Eleven Instruments*', writes Adorno in 'Trying to Understand *Endgame*' (1960), 'was a drawing by Picasso ... which shows two seedy figures, precursors of Vladimir and Estragon, the vagabonds who are waiting for Godot'.¹⁴⁴ Quite boldly, Adorno associates with this drawing 'the battered repetitions that Beckett's whole oeuvre irresistibly drags in. ... The repetition compulsion is learned by watching the regressive behaviour of the prisoner, who tries again and again'.¹⁴⁵

142 Adorno, 'Stravinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 386; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 150.

143 'das Tabu, das Stravinskys statische Musik über das Lebendige ergehen läßt, die erscheinende negative Wahrheit selbst ist' (Adorno, 'Stravinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 385; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 149, tr. modified).

144 'Auf der alten Klavierausgabe von Stravinskys *Ragtime für elf Instrumente* stand eine Picassozeichnung, die ... zwei verlumpte Figuren zeigt, Vorfahren der Vagabunden Wladimir und Estragon, die auf Herrn Godot warten' (Adorno, 'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen', GS 11, 281-321, here 313; 'Trying to Understand *Endgame*', *Notes to Literature*, 241-275, here 268).

145 'die ramponierten Wiederholungen, die Becketts gesamtes Werk unwiderstehlich herbeizieht. ... Wiederholungszwang ist der regressiven Verhaltensweise des

Picasso and Stravinsky are not discussed further in this text. Adorno states, however, playing out like in *Negative Dialectics* Beckett against Heidegger and logic of disintegration against fundamental ontology, that Beckett's repetitions 'crumble' positive metaphysical meaning 'with necessity and stringency'.¹⁴⁶

If Beckett had been a composer, Adorno would certainly have employed the Eurydice motive. Yet, when dealing with Stravinsky, he lets Sisyphus prevail over Eurydice in the end, just as in *Philosophy of New Music*. Adorno does concede that Stravinsky is the only composer who could have qualified repetition as determinate negation, and he says that 'for moments', in 'indelible passages' in the chorale of the *Histoire du soldat*, this could be felt.¹⁴⁷ But Stravinsky's positive metaphysics, or, as Adorno writes with a sideswipe at Heidegger, the pretention of his music to have overcome time, to be 'Being' (*Sein*),¹⁴⁸ lets his project fail. Despite the polemical tone, Adorno's late article on Stravinsky documents a serious attempt to solve the theoretical problem of repetition in modern artworks – and not only musical ones. However, Adorno honours only Stravinsky in this way, while he refuses to reflect profoundly on the repetitions of other composers outside the Schoenberg School. Adorno's claim, for instance, that Hindemith, who still serves as his scapegoat of modernity, always 'composed with

Eingespernten abgesehen, der es immer wieder versucht' (Adorno, 'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen', 313; 'Trying to Understand *Endgame*', 268).

146 'mit Notwendigkeit und Strenge zerbröckeln' (Adorno, 'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen', 282; 'Trying to Understand *Endgame*', 242, tr. modified).

147 'für Augenblicke', 'unauslöschlichen Stellen' (Adorno, 'Stravinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 408–409; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 174–175, tr. modified).

148 Adorno, 'Stravinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild', 388; 'Stravinsky: A Dialectical Portrait', 152.

ready-to-hand equipment' (*zuhandenem Zeug*),¹⁴⁹ is certainly a brilliant joke, but no serious critique.

After Schoenberg

According to Adorno's historiography, the composers after Schoenberg get entangled in temporal-philosophical antinomies just as the composers after Beethoven. This is especially true of the first generation of the Darmstadt School. Strict serialism, Adorno writes, 'subjects' Schoenberg 'to a further self-reflection and turns him upside down by totalising his principle'.¹⁵⁰ Adorno is convinced of the necessity of such reflection. He is equally convinced, however, that the attempt of Boulez, Stockhausen and others to expand twelve-tone technique to all dimensions of the material is in no way necessary. The result of his own further reflection of Schoenberg, it will be remembered, was that Schoenberg himself has shown that compositional mediation can be a viable solution for the problems of twelve-tone technique (cf. chapter IV.5). By advancing in the opposite direction, that of the rationalisation of the material, the strict serialists intensify the antinomy that Adorno observed in Schoenberg's work. In order to prove this, Adorno adapts an argument by Stockhausen which he found inconsistent, but all the more reflective of the strict serialists' intention, namely that the parameters that Schoenberg leaves undetermined are all to the same

149 'mit zuhandenem Zeug komponiert' (Adorno, 'Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - Postludium', GS 17, 239-246, here 242).

150 'reflektiert ihn [Schönberg] nochmals in sich und krepelt ihn um durch Totalität seines Prinzips' (Adorno, 'Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen', 303; 'Trying to Understand *Endgame*', 259, tr. modified).

degree temporal relations.¹⁵¹ When these parameters are determined, however, the music becomes 'incompatible with the medium of time to which as music it inevitably belongs. To neglect time means nothing less than that music is failing to concern itself with one of its specific material preconditions'.¹⁵²

Thus the strict serialists counter empirical time on all material levels with compulsive rationalistic measures. With such abstract negations they induce, faithfully reproducing the mechanism described in *Philosophy of New Music*, dialectical reversals that reinstate what they negate, empirical time. Adorno has varied this idea from different perspectives. Presupposing the Kantian theorem that time forms the inner sense of the subject, he can declare that music which is incompatible with time becomes estranged from the self,¹⁵³ thus escaping from the subject's sphere of influence and disabling it to expand its power to all musical dimensions. Another circle constructed with Kant's help, which was only applied to variation technique in *Philosophy of New Music*, now serves Adorno to describe entire works: 'Dynamic freed from every static reference and no longer discernible as such by its contrast to something fixed, is sublated into something that hovers and no longer has direction. In the manner of its appearance, Stockhausen's *Zeitmaße* evokes a through-composed cadence, a fully

151 Adorno, 'Sakrales Fragment: Über Schönbergs Moses und Aaron', GS 16, 454-475, here 465; 'Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg's *Moses und Aaron*', *Quasi una fantasia*, 225-248, here 238.

152 'inkompatibel mit dem Medium der Zeit, in dem sie als Musik allemal sich erstreckt, und das im kompositorischen Inhalt zu mißachten nicht weniger bedeutet, als daß die Musik um eine ihrer spezifischen materialen Voraussetzungen nicht sich kümmert' (Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle', GS 16, 493-540, here 530; 'Vers une musique informelle', *Quasi una fantasia*, 269-322, here 310).

153 Adorno, 'Schwierigkeiten - I: Beim Komponieren', GS 17, 253-273, here 270.

presented yet static dominant'.¹⁵⁴ Yet even in such static, the works do not come to rest; time takes revenge for its abstract negation and 'lends a completely transformed value to that which seems identical on paper ... because the balance of the musical elements is too static and works together only too well, it is overturned by the immanent dynamics of the music'.¹⁵⁵

To upset this balance is, according to Adorno, the intention of aleatory music. By yielding autonomy in a controlled way and giving empirical time a share in the constitution of the work,¹⁵⁶ it aims to curtail the disintegrating force of time. Adorno proves that such endeavours to undermine strictly serialist structures remain abstract negations, that they do not solve the antinomy of strict serialism but get caught up in its circle. Aleatory music reverses just as strictly serialist music into static, for the inclusion of chance into the work forces the composers to make the musical elements exchangeable. Thus, they offend against the laws of musical consequential logic and temporal-dimensional mediation which Adorno deems incontrovertible.¹⁵⁷ 'In Music', Adorno explained to the Darmstadt composers in 1961, 'nothing

154'Die jeglichem statischen Bezug entronnene Dynamik schlägt, nicht länger ablesbar an einem ihr entgegengesetzten Festen, ins Schwebende, nicht Fortschreitende um. Die Zeitmaße von Stockhausen erinnern, ihrer Erscheinungsweise nach, an eine durchkomponierte Kadenz, eine auskomponierte, doch statische Dominante' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 238; *Aesthetic Theory*, 159, tr. modified).

155'dem, was auf dem Papier als Identisches steht, einen völlig veränderten Stellenwert ... weil die Balance der musikalischen Elemente statisch allzu genau stimmt, wird sie von der immanenten Dynamik der Musik umgeworfen' (Adorno, 'Das Altern der neuen Musik', 152; 'The Ageing of the New Music', 103).

156Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 329; *Aesthetic Theory*, 221.

157Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle' [German], 516-518; 'Vers une musique informelle' [English], 295-298.

has the right to follow something else unless it has been determined by what precedes it or conversely, unless it reveals afterwards that what has preceded it was actually its own precondition'.¹⁵⁸ Apodictic formulations like this one earned Adorno in Darmstadt the reputation of an arrogant know-all; they can only be understood if one agrees that everything that Adorno has to say about music is in the last instance conditioned by his ideas about time.

This is also true of the few remarks that Adorno made about Cage. Between Cage's chance operations and aleatory music, Adorno did not differentiate for many years, probably in order to extend the post-Schoenbergian antinomy to Cage. As late as 1964, he said in a radio lecture, as if he had not understood the *Piano Concerto* (1957-1958), that Cage's chance operations 'were known to all as aleatory operations'.¹⁵⁹ In Darmstadt, he argued in a more sophisticated way. In his lecture 'Vers une musique informelle' (1961) he admits that Cage attempts 'to escape from the lie of everything meaningful, where meaning is merely subjectively posited'.¹⁶⁰ Such an escape is of course not to be achieved with aleatory operations, which allow the subject to make a selection from a given number of options. In order to prove the antinomic character of Cage's experiments, Adorno now appropriates Ligeti's

158 'Nichts Musikalisches hat das Recht auf ein anderes zu folgen, was nicht durch die Gestalt des Vorhergehenden als auf dieses Folgendes bestimmt wäre, oder umgekehrt, was nicht das Vorhergehende als seine eigene Bedingung nachträglich enthüllte' (Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle' [German], 518; 'Vers une musique informelle' [English], 297, tr. modified).

159 'allen unter dem Namen Aleatorik geläufig' (Adorno, 'Schwierigkeiten - I: Beim Komponieren', 270).

160 'der Lüge alles Sinnvollen, in seinem Sinn jedoch bloß vom Subjekt Gesetzten zu entrinnen' (Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle' [German], 534; 'Vers une musique informelle' [English], 315, tr. modified).

influential idea about the indifference of totally determined and indeterminate structures. Whereas strict serialism, Adorno argues, provokes the revenge of empirical time through absolutising autonomy and enforcing meaning, Cage's works, which succumb wholly to heteronomous time in order to evade meaning, become meaningful again.¹⁶¹ Thus neither the radicalisation of Schoenberg's approach nor its reversal makes possible an escape from the antinomy that Adorno first observed in his work.

Adorno does not only reflect Schoenberg again to gain fundamentally different insights than the strict serialists. He also reflects the post-Schoenbergian situation as a whole to find a solution to the antinomy. These reflections can be found in Adorno's writings from 1961 wherever he discusses the so-called *musique informelle*. The concept of *musique informelle* is a strictly utopian one, which means in Adorno that it may in no way be qualified positively and can only be realised in a better society. In the discussions at Darmstadt about Adorno's concept, this has been barely understood; again and again composers declared that they had written a piece of music that conforms to the concept of a *musique informelle*. Whether they really did achieve this, is doubtful. Consider the most important of Adorno's demands on a *musique informelle*: 'Today it is conceivable and perhaps requisite that artworks immolate themselves through their temporal nucleus, devote their own life to the instant of the appearance of truth, and tracelessly vanish without thereby diminishing themselves in the slightest'.¹⁶² What this might mean, and what Adorno's entire music

161 Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle' [German], 535-536; 'Vers une musique informelle' [English], 316-317.

162 'Denkbar, heute vielleicht gefordert sind Werke, die durch ihren Zeitkern sich selbst verbrennen, ihr eigenes Leben in dem Augenblick der Erscheinung von Wahrheit

historiography in fact leads up to, may only be explained with reference to a metaphysical constellation elaborated in *Negative Dialectics* and *Aesthetic Theory*. This directs us to the final chapter of the present study.

drangeben und spurlos untergehen, ohne daß sie das im geringsten minderte' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 265; *Aesthetic Theory*, 177).

Chapter V

'Overcoming' Time

Adorno's musical thought gravitates towards metaphysical questions – questions that he poses more and more passionately, whilst denying with increasing resolve any positive answer. The writings from the 1920s and 1930s, it will be remembered, abound with moments of metaphysical truth (cf. chapter I). In *Versuch über Wagner* and the writings from the 1940s, one has to look for such moments quite sharply (cf. chapter II, III). In Adorno's mature music historiography, then, they appear only when certain composers are discussed, whilst entire historical epochs are entrapped in temporal-philosophical antinomies (cf. chapter IV). There is an intimate connection between this development and Adorno's effort to elaborate his concept of materialist critique, which matured only slowly towards negative dialectics. The major work from 1966 with that title will be analysed in the first section of the present chapter. The second section follows the impulse of musical experience that carries the metaphysical questions pursued in *Negative Dialectics* into *Aesthetic Theory*.

Music and Negative Dialectics

As *Negative Dialectics* is conceived as an exclusively philosophical book, some prior explanation needs to be given as to why it can, indeed must, be discussed in the context of a study about Adorno's writings on music. It might appear that there is no reliance of thought on music in *Negative Dialectics*, which therefore might be seen as documenting a breach between philosophy and music in Adorno's late work. This could be explained persuasively by assuming that Adorno finally, and resolutely, yielded to Berg's advice from 1926 to decide between music and philosophy,¹ a decision that on this account would have gone in favour of philosophy. If this were true, Adorno's project – and that of the present study – would face serious danger. In this situation, the hermeneutic potential of the theory of time expounded here as the centre of Adorno's thought ultimately proves itself. For we have already seen that Adorno made important observations for negative dialectics in the music of Beethoven. It will also be remembered that he began working on *Negative Dialectics* shortly after he had come into a dead end with his book on Beethoven (cf. chapter IV.3). Thus *Negative Dialectics* can be interpreted as that work in which the theory of a negatively temporalised materialist critique and metaphysics, which was essentially inspired by music, is elaborated in detail.

As in the early writings, this task is carried out in polemical opposition to fundamental ontology. Without mentioning Heidegger's name, Adorno repudiates his thought in *Negative Dialectics* as

1 Adorno and Alban Berg, *Briefwechsel 1925-1935*, ed. Henri Lonitz, Frankfurt am Main 1997, letter from 28 January 1926, 66.

tautological reflection.² His metaphysics is for him still a metaphysics of repetition.³ Furthermore, he deems Heidegger's metaphysics quite traditional as it eternalises the finite. 'Time itself, and thus transitoriness', Adorno writes, is in Heidegger 'absolutised and transfigured as eternal'.⁴ Crucially, this inadequate critique of Heidegger is in the late writings still bound up with a critique of Kant. Whilst Adorno's attitude to Heidegger remains the same, however, his attitude to Kant has changed considerably. In the early writings, he attempted to undo Heidegger and Kant in one and the same strike; the strategy in his late work is to eliminate Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy of time in order to establish his own. For both Heidegger and mature Adorno believe that a critical processing of Kant's philosophy of time makes possible a metaphysics that is not indifferent to epistemology and does without an eternalisation of time.⁵ With his assertion that Heidegger 'absolutises and transfigures time itself, and thus transitoriness', Adorno merely tries to devalue Heidegger's theory from the start.

What provokes Adorno especially is Heidegger's interest, documented in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, in the concept of the transcendental schematism, the pure temporal form which in Kant supports the unity of the subject. Heidegger gains from the schematism in a positive interpretative act the self-transcending nature of finite subjective experience. Adorno, by contrast, avails himself of the schematism to demonstrate that the idea of a finite cognitive unity of

2 Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 362; *Negative Dialectics*, 369.

3 Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 121, 125; *Negative Dialectics*, 115, 119.

4 'Zeit selber, und damit Vergängnis ... als ewig ebenso verabsolutiert wie verklärt' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 136; *Negative Dialectics*, 130-131, tr. modified).

5 Cf. Jarvis, *Adorno: A Critical Introduction*, 203-204.

the subject is inherently contradictory: 'It is unfathomable ... how such a nontemporal thing' – the schematism – 'might take effect in the spatial-temporal world without turning temporal itself and straying into the Kantian realm of causality'.⁶ At another point in *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno argues from a slightly different angle but with the same objective that the content on which Kant's forms of cognition depend are themselves transitory.⁷ A few pages further down, in a passage that is most probably influenced by Beckett's study on Proust from 1931,⁸ he adds that the subject as a concretely human one becomes in the course of its life non-identical with itself. '[T]he "I" that one remembers, which one was at one time and potentially becomes again', Adorno writes, turns with the years 'into another, into a stranger to be detachedly observed'.⁹

Adorno here employs with great effect a principle of the logic of disintegration, namely to break down through insistent reflection on transitoriness the synthetic unity of consciousness. The so-called Kantian 'block' – the prohibition to think what transcends thought – thus begins to come loose. In an insightful review of Adorno's *Lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason* (1959), which prefigures the Kant interpretation from *Negative Dialectics*, this hermeneutic method, which clearly stems from the logic of disintegration, is designated

6 'Unerfindlich, ... wie ein derart Unzeitliches in die raumzeitliche Welt hineinzuwirken vermöchte, ohne selbst zeitlich zu werden und ins Kantische Reich der Kausalität sich zu verirren' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 251; *Negative Dialectics*, 254).

7 Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 141; *Negative Dialectics*, 137.

8 Samuel Beckett, *Proust and Three Dialogues*, London 1965. There exists a copy of this study in Adorno's library.

9 '[D]as Ich, an das man sich erinnert, das man einmal war und das potentiell wiederum zu einem selbst wird ... ein Anderer, Fremder, detachierte zu Betrachtender' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 157; *Negative Dialectics*, 154, tr, modified).

‘unblocking’.¹⁰ A crucial difference between the logic of disintegration as expounded in the early writings and the hermeneutic of unblocking, however, must be noted. In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno makes concessions to Kant that he would have denied in the early writings and even in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. He writes in ‘Meditations on Metaphysics’, the final chapter of *Negative Dialectics*: ‘Socially there is good reason to suspect that the block, the bar erected against the absolute, is one with the necessity of labour, which in reality keeps mankind under the same spell that Kant transfigured into philosophy ... Even if Kant’s doctrine of the block was part of a social illusion, it is still based as solidly as the factual rule of the illusion’.¹¹ Only in a better society could the factual rule of illusion be broken. In order to keep this possibility open, the Kantian block must by no means be ontologised as in Heidegger, but has to be moved in its foundations with the means of reflection.

With the ‘unblocking’, Adorno positions himself against Kant in a way comparable to Hegel. Differences, however, can already be seen in Adorno’s notion that the Kantian limit to cognition may only be crossed in a future better society. Yet, Adorno provides more than merely a temporal-dimensional reformulation of Hegel’s dictum about the Kantian limits. In fact, he profoundly restructures Hegel’s philosophy of time in order to turn dialectics negative. The point of departure lies in

10 Christopher J. Thornhill, ‘Adorno Reading Kant: A Review of Theodor W. Adorno, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*’, *Parataxis* (forthcoming).

11 ‘Gegründet ist der gesellschaftliche Verdacht, jener Block, die Schranke vorm Absoluten, sei eins mit der Not von Arbeit, welche die Menschen real im gleichen Bann hält, den Kant zur Philosophie verklärte ... War die kantische Lehre vom Block ein Stück gesellschaftlichen Scheins, so ist sie doch so gegründet, wie tatsächlich der Schein herrscht über die Menschen’ (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 381-382; *Negative Dialectics*, 389, tr. modified).

Hegel's 'passing of the passing', a concept of redemption that Adorno had implicitly criticised for the first time in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (cf. chapter III.2). Hegel's speculations, 'which equate the absolute idea of totality with the passing of everything finite',¹² are for Adorno, as was explained above, only true if they are themselves conceived as transitory. According to *Negative Dialectics*, Hegel's positive 'passing of the passing' is based in the relationship of logic and time. Time, Adorno argues, is in Hegel produced by logic; but he believes that truth-content can be extracted from this theorem only if one 'perceives in logic, instead, coagulated temporal relations, as indicated variously, if cryptically, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the chapter on schematism in particular'.¹³ This statement itself remains as cryptic as the corresponding one in Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. What is clear, however, is that dialectical logic turned negative would be a logic of disintegration. It is hardly accidental that Adorno placed the all-important declaration that the logic of negative dialectics is 'one of disintegration' into the context of his critique of Hegel.¹⁴

Adorno thus furnishes the critically Hegelian account of the logic of disintegration that one expects since the early writings. He does this quite cogently with recourse to the concept of *Naturgeschichte* (cf. chapter I.2). Adorno does not fail to mention Benjamin and Lukács, to whom he owes the insight into the convergence of nature and history in transitoriness; but he now claims to have gained this significant insight

12 'welche die absolute Idee der Totalität der Vergängnis alles Endlichen gleichsetzen' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 325; *Negative Dialectics*, 331).

13 'statt dessen in der Logik geronnene Zeitrelationen gewahrt, so wie es verschiedentlich in der Vernunftkritik, zumal im Schematismuskapitel, kryptisch genug angezeigt war' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 326; *Negative Dialectics*, 333, tr. modified).

14 'eine des Zerfalls' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 148; *Negative Dialectics*, 145).

in the critique of Hegel's 'passing of the passing' or, as he puts it in *Negative Dialectics*, the 'passing of everything finite'.¹⁵ In the transitional passage between 'World Spirit and *Naturgeschichte*' and 'Meditations on Metaphysics', then, Adorno reiterates in a literal self-citation the core sentences from his early lecture on *The Idea of Naturgeschichte*. The following final passage, however, is not credited to Lukács and Benjamin, but exclusively to his reading of Hegel: 'No reflection on transcendence is possible any more, save by virtue of transitoriness; eternity appears, not as such, but diffracted through the most transitory. Where Hegelian metaphysics transfigures the absolute by equating it with the total passing of everything finite, it simultaneously looks a little beyond the mythical spell'.¹⁶

The beginning of 'Meditations on Metaphysics' confirms the importance of transitoriness again. Yet, the expectation that the potential offered by a negatively temporalised metaphysics may now be elaborated, is immediately thwarted. Especially on the first pages of the 'Meditations', determinate negativity seems to revert into sheer pessimism. This is usually interpreted via the assumption that Adorno makes an anti-metaphysical turn in his late work. This assumption is untenable, for the 'Meditations' as a whole develop Adorno's redemptive constellation, the negative passing of the passing, much more strictly than *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, where it first surfaces (cf. chapter III.2). Thus the metaphysical content of *Negative Dialectics* is not

15 Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 353; *Negative Dialectics*, 360.

16 'Kein Eingedenken an Transzendenz ist mehr möglich als kraft der Vergängnis; Ewigkeit erscheint nicht als solche sondern gebrochen durchs Vergänglichste hindurch. Wo die Hegelsche Metaphysik das Leben des Absoluten mit der Totalität der Vergängnis alles Endlichen verklärend gleichsetzt, blickt sie zugleich um ein Geringes hinaus über den mythischen Bann' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 353; *Negative Dialectics*, 360, tr. modified).

diminished, but increases in comparison with the earlier writings. This can be corroborated with reference to a particularly dense passage where the redemptive constellation is associated with the Kantian concept of the intelligible sphere. 'Nowhere else than in this sphere', Adorno writes, 'is truth so fragile', and yet the 'possibility of metaphysics has its unobtrusive site' in the riddle-image of the negation of the finite which the finite demands and which animates the word 'intelligible'.¹⁷ The dense linguistic texture of this passage conceals its impressionistic character. The meditation on the 'mundus intelligibilis' then leads somewhat surprisingly and abruptly into the conclusion that 'the rescue of illusion, the object of aesthetics' had 'incomparable metaphysical relevance'.¹⁸

This opens the seemingly unmusical *Negative Dialectics* just enough to let in some musical sounds. They are the most hopeful sounds in the entire work. In their experience the finite passes – but only for fleeting moments. According to Adorno, something that cannot be expressed in words and concepts – as we have just witnessed – is expressed in these sounds.¹⁹ Of course Adorno opposes to immediate expression of the inexpressible; 'where its expression carried, as in great music', he writes against his ontological arch-enemy, 'its seal was evanescence and transitoriness, and it was attached to the process, not to an indicative "That's it"'.²⁰ Music, which Adorno calls in this passage the sister of

17 'Wahrheit so fragil', 'Möglichkeit von Metaphysik ihre unauffällige Stätte' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 385; *Negative Dialectics*, 392-393, tr. modified).

18 'die Rettung des Scheins, Gegenstand der Ästhetik ... unvergleichliche metaphysische Relevanz' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 386; *Negative Dialectics*, 393, tr. modified).

19 Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 115; *Negative Dialectics*, 109.

20 'wo sein Ausdruck trug, wie in großer Musik, war sein Siegel das Entgleitende und Vergängliche, und er haftete am Verlauf, nicht am hindeutenden Das ist es' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 116; *Negative Dialectics*, 110).

philosophy, stands in where words and concepts fail. With the 'great music', which in Adorno's view carried the expression of the inexpressible, he means primarily the music of that composer to whom *Negative Dialectics* owes its existence to at least the same degree as to Kant, Hegel and Heidegger: the music of Beethoven. 'Any expression of hope', Adorno states towards the end of 'Meditations on Metaphysics', 'is configured with the humanistic; nowhere as unequivocally as in the moments of Beethoven'.²¹

In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno pays such respect only to one other composer: Berg. In the context of a discussion of Hegelian and Kierkegaardian theology, Adorno explains that metaphysical experience finds a refuge where Berg composes the gesture of idle waiting: 'Berg gave the highest rank to bars that express idle waiting as music alone can express it, and he cited the harmony of those bars in the crucial caesuras and at the close of *Lulu*'.²² That Adorno assigns the seat of honour next to Beethoven to Berg and not to Schoenberg, might contradict current Adorno interpretations, but it is wholly consistent with Adorno's music historiography (cf. chapter IV.5). The logical association of this passage on Berg with the one on Beethoven is evident, for the concept of idle waiting, i.e. of a duration that does not pass, forms the complement to the passing moment. For this reason, the Berg passage is not of the same systematic significance for *Negative*

21 'Jeglicher Ausdruck von Hoffnung ... ist konfiguriert mit dem des Menschlichen; nirgends unzweideutiger als in den Augenblicken Beethovens' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 389; *Negative Dialectics*, 397, tr. modified).

22 'Berg stellte im Wozzeck am höchsten jene Takte, welche, wie nur Musik es kann, vergebliches Warten ausdrücken, und hat ihre Harmonie an den entscheidenden Zäsuren und am Schluß der *Lulu* zitiert' (Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 368; *Negative Dialectics*, 375).

Dialectics as the Beethoven passage. The concept of idle waiting is, compared to the concept of the moment, barely relevant for the constitution of negative dialectics. This is corroborated by the fact that it appears only this one time in Adorno's work.

From these observations can be concluded that although Adorno wrote *Negative Dialectics* instead of the Beethoven monograph, he has not abandoned music in favour of philosophy. Neither has he, in orthodox fulfilment Hegel's notion of the end of art, merely preserved his experiences with music in thought. Eurydice is certainly not just an aide to the philosopher in his Sisyphean task. Rather, music occupies a very special place in the structure of *Negative Dialectics*: its musical moments establish a link to *Aesthetic Theory*, where the notion of the 'incomparable metaphysical relevance' of the redemption of illusion is elaborated.

Redeeming Illusion

Aesthetic Theory stands in an intimate relationship with *Negative Dialectics*. This is evident even on a philological level: Adorno jotted down his first ideas for *Aesthetic Theory* in 1956, three years before he began work on *Negative Dialectics*. Until the dictation of the first draft of *Aesthetic Theory* in 1961, the two projects ran parallel. Then, however, Adorno interrupted his work on *Aesthetic Theory*. In 1967, after the completion of *Negative Dialectics*, he strongly revised the draft from 1961. This was certainly not just for practical reasons. Adorno's two late major works are in fact constructed so as to support one another. The metaphysical constellation of *Negative Dialectics* explained above is adopted in *Aesthetic Theory* and arranged around a new centre, the

concept of aesthetic illusion. Although *Aesthetic Theory* is conceived as an aesthetic of artworks (*Werkästhetik*), this constellation is again motivated essentially by experiences with musical time, since for temporal-philosophical reasons that shall be explained soon, 'all artworks' bear in Adorno's view a certain 'similarity to music, a similarity once expressed by the term muse'.²³ Whether this leads to a levelling of the other arts, however, cannot be examined here.

Aesthetic illusion, the conceptual centre of Adorno's metaphysical constellation as it appears in *Aesthetic Theory*, is subject to the Kantian doctrine of the block, just as anything else in the present empirical world. 'Whatever perfection they may lay claim to, artworks are lopped off', Adorno writes; 'that what they mean is not their essence is evident in the fact that their meaning appears as if it were blocked'.²⁴ Compared to discursive cognition, the subject of *Negative Dialectics*, the doctrine of the block is valid to an even greater extent for aesthetics. Adorno holds against Kant, who grants aesthetics access to the realm of the transcendent while denying it to thought that proceeds by judgements, that artworks are blocked exactly because of their judgementless nature. For this very reason, however, he believes that artworks provide an image of transcendence.²⁵ Adorno so achieves a radicalisation of the Kantian epistemological antinomy for art. On the one hand, art is in the world of illusion even more powerless than thought, and on the other hand art gains from that powerlessness the ability to anticipate the end

23 'alle Kunstwerke ... Musikähnlichkeit, der einst der Name der Muse eingedenk war' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 124; *Aesthetic Theory*, 79, tr. modified).

24 'Kunstwerke, mögen sie noch so vollendet sich gerieren, sind gekappt ... daß, was sie bedeuten, nicht ihr Essentielles ist, nimmt an ihnen sich aus, als ob ihre Bedeutung blockiert ist' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 191-192; *Aesthetic Theory*, 126).

25 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 191; *Aesthetic Theory*, 126.

of illusion: 'But as for art, utopia ... is draped in black, it remains in all its mediations recollection; recollection of the possible in opposition to the actual that suppresses it; it is the imaginary reparation of the catastrophe of world history'.²⁶

Adorno designates the radicalised epistemological antinomy 'riddle-image' – a figure composed from the temporal elements that the artwork requires for its materialisation, and its transcendent truth. The solution to the antinomy neither inheres in artworks – they do not 'know' the solution as the mythical Sphinx – nor do they 'express' the solution. Because the artworks are blocked, however, they refer negatively to the solution, luring the interpreter, in this respect acting in a way comparable to the Sphinx, to pursue their negative reference. Yet, the interpreter lacks in the present society the keys, or rather the judgments, required to solve the riddle.²⁷ Any positivist 'science' of art and traditional hermeneutics are thus denied the capability of gaining emphatic insight into the truth-content of art; and indeed, the reasoning about the block and the riddle in *Aesthetic Theory* serves a strategic cause. It supports Adorno's notion that the truth-content of art can only be revealed philosophically. In his own words: 'Although no artwork can be reduced to rationalistic determinations, as is the case with what art judges, each artwork through the neediness implicit in its riddle-character nevertheless turns toward interpretive reason'.²⁸

26 'Weil aber der Kunst ihre Utopie ... schwarz verhängt ist, bleibt sie durch all ihre Vermittlung hindurch Erinnerung, die an das Mögliche gegen das Wirkliche, das jenes verdrängte, etwas wie die imaginäre Wiedergutmachung der Katastrophe Weltgeschichte' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 204; *Aesthetic Theory*, 135).

27 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 191-193; *Aesthetic Theory*, 126-127.

28 'Während kein Kunstwerk in rationalistischen Bestimmungen wie dem von ihm Geurteilten aufgeht, wendet gleichwohl ein jegliches durch die Bedürftigkeit seines

On this account, artworks need philosophical interpretation because their meaning is blocked. Thus the hermeneutics of unblocking has an important function particularly in the aesthetic context, for the riddle posed by the artwork can only be solved along with the block that lends riddle-character to the artworks in the first place. For a technical explanation of the hermeneutics of unblocking, Adorno resorts in *Aesthetic Theory* to earliest strata of his thought. Adopting the Benjaminian notion according to which materialist critique changes artworks in their substance to further their truth-content (cf. chapter I.3), he writes: 'The historical development of works through critique and the philosophical development of their truth-content have a reciprocal relation. The theory of art must not situate itself beyond art but must rather entrust itself to its laws of movement'.²⁹ Evidently, the logic of disintegration and unblocking are closely related. As the analysis of *Negative Dialectics* has revealed, both concepts are to be understood as synonyms although they represent different stages in Adorno's development.

The function of unblocking in *Negative Dialectics* was to work towards breaking the Kantian limits and undoing the domination of societal illusion through a disintegration of the synthetic unity of consciousness. To distinguish unblocking from Hegel, Adorno postulated that it should not proceed as a positive passing of the passing. The relationship of *Aesthetic Theory* to Hegel's aesthetics is

Rätselcharakters sich an deutende Vernunft' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 193; *Aesthetic Theory*, 128, tr. modified).

29 'Die geschichtliche Entfaltung der Werke durch Kritik und die philosophische ihres Wahrheitsgehalts stehen in Wechselwirkung. Theorie der Kunst darf ihr nicht jenseitig sein, sondern muß ihren Bewegungsgesetzen sich überlassen' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 194; *Aesthetic Theory*, 128, tr. modified).

strictly analogous. In the *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1817-1829), the passing of the passing figures as 'death of art'. This is the theorem that Adorno has in mind when he warns in the introductory chapter to *Aesthetic Theory* that aesthetics 'must not play at delivering graveside sermons'.³⁰ Adorno concedes that Hegel already thought art as transitory and was the first modern thinker to recognise its utopian potential. Yet, he severely criticises Hegel for sublating art into the absolute spirit where it finds its end. It is in this sense that Adorno's dictum about a 'graveside sermon' is to be understood: art's transitoriness, which Hegel recognised, passes along with its utopian content in the absolute spirit.³¹ As so often in his critique of Hegel, Adorno is utterly sensitive to the underlying temporal-philosophical figure of the positive passing of the passing.

Against Hegel, Adorno hypothesises that 'art could have its substance in its *own* transitoriness'.³² Its impulse might be 'to objectivate the fleeting, not the permanent'; Hegel, Adorno argues, 'failed to recognize this and for this reason, in the midst of dialectics, failed to recognize the temporal core of its truth-content'.³³ Here lies the innermost point of convergence of *Negative Dialectics* and *Aesthetic Theory*. Negative-dialectical logic, in order to do justice to its temporal core, must conceive the 'passing of the passing' from Hegel's *Science of Logic* itself as transitory. The redemption of illusion is only thinkable

30 'den Leichenredner spielen' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 13; *Aesthetic Theory*, 4).

31 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 13, 55; *Aesthetic Theory*, 4, 32.

32 'ihren Gehalt in ihrer eigenen Vergänglichkeit haben' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 13; *Aesthetic Theory*, 3, tr. modified, italics added).

33 'das Enteilende, nicht das Bleibende zu objektivieren ... verkannt und darum inmitten von Dialektik den Zeitkern ihres Wahrheitsgehalts' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 326; *Aesthetic Theory*, 219, tr. modified).

when the concept of illusion is related to this constellation. Whether the metaphysical telos of *Aesthetic Theory* – and *Negative Dialectics* – can be attained, depends crucially on the success of this operation.

In this situation, Adorno seeks help from Beethoven again. Beethoven's symphonic music, in strict accordance with Hegel's positive passing of the passing, 'eternalises movement at a standstill in the moment'. At the same time, however, Beethoven 'annihilates by reduction to the moment that which has been made eternal'.³⁴ That which has been made eternal is aesthetic illusion; the 'great music' of Beethoven thus serves as an example for a constellation of aesthetic illusion and negative passing of the passing. For reasons that will soon become apparent, it is important to remember in this context the corresponding passage in *Negative Dialectics* where Adorno states that hope and humanity blend in Beethoven's moments. In the same chapter of *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno also provides an example from 'great new music'. He mentions no names; yet, his choice of concepts betrays that again he has not Schoenberg in mind, but Berg, and perhaps also Webern. In great new music, Adorno writes, 'nothing is so full of expression as the evanescent'.³⁵ The parallel to the passage about Beethoven is obvious: that which is objectivated aesthetically as duration is 'annihilated' in Beethoven's music and 'evanesces' in the music of Berg. This parallel is further strengthened by the fact that according to Adorno hope and humanity blend in Berg's music just as in Beethoven's (cf. chapter IV.5). For all differences, therefore, Adorno

34 'Verewigt wird die stillstehende Bewegung im Augenblick, und das Verewigte vernichtet in seiner Reduktion auf den Augenblick' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 132; *Aesthetic Theory*, 85, tr. modified).

35 'nichts soviel Ausdruck wie das Verlöschende' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 123; *Aesthetic Theory*, 79, tr. modified).

considers the metaphysical formal laws of 'great music' and 'great new music' compatible in the last instance.

Usually, however, the constellation of negative passing of the passing and aesthetic illusion is in *Aesthetic Theory* not presented through concrete musical examples, but in work-aesthetic generalisation. The following formulation is in *Aesthetic Theory* directly juxtaposed to the passage on 'great new music': 'The moment of appearance in artworks is indeed the paradoxical unity or the balance between the vanishing and the preserved'.³⁶ Here one can already observe how Adorno distils his concept of redemption from the experience with music; yet, the result remains murky. A few pages further down, in the context of the Beethoven passage, Adorno formulates more clearly: 'If, as images, artworks are the persistence of the transient, they are concentrated in appearance as something momentary'.³⁷ For an understanding of the constellation of aesthetic illusion and negative passing of the passing, it is important to note that 'appearance' is in both passages thought together with the 'moment' or the 'momentary' to negate the 'balance between the vanishing and the preserved' or the 'persistence of the transient', that is, the passing of the passing. Of course Adorno only achieves this through an almost Heideggerian play with illusion and appearance (*Schein* and *Erscheinung*).

To further elaborate his concept of redemption, Adorno has coined a number of metaphors that appear only in *Aesthetic Theory*. One of these

36 'Der Augenblick des Erscheinens in den Werken jedoch ist die paradoxe Einheit oder der Einstand des Verschwindenden und Bewahrten' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 124; *Aesthetic Theory*, 80, tr. modified).

37 'Sind Kunstwerke als Bilder die Dauer des Vergänglichen, so konzentrieren sie sich im Erscheinen als einem Momentanen' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 131; *Aesthetic Theory*, 84).

metaphors is that of 'suddenness'. It emphasises in the constellation the surprise that initiates the fleeting experience of transcendence to which the blocked artworks refer: 'Artworks become appearances, in the pregnant sense of the term – that is, as the appearance of an other – when the accent falls on the unreality of their own reality. Artworks have the immanent character of being an act, even if they are carved in stone, and this endows them with the quality of something momentary and sudden'.³⁸ The metaphor of suddenness is used in *Aesthetic Theory* only at this one point. Nonetheless, it is of some systematic significance. After all, suddenness, 'the feeling of being overwhelmed when faced with an important work', is responsible for the similarity to music which Adorno asserts for all artworks, and, incidentally, also for the beautiful in nature.³⁹

Of greater systematic importance, however, is the metaphor of epiphany. Whereas 'suddenness' signifies the beginning of the momentary experience, 'epiphany' embraces also its equally sudden end. Strictly speaking, experience can only be thought as momentary if this aspect is considered, for an experience that only begins suddenly may well become durational rather than end. This interplay of positive and negative aspects is also reflected in other semantic strata of the epiphany metaphor. The appearance of the absolute is both present and absent in artworks: 'Illusion, which reveals the ineffable, does not

38 'Zu Erscheinungen im prägnanten Verstande, denen eines Anderen, werden Kunstwerke, wo der Akzent auf das Unwirkliche ihrer eigenen Wirklichkeit fällt. Der ihnen immanente Charakter des Akts verleiht ihnen, mögen sie noch so sehr in ihren Materialien als Dauerndes organisiert sein, etwas Momentanes, Plötzliches' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 123; *Aesthetic Theory*, 79).

39 'das Gefühl des Überfallen-Werdens im Angesicht jedes bedeutenden Werkes' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 123-124; *Aesthetic Theory*, 79).

literally make artworks epiphanies, however difficult it may be for genuine aesthetic experience not to trust that the absolute is present in authentic artworks'.⁴⁰ Such trust is of course inspired by artworks; their illusion 'reveals' – please note the use of theological jargon – the absolute. Therein lies for Adorno the truth-content of artworks and concurrently their 'cardinal sin'.⁴¹

Remaining in the theological jargon from which the epiphany metaphor stems, Adorno also formulates the notion of the simultaneous presence and absence of the absolute in artworks via the concept of incarnation: 'Artworks are ... epiphanies. If the deities of antiquity were said to appear fleetingly at their cult sites, or at least were to have appeared there in the primeval age, this act of appearing became the primal law of the permanence of artworks, but at the price of the living incarnation of what appears in them'.⁴² It is remarkable that Adorno seems to have no qualms about transplanting the concept of incarnation, which has its roots in the Christian tradition, into the wholly different context of antique religion. Adorno presumably accepted this inconsistency in order to use the epiphany metaphor as a qualifier for the constellation of illusion and negative passing of the passing. It must be said to Adorno's credit that the central paradox of his concept of

40 'Durch den Schein, der es verkündet, werden die Kunstwerke nicht wörtlich zu Epiphanien, so schwer es auch der genuinen ästhetischen Erfahrung den authentischen Kunstwerken gegenüber fällt, nicht darauf zu vertrauen, in ihnen sei das Absolute präsent' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 159; *Aesthetic Theory*, 103-104, tr. modified).

41 'Kardinalsünde' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 159; *Aesthetic Theory*, 104, tr. modified).

42 'Kunstwerke sind ... Epiphanien. Sollten die antiken Gottheiten an ihren Kultstätten flüchtig erscheinen oder wenigstens in der Vorzeit erschienen sein, so ist dies Erscheinen zum Gesetz der Permanenz von Kunstwerken geworden um den Preis der Leibhaftigkeit des Erscheinenden' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 125; *Aesthetic Theory*, 80, tr. modified).

redemption is aptly expressed with the formulation that the fleeting appearance of the deities had in the process of secularisation become the primal law of the permanence of artworks. And the additional statement, that artworks pay for this the price of the living incarnation of what appears in them, even intensifies the paradox.

The crucial and most frequently used metaphor is *apparition*: 'The artwork as appearance is most closely resembled by the *apparition*'.⁴³ At the point in *Aesthetic Theory* where Adorno speaks for the first time of *apparition*, it is described as 'heavenly vision'.⁴⁴ In using this metaphor, Adorno does not succumb to a need for poetic expression, but lends further plasticity to the paradox which the epiphany metaphor expresses. Artworks are comparable to heavenly visions because of the momentary rising and setting of truth in artworks. The metaphor of *apparition* also serves Adorno to emphasise once more his Kant critique. The 'starry sky' above the mortal humans, which in Kant figures as an image for the eternity of the ideas, can according to Adorno only be called eternal because of the 'most fleeting'⁴⁵ nature of the heavenly visions. Adorno also thinks against Kant when he writes that artworks stand tacitly in accord with *apparition* 'as it rises above human beings and is carried beyond their intentions and the world of things'.⁴⁶ This formulation reiterates from a different angle Adorno's conviction that there is a wide gap between Kant's starry sky and the empirical world. Yet, when Adorno states that artworks stand in tacit accord with that

43 'Am nächsten kommt dem Kunstwerk als Erscheinung die *apparition*' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 125; *Aesthetic Theory*, 80).

44 'Himmelserscheinung' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 125; *Aesthetic Theory*, 80).

45 'Allerflüchtigste' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 130; *Aesthetic Theory*, 84, tr. modified).

46 'Einverständnis, wie sie aufgeht über den Menschen, ihrer Intention entrückt und der Dingwelt' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 125; *Aesthetic Theory*, 80).

which rises above man as *apparition*, he nearly slips into an affirmative mode.

Thus the twofold paradoxical relationship of momentariness and eternity, and of illusion and appearance, which also determines the other metaphors, is contained in the metaphor of *apparition*. Adorno arranges the semantic elements of this metaphor in particular to a constellation of negative passing of the passing and illusion. 'The moment in which they' – the artworks – 'become image, the moment in which what is interior becomes exterior, the outer husk is exploded; their *apparition*, which makes them an image, always at the same time destroys them as image'.⁴⁷ 'Image' here stands for aesthetic illusion, whose positive objectivation passes in the moment of *apparition*. The linguistic opacity, which is unusual even by the standards of *Aesthetic Theory*, is due to Adorno's effort to think together the moment in which aesthetic illusion is constituted and its equally momentary passing. A few lines further down, Adorno manages to express the same without a linguistic *tour de force*: 'As a result of its determination as appearance, art bears its own negation embedded in itself as its own telos; the sudden unfolding of appearance disclaims aesthetic illusion'.⁴⁸

The last metaphor is that of the firework. It is best introduced with a quotation: 'The phenomenon of fireworks is prototypical for artworks. Fireworks are *apparition* κατ' ἐξοχήν: They appear empirically yet are

47 'Der Augenblick, in dem sie Bild werden, in dem ihr Inwendiges zum Äußeren wird, sprengt die Hülle des Auswendigen um das Inwendige; ihre apparition, die sie zum Bild macht, sprengt immer zugleich auch ihr Bildwesen' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 131-132; *Aesthetic Theory*, 85, tr. modified).

48 'Durch ihre Bestimmung als Erscheinung ist der Kunst ihre eigene Negation teleologisch eingesenkt; das jäh Aufgehende der Erscheinung dementiert den ästhetischen Schein' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 132; *Aesthetic Theory*, 85, tr. modified).

liberated from the burden of the empirical, which is the obligation of duration; they are heavenly visions yet artifactual; an ominous warning; a script that flashes up, vanishes and indeed cannot be read for its meaning'.⁴⁹ This is a complete inventory of the semantic elements which also determine the metaphor of *apparition*. Thus the firework metaphor is dependent upon *apparition*; its function in the constellation is to further enhance the aspect of transitoriness. Adorno's talk of an 'evaporation of aesthetic transcendence' and an 'incineration of appearance' at other points in *Aesthetic Theory* fulfils the same purpose.⁵⁰ For the firework metaphor, Adorno credits Paul Valéry and Ernst Schoen.⁵¹ It is most clearly anticipated in a Beethoven fragment from 1942 entitled 'On the Metaphysics of Musical Time', where Adorno recorded his plan to relate the end of the Beethoven book to the cabbalistic doctrine of the grass angels 'who are created for an instant only to perish in the sacred fire' – a notion which Beethoven raised according to Adorno to musical self-consciousness.⁵²

The idea that artworks are 'a script that flashes up, vanishes and indeed cannot be read for its meaning', is not thought for the first time in *Aesthetic Theory* either. Quite crucially, the idea comes from the last lines of the Schoenberg part of *Philosophy of New Music*. There Adorno

49 'Prototypisch für die Kunstwerke ist das Phänomen des Feuerwerks. Es ist apparition κατ' ἐξοχήν: empirisch Erscheinendes, befreit von der Last der Empirie als einer der Dauer, Himmelszeichen und hergestellt in eins, Menetekel, aufblitzende und vergehende Schrift, die doch nicht ihrer Bedeutung nach sich lesen läßt' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 125; *Aesthetic Theory*, 81, tr. modified).

50 'Verdampfen der ästhetischen Transzendenz', 'Verbrennen der Erscheinung' (Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 131; *Aesthetic Theory*, 85, tr. modified).

51 Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 125, 49; *Aesthetic Theory*, 81, 28.

52 'für einen Augenblick geschaffen werden, um im heiligen Feuer zu verlöschen' (Adorno, *Beethoven: Philosophie der Musik*, 254; *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, 176-177).

wrote that new music 'dies away unheard, without echo' and 'falls into empty time like a destructive bullet'. 'New Music', Adorno continued, 'spontaneously aims towards this last experience' (cf. chapter III.4). The parallelism of these passages is as unmistakable as the fact that both paraphrase Adorno's concept of redemption, the negative passing of the passing. Without doubt, Adorno tells a great story about the redeeming potential of music – perhaps the greatest ever told. Whether music will redeem us, however, only time will tell.

Chronology of Theodor W. Adorno's Writings

This chronology was researched at the *Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin Archiv* in Frankfurt am Main from 1999-2002. Future research might in some cases reveal more accurate dates, but until work on a historical-critical edition begins, which is not a priority of the *Archiv* at present, this chronology should be the definite one.

date	title		written	printed	read
1919	Zur Psychologie des Verhältnisses von Lehrer und Schüler	GS 20.2 715-728	1919	October 1919	
1920	Expressionismus und künstlerische Wahrhaftigkeit	GS 11 609-611	1920	1920	
ca. 1920	Platz: Zu Fritz von Unruhs Spiel	GS 11 612-618	soon after the premiere in 1920		
early 1920s	Frank Wedekind und sein Sittengemälde "Musik"	GS 11 619-626	early 1920s		1932
1921	Die Natur, eine Quelle der Erhebung, Belehrung und Erholung [A-level essay]	GS 20.2 729-733	Easter 1921		
1921	Die Hochzeit des Faun: Grundsätzliche Bemerkungen zu Bernhard Sekles' neuer Oper	GS 18 263-268		1921	
1922	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Kammermusik im Verein für Theater- und Musikkultur: Arnold Schönbergs Pierrot lunaire	GS 19 11-13		3 February 1922	
1922	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Vierter Kammermusikabend	GS 19 13-14		February 1922	
1922	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - I	GS 17 212-217		20 March 1922	
1922	Béla Bartók	GS 18 275-278		1 May 1922	
1922	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Drei Operneinakter von Hindemith	GS 19 15-16		May 1922	
1922	Kimiko: Sieben Bilder für die Bühne		August/September 1922		

1922	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Bartók-Aufführungen in Frankfurt	GS 19 16-21		18 September 1922	
1922	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Zeitgenössische Kammermusik, Erster und zweiter Abend im Verein für Theater- und Musikkultur	GS 19 21-24		September 1922	
1922	Bernhard Sekles: Zum 50. Geburtstage	GS 18 269-270		1922	
1923	Kammermusikwoche in Frankfurt am Main	GS 20.2 771-776	ca. July 1923		
1923	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 24-31		August 1923	
ca. 1923/1924	Ohne Titel [Kants Kritik der rationalen Psychologie]		ca. 1923/1924		
1924	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Jenufa von Leoš Janáček	GS 19 31-32		February 1924	
1924	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 32-35		February 1924	
1924	Kompositionskritiken: Orchestermusik aus Italien	GS 19 283-287		March 1924	
1924	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 35-43		May 1924	
1924	Richard Strauss: Zum 60. Geburtstage	GS 18 254-262		before 11 June 1924	
1924	Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen und Noematischen in Husserls Phänomenologie	GS 1 11-77	before 28 July 1924 (PhD examination)		
1924	Résumé der Dissertation	GS 1 375-377	before 28 July 1924 (PhD examination)		
1924	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Rückblick	GS 19 43-46		December 1924	
1924	Gebrauchsmusik	GS 19 445-447		1924	
1925	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 46-49		February 1925	
1925	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 49-51		March 1925	
1925	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 57-58		April 1925	
1925	Zum Problem der Reproduktion	GS 19 440-444		April 1925	
1925	Kompositionskritiken: Volksliedersammlungen	GS 19 287-290		May 1925	
1925	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 58-60		June 1925	
1925	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Strawinsky-Fest	GS 19 60-63		December 1925	
1925	Béla Bartóks Tanzsuite	GS 18 279-281		1925	
1925	Über einige Werke von Béla Bartók	GS 18 282-286		1925	
1925	Schönberg, Serenade op. 24 (I)	GS 18 324-330		1925	
1925	Alban Berg: Zur Uraufführung des Wozzeck	GS 18 456-464		1925	
1925	Hanns Eisler: Duo für Violine und Violoncello op. 7, Nr. 1	GS 18 519-521		1925	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 63-64		January 1926	

1926	Kompositionskritiken: Jemnitz, Flötentrio	GS 19 291-292		January 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 64-65		February 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 65-67		March 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 67-70		April 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 70-73		May 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Bernhard Sekles, Die zehn Küsse	GS 19 73-74		May 1926	
1926	Opernprobleme	GS 19 470-475		May 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 74-77		July 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 77-81		August 1926	
1926	Kompositionskritiken: Möller, Französische Volkslieder	GS 19 292-294		September 1926	
1926	Drei Dirigenten	GS 19 453-359		September 1926	
1926	Kompositionskritiken: Honegger, Pastorale d'été	GS 19 294-295		October 1926	
1926	Kompositionskritiken: Honegger, Horace victorieux	GS 19 295		October 1926	
1926	Kompositionskritiken: Toch, Drei Klavierstücke	GS 19 295-297		October 1926	
1926	Kompositionskritiken: Malipiero, Impressioni dal vero	GS 19 297		October 1926	
1926	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - II	GS 17 217-222		October 1926 under the title Kammermusik von Paul Hindemith	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [New production of Fidelio in Frankfurt am Main]	GS 19 81-83		November 1926	
1926	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 83-85		December 1926	
1926	Metronomisierung	GS 17 307-310		1926	
1926	Anton Webern: Zur Uraufführung der Fünf Orchesterstücke op. 10, in Zürich	GS 18 513-516		1926	
1926 [1928]	Nachtmusik: Aphorismen	GS 17 52-59	1926 [1928]	1929; abridged in GS	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 85-88		January 1927	
1927	Reutter, Fantasia apocaliptica	GS 19 208		January 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Jemnitz, Lieder op. 3 und op. 11	GS 19 299-300		January 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 88-90		March 1927	
1927	Schönberg: Fünf Orchesterstücke op. 16	GS 18 335-344		March/ April 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 90-92		April 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 92-94		May 1927	

1927	Kompositionskritiken: Kósa, Bagatellen	GS 19 300		May 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Alfano, Sonata	GS 19 301		May 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 94-97		June 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Szymanowski, Mazurkas	GS 19 301-302		June 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Pijper, Sonatinen	GS 19 302-303		June 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Vierne, Solitude	GS 19 303		June 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Puccini's Turandot in Frankfurt am Main]	GS 19 97-98		July 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Tansman, Sonata rustica	GS 19 303-304		July 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 99		August 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Die stabilisierte Musik, Zum fünften Fest der IGNM in Frankfurt	GS 19 100-112	ca. July/ August 1927	a distorted version appeared in September 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 112-115		September 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 115-116		October 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 116-117		November 1927	
1927	Kompositionskritiken: Coppola, Symphonie en la mineur	GS 19 304-305		November 1927	
1927	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 117-119		December 1927	
1927	Schönberg: Suite für Klavier, drei Bläser und drei Streicher op. 29, Drittes Streichquartett op. 30	GS 18 358-362	ca. December 1927	1927	
1927	Motive I	GS 16 259-260		1927	
1927	Musikalische Aphorismen 1-4	GS 18 13-14		1927	
1927	Eisler, Klavierstücke op. 3	GS 18 522-523		1927	
1927	Der Begriff des Unbewußten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre	GS 1 79-322		1927	
ca. 1927	Schönberg: Serenade op. 24 (II)	GS 18 331-334	ca. 1927		
1927 [1958]	Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkombination	GS 16 68-84	on the basis of an essay on the Orchesterstücke op. 16 from <i>Pult und Taktstock</i> (1927)		1958, Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1928 [1926]	Nachtmusik: Aphorismen	GS 17 52-59	1928 [1926]	1929; abridged in GS	
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 119-122		January 1928	
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 123-125		February 1928	
1928	Die stabilisierte Musik	GS 18 721-728	ca. February 1928		

1928 [1965]	Nadelkurven	GS 19 525-529		February 1928; July/ August 1965	
1928	Andere Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Berliner Memorial	GS 19 259-266	February 1928	1928	
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 125-126		March 1928	
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 126-128		May 1928	
1928	Veristisches Ende	GS 20.2 780-781	ca. July 1928		
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 128-133		August 1928	
1928	Exposé über die Neugestaltung der "Musikblätter des Anbruch"	GS 19 595-604	16 August 1928; August 1928		
1928	Motive II, III	GS 16 260-265		Motive III August/September 1928	
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 133-136		September 1928	
1928	Situation des Liedes	GS 18 345-353		November/Decemb er 1928	
1928	Schönberg: Chöre op. 27 und op. 28	GS 18 354-357		November/Decemb er 1928	
1928	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 136-139		December 1928	
1928	Kreneks Operneinakter in Wiesbaden	GS 20.2 777-779		1928	
1928	Schubert	GS 17 18-33	1928; 1963	1928; 1963	
1928	Schönbergs Bläserquintett	GS 17 140-144		1928	
1928	Musikalische Aphorismen 5-11	GS 18 14-18		1928	
1928	Marginalien zur Sonata von Alexander Jemnitz	GS 18 296-303		1928	
ca. 1928	Ravel	GS 18 273-274	ca. 1928		
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 140-144		January 1929	
1929	Zum Jahrgang 1929 des <i>Anbruch</i>	GS 19 605-608		January 1929, anonymous	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 144-145		February 1929	
1929	Alban Bergs frühe Lieder	GS 18 465-468		February 1929	
1929	Schlageranalysen	GS 18 778-787		March 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 146-148		March 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Kolisch- Quartett	GS 19 148		April 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Kolisch- Quartett; Mahler, X. Symphonie; Janáček, Sacke Makropulos	GS 19 148-150		April 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 153-154		April 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 154-158		May 1929	

1929	Atonales Intermezzo?	GS 18 88-97		May 1929	
1929	Eisler: Zeitungsausschnitte op. 11	GS 18 524-527		May 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 158-159		June 1929	
1929	Andere Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Berliner Opernmemorial	GS 19 267-275		June 1929	
1929	Glosse zu Richard Strauss	GS 16 281-283		June 1929, under the pseudonym Gianni Schicchi	
1929	Kompositionskritiken: Jemnitz, Serenade	GS 19 305-306	ca. April 1929	July 1929	
1929	Kompositionskritiken: Hauer, Hölderlin-Lieder II op. 23	GS 19 306-308		August 1929	
1929	Kompositionskritiken: Toch, Neun Lieder op. 41	GS 19 309-311		September 1929	
1929	Kurt Weill, Kleine Dreigroschenmusik für Blasorchester	GS 18 541-543		September/October 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 160		October 1929	
1929	Kompositionskritiken: Hauer, Hölderlin-Lieder III op. 32 und IV op. 40	GS 19 311-312		November 1929	
1929	Die Oper Wozzeck	GS 18 472-479		November 1929	
1929	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 160-165		December 1929	
1929	Musikalische Aphorismen 12	GS 18 18	1929		
1929	Musikalische Aphorismen 13-14	GS 18 18-19, 287-290	4 October 1929	1929	
1929	Béla Bartóks Drittes Streichquartett	GS 18 287-290		1929	
1929	Zur Zwölftontechnik	GS 18 363-369		1929	
1929	Berg, Sieben frühe Lieder	GS 18 469-471		1929	
1929	Zur Dreigroschenoper	GS 18 535-540		1929	
1929-1931	Lesestücke mit Carl Dreyfus: Die Pendelwagen, Sitzung, Regent, Erwartung, Der Mord, Eisenbahn, Der Morgen, Erinnerung, Klage, Die Reise, Inkognito, Seminarabend, Visite, Gegenbesuch, Freitod, Lauter lachen, Begegnung, Herrisches Gespräch, Cembalo, Grabmal	GS 20.2 587-597	August 1929-October 1931	17 November 1931, under the pseudonym Castor Zwieback; 1963	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 165-169		January 1930	
1930	H. H. Stuckenschmidt und Adorno: Kontroverse über die Heiterkeit	GS 19 448-452		January 1930	
1930	Schönberg: Variationen für Orchester op. 31	GS 18 370-375		January 1930	
1930	Schönberg: Von heute auf morgen op. 32 (I)	GS 18 376-380		February 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 169-172		February 1930	

1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Neue Musik im Frankfurter Rundfunk	GS 19 173-174		March 1930	
1930	Kompositionskritiken: Kodály, Drei Gesänge	GS 19 312-314		March 1930	
1930	Mahler heute	GS 18 226-234	1930	March 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 174-177		April 1930	
1930	Ravel	GS 17 60-65	1930	April/ May 1930; revised in GS	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 177-178		May 1930	
1930	Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte	GS 20.2 555-556		6 June 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 178-179		June 1930	
1930	Reaktion und Fortschritt	GS 17 133-139		June 1930; abridged in GS	
1930	Stilgeschichte in Schönbergs Werk	GS 18 385-393		June 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 179-187		July 1930	
1930	Notiz über Namen	GS 20.2 533-534		7 August 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 187-188		August 1930	
1930	Musikalische Aphorismen 15- 19	GS 16 269-271 GS 18 19-24		August 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 189-190		September 1930	
1930	Buchrezensionen: Chinesische Musik, hrsg. von Richard Wilhelm	GS 19 343-345		September 1930	
1930	"Was lieben sie eigentlich an ihrem Mann"	GS 20.2 557-559	mid September 1930	January 1931	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 190-192		November 1930	
1930	Zum Rundfunkkonzert von 7. November 1930	GS 18 557-564	after 7 November 1930		
1930	Das Bewußtsein des Konzert Hörers	GS 18 815-818		November/Decemb er 1930	
1930	Ernst Krenek und Adorno: Arbeitsprobleme des Komponisten	GS 19 433-439		10 December 1930	
1930	Buchrezensionen: Was will die neue Musik?	GS 19 346-348		18 December 1930	
1930	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Die Opernfestspiele in Frankfurt am Main	GS 19 192-195		December 1930	
1930	Neue Oper und Publikum	GS 19 476-480	1930	1930	
1930	Berg und Webern	GS 20.2 782-792	1930		
1930	Neue Tempi	GS 17 66-73	1930	1930	
1930	Mahagonny	GS 17 114-122		1930	
1930	Schönberg: Von heute auf morgen op. 32 (II)	GS 18 381-384		1930	

1930	Berg and Webern - Schönberg's Heirs	GS 18 446-455	translation (not by Adorno) of Berg und Webern	1930	
ca. 1930	Bartók	GS 18 291-294	ca. 1930		
ca. 1930	Wiener Memorial	GS 20.2 535-536	ca. 1930		
ca. 1930	Über den Gebrauch von Fremdwörtern	GS 11 640-646	ca. 1930		
early 1930s	Thesen über die Sprache des Philosophen	GS 1 366-371	MS not dated, early 1930s		
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [new production of the Barbieri di Seviglia]	GS 19 195-197		January 1931	
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Strawinsky im Montagskonzert]	GS 19 197-198		January 1931	
1931	Musikstudio	GS 19 520-524		January 1931	
1931	Zum Rundfunkkonzert am 22. Januar 1931	GS 18 565-570	1931		
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Beethoven, String Quartet op. 132]	GS 19 199		February 1931	
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [new production of Tannhäuser]	GS 19 199-201		March 1931	
1931	Kompositionskritiken: Eugen d'Albert, Blues für Klavier	GS 19 314		March 1931	
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Strawinskys Bühnenwerke in Frankfurt]	GS 19 202-203		April 1931	
1931	Rede über den "Raritätenladen" von Charles Dickens	GS 11 515-522	17 January 1967	18 April 1931	
1931	Zum Rundfunkkonzert vom 8. April 1931	GS 20.2 793-796	after 8 April 1931		
1931	Die Aktualität der Philosophie	GS 1 325-344	7 May 1931		
1931	Gegen die neue Tonalität	GS 18 98-107		May 1931	
1931	Widerlegungen: Musikalische Aphorismen 23-28	GS 18 26-31		June 1931	
1931	Worte ohne Lieder	GS 20.2 537-543		14 July 1931	
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 203-206		July 1931	
1931	Kompositionskritiken: Haas, Schelmenlieder u. a.	GS 19 314-316		September 1931	
1931	Schräger Rückblick: Motive VI; Musikalische Aphorismen 29-37	GS 18 31-37		17 October 1931	
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 206-208		November 1931	
1931	Kompositionskritiken: Manasse, Introduction, Variationen und Fuge	GS 19 316		November 1931	
1931	Kompositionskritiken: Jemnitz, Tanzsonate op. 23	GS 19 316-317		November 1931	

1931	Kompositionskritiken: Goossens, Concertino	GS 19 318		November 1931	
1931	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 208-211		December 1931	
1931	Kompositionskritiken: Schubert, Klaviersonaten, ed. Rehberg	GS 19 319		December 1931	
1931	Buchrezensionen: Eine Musikpsychologie	GS 19 349		19 December 1931	
1931	Eduard Steuermanns Brahms- Ausgabe	GS 18 195-199	1931	1932	
1931	Warum ist die neue Kunst so schwer verständlich?	GS 18 824-831		1931	
ca. 1931	Fütterung der Toten	GS 20.2 560-561	ca. 1931		
1931/1932	Musikalische Aphorismen 20- 22	GS 18 24-25		1931/1932	
1931/1932	Probleme der Ästhetik	Frankfu rter Adorno Blätter I, 35-103	winter semester 1931/1932, draft		
1931/1932 [1958]	Applaus, Zur Galerie, Loge, Foyer, Parkett, Kuppel als Schlußstück [Zur Naturgeschichte des Theaters]	GS 16 309-320		1931/1932; 1958 expanded version	
1932	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 211-214		January 1932	
1932	Kompositionskritiken: Hindemith, Konzertmusik	GS 19 391-321		January 1932	
1932	Kompositionskritiken: J. S. Bach, Präludium und Fuge in G-Dur, Klavierübertr. Singer	GS 19 321		January 1932	
1932	Wirtschaftskrise als Idyll	GS 11 637-639		17 January 1932	
1932	Exkurse zu einem Exkurs	GS 18 108-113		January/February 1932	
1932	Über den Nachlaß Frank Wedekinds	GS 11 627-633	4 February 1932		1932, Südwestfunk
1932	Physiologische Romantik	GS 11 634-636		16 February 1932	
1932	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 214-217		February 1932	
1932	Kompositionskritiken: C. Ph. Em. Bach, Sonaten, bearb. Klengel	GS 19 322		February 1932	
1932	Andere Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Mahagonny	GS 19 276-277		February/March 1932	
1932	Abstrakt oder konkav?	GS 20.2 521-523		6 March 1932	
1932	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - III	GS 17 222-229		12 March 1932 unter Titel Kritik des Musikanten	
1932	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 217-219		March 1932	
1932	Kompositionskritiken: Korngold, Drei Lieder op. 22, und Suite op. 23	GS 19 323-324		April 1932	
1932	Anton Webern	GS 17 204-209		1936 in <i>Auftakt</i>	21 April 1932, Südwestfunk
1932	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 219-222		May 1932	

1932	Kompositionskritiken: Otto Siegl, Kleine Unterhaltungsmusik	GS 19 324-325		May 1932	
1932	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 222-225		July 1932	
1932	Der Ur	GS 20.2 562-564		6 July 1932 under the pseudonym Gianni Schicchi	
1932	Parodie, je nachdem	GS 18 788-789		14 July 1932	
1932	Kleiner Zitatenschatz [Quasi una fantasia: Motive]	GS 16 271-275		July 1932	
1932	Die Idee der Naturgeschichte	GS 1 345-365			lecture to the Frankfurt chapter of the Kant Society, 15 July 1932
1932	Zerrbild	GS 20.2 565-566		31 August 1932	
1932	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Das XI. deutsche Sängerbundesfest	GS 19 226-231		August 1932	
1932	Kompositionskritiken: Mozart, Klavierkonzerte, ed. Hinze-Reinhold	GS 19 325-326		August 1932	
1932	Karlsbader Souvenirs	GS 20.2 546-547	ca. August 1932		
1932	Hoffmanns Erzählungen in Offenbachs Motiven	GS 17 42-46		October 1932	
1932	Kompositionskritiken: Hans Gál, Zweites Quartett op. 35	GS 19 326-327		November 1932	
1932	Bernhard Groethuysen, Die Entstehung der bürgerlichen Welt- und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich	GS 20.1 205-211		1 December 1932	
1932	Oswald Spengler, Der Mensch und die Technik	GS 20.1 197-199		1932	
1932	Alfred Kleinberg, Die europäische Kultur der Neuzeit	GS 20.1 200-201		1932	
1932	Herbert Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit	GS 20.1 203-204		1932	
1932	Zur Deutung Kreneks	GS 18 571-575		1932	
1932	Arabesken zur Operette	GS 19 516-519	1932		
1932	Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik	GS 18 729-777		1932	
1932	Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen	GS 2 7-213	1929/1930; habilitation February 1931; revised 1932	1933, 1962	
ca. 1932	Zu Wiesengrund-Adorno, Kierkegaard		ca. 1932		
ca. 1932	Der Wunderkantor	GS 18 790	ca. 1932		
ca. 1932	Kitsch	GS 18 791-794	ca. 1932		
ca. 1932	Anstelle eines Tagebuches	GS 20.2 544-545	ca. 1932		
vor 1933	Der Fischer Spadaro	GS 20.2 583-584	before 1933		

1932-1933	Der Schatz des Indianer-Joe, Singspiel nach Mark Twain		13 November 1932-28 July 1933; revision of the last scene summer 1933		
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 232-235		January 1933	
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 235-237		February 1933	
1933	Buchrezensionen: Ernst Kurths Musikpsychologie	GS 19 350-358		11 March 1933	
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 237-240		March 1933	
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 240-242		April 1933	
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel ["Die Herzogin von Chicago"]	GS 19 242-243		May 1933	
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 243-245		November 1933	
1933	Anton von Webern	GS 18 517-518		3 December 1933	
1933	Mascagnis Landschaft: Zum 70. Geburtstag	GS 18 271-272		7 December 1933	
1933	Vierhändig, noch einmal	GS 17 303-306		19 December 1933	
1933	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Richard Strauss's Arabella in Frankfurt am Main]	GS 19 245-248		December 1933	
1933	Hans Driesch, Philosophische Gegenwartsfragen	GS 20.1 212-213		1933	
1933	Theodor Steinbüchel, Das Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philosophie	GS 20.1 214-215		1933	
1933	Nicolai Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins; Hans Prinzhorn, Charakterkunde der Gegenwart; Joseph Geyser, Das Gesetz der Ursache	GS 20.1 216-217		1933	
1933	Notiz über Wagner	GS 18 204-209	1933	1933	
1933	Abschied vom Jazz	GS 18 795-799		1933	
ca. 1933	Rundfunkautorität und Schlagersendung		ca. 1933		
1934	Franz Schubert: Großes Rondo A-Dur, für Klavier zu vier Händen op. 107	GS 18 189-194		6 January 1934	
1934	Musik im Hintergrund	GS 18 819-823		31 January 1934	
1934	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Franz Léhar's Lustige Witwe in Frankfurt am Main]	GS 19 248-250		January 1934	
1934	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel [Humperdinck's Königskinder in Frankfurt am Main]	GS 19 251-253		February 1934	
1934	Johann Sebastian Bach: Präludium und Fuge cis-moll aus dem ersten Teil des Wohltemperierten Klaviers	GS 18 179-182		3 March 1934	

1934	"Die alte Orgel", Leserbriefantwort	GS 18 183-184		25 March 1934	
1934	Frankfurter Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Ohne Titel	GS 19 253-255		March 1934	
1934	Arnold Schönberg (II)	GS 18 394-397	ca. March 1934		
1934	Schönberg: Lieder und Klavierstücke	GS 18 398-400	ca. March 1934		
1934	Brahms aktuell	GS 18 200-203	ca. March 1934		
1934	Kompositionskritiken: Köhnke, Trauungsgesang	GS 19 327-328		April 1934	
1934	Kompositionskritiken: Bauer, Braten-Kantate	GS 19 328		May 1934	
1934	Kompositionskritiken: Bernhard Alt, Vier Stücke und Suite	GS 19 328-330		June 1934	
1934	Kompositionskritiken: Bányay, Serenade; Gajáry, Elegie, Orszagh; Ungarische Tänze I	GS 19 330-331		June 1934	
1934	Kompositionskritiken: Müntzel, Die Fahne der Verfolgten; Bauer, Ans Vaterland; Grabner, Ans Werk!; Lichey, Saarland in Not; Roesner, Morgenlied der schwarzen Freischar	GS 19 331-332		June 1934	
1934	Musikalische Aphorismen 38- 43 [Drehorgel-Stücke]	GS 18 37-39		28 July 1934	
1934	Kompositionskritiken: Donisch, Fünf Lieder	GS 19 333-334		August 1934	
1934	Buchrezensionen: Eine Geschichte der Musikästhetik	GS 19 359-362		9 September 1934	
1934	Antwort eines Adepten: An Hans F. Redlich	GS 18 401-407	November 1934		
1934	Die Form der Schallplatte	GS 19 530-534		15 December 1934	
1934	Der dialektische Komponist	GS 17 198-203		1934	
1934	Ludwig van Beethoven, Sechs Bagatellen op. 126	GS 18 185-188; NS I.1, 189-192	1934		
1934	Andere Opern- und Konzertkritiken: Mozartfest in Glyndebourne	GS 19 278-280	1934		
1934	Walter Ehrenstein, Einführung in die Gestaltpsychologie	GS 20.1 218-220	1934		
1934	Berg, Drei Stücke aus der Lyrischen Suite für Streichorchester	GS 20.2 797-801	1934		
1934	Spätstil Beethovens	GS 17 13-17; NS I.1 180-184	1934; second version with altered ending	1937	
1934	Musikalische Diebe, unmusikalische Richter	GS 17 292-296	1934		
1934-1935	Ohne Titel [Paul Verlaine, Drei Gedichte in deutscher Übertragung; Green, Les Ingénues/Die Unbefangenen, from Sagesse]		16 May 1934-10 February 1935		
1935	Zur Krisis der Musikkritik	GS 20.2 746-755		25 March 1935	

1935	Erinnerung an den Lebenden		Christmas 1935	under the pseudonym Hektor Rottweiler in the volume of 23 dedicated to Berg (1936)	
1935	Ernst Krenek	GS 18 531-534	1935		
ca. 1935	Warum Zwölftonmusik?	GS 18 114-117	ca. 1935		
1936	Marginalien zu Mahler	GS 18 235-240	23 April 1936		
1936	Musikpädagogische Musik: Ein Brief an Ernst Krenek	GS 18 805-812	September 1936	10 November 1936 under the pseudonym Hektor Rottweiler	
1936	Berg-Gedenkkonzert im Londoner Rundfunk	GS 20.2 802-803	1936		
1934-1937	Husserlbuch		1934-1937, 1955 teilweise überarbeitet		
1936-1937	Über Jazz	GS 17 74-108	Über Jazz 1936; Oxforder Nachträge 1937	Über Jazz 1937 under the pseudonym Hektor Rottweiler; Oxforder Nachträge 1964	
1937	Zur Philosophie Husserls	GS 20.1 46-118	July 1937		
1937	Kongreß für Einheit und Wissenschaft (Logische Positivisten) [report to Max Horkheimer, with Walter Benjamin]		ca. early August 1937		
1937	Congrès Descartes und Ästhetikerkongreß [report to Max Horkheimer]		11 August 1937		
1937	Musikalische Aphorismen 44	GS 18 39-40		15 September 1937	
1937	Ensemble	GS 16 275-280		15 September 1937 under the pseudonym Hektor Rottweiler	
1937	Musiquettes [Musikalische Aphorismen 45-49]	GS 18 40-43		15 September 1937	
1937	Zweite Nachtmusik	GS 18 45-53	September/October 1937		
1937	Exposé zur Monographie über Arnold Schönberg	GS 19 609-613	8 November 1937		
1937/1950	Das Bewußtsein der Wissenssoziologie	GS 10.1 31-46	1937; 1950		
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Klaviersonate	GS 13 374-382		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Lieder nach Hebbel und Mombert	GS 13 383-386		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Sieben frühe Lieder	GS 13 386-390		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	

1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Erstes Streichquartett	GS 13 391-401		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Klarinettenstücke	GS 13 408-413		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Orchesterstücke	GS 13 414-428		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Lyrische Suite	GS 13 451-462		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Konzertarie Der Wein [early version]	GS 13 509-514		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Erfahrungen an Lulu, Teil I	GS 13 472-477		Willi Reich, ed., Alban Berg, Wien/Leipzig/Zürich 1937	
1937	Buchrezensionen: Siegfried Kracauer, Jacques Offenbach und das Paris seiner Zeit	GS 19 363-365		1937	
1937	Neue wertfreie Soziologie	GS 20.1 13-45	1937		
1937	Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer	GS 20.1 221-228		1937	
1937	Traumprotokolle: London 1937	GS 20.2 572-573	1937		
1937	Fußnote zu Sibelius und Hamsun	GS 20.2 804		1937	
1937-1938	Versuch über Wagner	GS 13 7-148	Ms from 1937-1938; Ms fair copy 1951 at the earliest	chapters 2-5, 7, 8 and a résumé prepublished in 1939 as "Fragmente über Wagner" in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung; publication of the entire book with revisions in 1952	
1938-1941	Analysen zur Music Study des Princeton Radio Research Project	NS I.3	January 1938-1941		
ca. 1938-1949	Draft of a Course on Modern Music [abstract and themes for 30 seminars]		ca. 1938-1949		
1938	Ohne Titel [Der Schatz des Indianer-Joe; 3 Songs: Kinder im Labyrinth, Huckleberry Finn, Säufer im Wasserturm]		after early 1938		
1938	Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens	GS 14 14-50	summer 1938	1938	
1938	Draft of an article on the state of the forces of musical production [supplement to Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens]		9 December 1938		

1938	Buchrezensionen: Ernst Krenek, Über neue Musik	GS 19 366-368		1938	
1938	Buchrezensionen: Leo Wilzin, Musikstatistik	GS 19 369-370	1938		
1938	Buchrezensionen: Ernest Newman, The Life of Richard Wagner II	GS 19 371-372		1938	
1938	Glosse über Sibelius	GS 17 247-252	American translation under the title "The Sibelius Habit" at the Adorno Archive	1938	
1938	Roger Caillois, La Mante religieuse	GS 20.1 229-230		1938	
1938	Erich Rothacker, Die Schichten der Persönlichkeit	GS 20.1 231		1938	
1938	Othmar H. Sterzinger, Grundlinien der Kunstpsychologie	GS 20.2 505-506		1938	
1938	Ernst Krenek, Über neue Musik	GS 20.2 805	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T81	NS I.1 59-60	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T228	NS I.1 148-149	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T221	NS I.1 137-138	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T278	NS I.1 197	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T330	NS I.1 236	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T331	NS I.1 236	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T185	NS I.1 115	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T142	NS I.1 97	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T172	NS I.1 110-111	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T366	NS I.1 252	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T274	NS I.1 196	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T275	NS I.1 196	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T53	NS I.1 47-48	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T164	NS I.1 107	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T355	NS I.1 245	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T334	NS I.1 237	1938		
1938	Beethoven Fragments: T332	NS I.1 236-237	1938		
ca. 1938-1940	Ohne Titel [Rauchen bei Frauen, Rauchen bei Männern]		ca. 1938-1940		
1939	Buchrezensionen: W. van de Wall, The Music of the People	GS 19 373-374	ca. March 1939		
1939	Richmond Laurin Hawkins, Positivism in the United States 1853-1861	GS 20.1 242-243	ca. March 1939		
1939	Husserl and the Problem of Idealism	GS 20.1 119-134	May 1939	January 1940	

1939	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - IV [review of Hindemith's Unterweisung im Tonsatz, Theoretischer Teil]	GS 17 229-235	ca. May 1939	supposed to appear in <i>Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung</i> (1939); not printed because of the war	
1939	Gleason L. Archer, History of Radio to 1926	GS 20.1 348-349	ca. May 1939		
1939	Was ist Musik? [title added later by Gretel Adorno]	GS 19 614-619	11 September 1939		
1939	Maximilian Beck, Psychologie	GS 20.1 240-241	ca. November 1939		
1939	Broadcasting and the Public	GS 20.1 350-351	1939		
1939	Résumés der Kapitel 2 bis 5 und 7 und 8 [of Versuch über Wagner] aus der Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung	GS 13 497-503	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T350	NS I.1 243-244	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T141	NS I.1 95-96	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T184	NS I.1 115	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T74	NS I.1 57	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T181	NS I.1 114	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T29	NS I.1 34-37	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T97	NS I.1 68-69	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T276	NS I.1 196	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T116	NS I.1 84	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T277	NS I.1 197	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T279	NS I.1 197	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T108	NS I.1 73	1939		
1939	Beethoven Fragments: T191	NS I.1 119	1939		
ca. 1939	G. P. Adams u. a., Knowledge and Society	GS 20.1 238-239	ca. 1939		
1939-1940	Musikalische Warenanalysen, Teil I: Steckbriefe, Teil II: Neue Schlageranalysen, Teil III	GS 16 I: 284-288, II: 289-294, III: 294-287	I and II ca. 1939; the entire MS dated 27 February 1940; the analysis of Tschaikowsky's e-minor symphony dates from July 1954	1955	
ca. 1940-1949	Ad Konvention [Notizen zur Musikphilosophie]		ca. 1940-1949		
ca. 1940-1949	Ohne Titel [draft of a lecture on musical listening]		ca. 1940-1949		
ca. 1940s	Seminarankündigungen des New Yorker Instituts		ca. 1940s		
1940	Jean Wahl, Etudes Kierkegardiennes; Lowrie, Kierkegaard; Dru, The Journals of Sören Kierkegaard	GS 20.1 232-235	1940	January 1940	
1940	Wilhelm Grebe, Der tätige Mensch	GS 20.1 236-237		January 1940	

1940	Ad prima philosophia [notes]		early 1940		
1940	Zum Rundfunkkonzert vom 22. Februar 1940	GS 18 576-580	before 22 February 1940		
1940 [1963]	Kierkegaards Lehre von der Liebe	GS 2 217-236	originally in German; translated into English by Adorno (On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love); 1963 revised German version	1940 English version; 1963 revised German version	23 February 1940
1940	Donald Brinkmann, Natur und Kunst	GS 20.2 507-509	February 1940		
1940	Buchrezensionen: Carl A. Seashore, Psychology of Music	GS 19 375-381	ca. February 1940		
1940	George und Hofmannsthal: Zum Briefwechsel 1891-1906	GS 10.1 195-237	Frühjahr 1940		
1940	Heinrich Rickert, Unmittelbarkeit und Sinndeutung	GS 20.1 244-250	early March 1940	1941	
1940	Diskussionsbemerkungen ad Aufsatz über Staatskapitalismus: Zu Max Horkheimers Aufsatz [Autoritärer Staat]		after spring 1940		
1940	Zum Rundfunkkonzert vom 11. Juni 1940	GS 18 581-583	before 11 June 1940		
1940	Zu Benjamins Gedächtnis	GS 20.1 169-170		18 October 1940	
1940	Traumprotokolle: 30. Dezember 1940	GS 20.2 573	30 December 1940	1942	
1940	Ohne Titel [CV; originally for Die Geschichte der deutschen Musik von 1908 bis 1933: Exposé]		ca. 1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T223	NS I.1 146-147	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T224	NS I.1 147	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T101	NS I.1 70	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T87	NS I.1 62-63	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T57	NS I.1 49-51	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T60	NS I.1 52	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T61	NS I.1 52	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T335	NS I.1 237	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T11	NS I.1 25	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T1	NS I.1 21	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T365	NS I.1 251-252	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T102	NS I.1 70	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T128	NS I.1 89	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T260	NS I.1 169	1940		

1940	Beethoven Fragments: T183	NS I.1 115	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T8	NS I.1 23	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T117	NS I.1 84	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T112	NS I.1 82	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T72	NS I.1 56-57	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T313	NS I.1 227	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T192	NS I.1 120	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T344	NS I.1 241	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T195	NS I.1 120	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T35	NS I.1 40-41	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T133	NS I.1 91	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T121	NS I.1 86	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T131	NS I.1 90-91	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T114	NS I.1 83	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T88	NS I.1 63	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T99	NS I.1 69	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T52	NS I.1 47	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T31	NS I.1 37-38	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T201	NS I.1 123	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T115	NS I.1 84	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T86	NS I.1 62	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T45	NS I.1 45	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T3	NS I.1 21	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T73	NS I.1 57	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T44	NS I.1 44	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T75	NS I.1 57	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T130	NS I.1 90	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T119	NS I.1 85	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T120	NS I.1 85-86	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T281	NS I.1 197	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T49	NS I.1 46	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T361	NS I.1 250	1940		

1940	Beethoven Fragments: T5	NS I.1 22	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T311	NS I.1 225-227	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T315	NS I.1 228	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T316	NS I.1 228	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T266	NS I.1 186-187	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T258	NS I.1 169	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T267	NS I.1 187-189	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T307	NS I.1 223	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T138	NS I.1 94	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T271	NS I.1 195	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T30	NS I.1 37	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T202	NS I.1 123-124	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T85	NS I.1 61-62	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T154	NS I.1 104	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T155	NS I.1 104	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T84	NS I.1 61	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T314	NS I.1 227-228	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T309	NS I.1 223-224	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T353	NS I.1 244-245	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T171	NS I.1 110	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T145	NS I.1 98	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T118	NS I.1 84-85	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T219	NS I.1 135-137	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T156	NS I.1 104	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T222	NS I.1 138-146	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T220	NS I.1 137	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T326	NS I.1 234	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T62	NS I.1 52	1940		
1940	Beethoven Fragments: T134	NS I.1 91-92	1940		
ca. 1940	Die Geschichte der deutschen Musik von 1908 bis 1933: Exposé	GS 19 620-629	ca. 1940		
ca. 1940	Kein Abenteuer	GS 20.2 585-586	ca. 1940		

1941-1948	Philosophie der neuen Musik	GS 12 5-196	Fair copy of the preface 1941; part I: 1941; part II: 1947, completed in summer 1948; fair copy of the complete text 1948	1949; second edition 1958; third edition 1966	
1941	Buchrezensionen: Wilder Hobson, American Jazz Music; Winthrop Sargeant, Jazz Hot and Hybrid	GS 19 382-399	1941	an English translation appeared in early 1941	
1941	Spengler nach dem Untergang	GS 10.1 47-71	1938; revised lecture version 18 April 1941; expansion and American translation April 1941; May 1941		
1941	Problem des neuen Menschentypus: Memorandum an Paul Lazarsfeld zu einer geplanten Studie		23 June 1941		
1941	Notizen zur neuen Anthropologie		ca. August-September 1941		
1941	Ad Chaplin und Hitler [Notizen zur neuen Anthropologie]		ca. August-September 1941		
1941	Ohne Titel [William Dieterle, Syncopation, commentary for Max Horkheimer]		before 18 October 1941		
1941	Study of Popular Music, Memorandum an John Gray Peatman		27 October 1941		
1941	Veblens Angriff auf die Kultur	GS 10.1 72-96	ca. October-early November 1941/November 1952-February 1953		
1941	Buchrezensionen: Ernest Newman, The Life of Richard Wagner III	GS 19 400-403		1941	
1941	Eine Stätte der Forschung	GS 20.2 601-604		1941	
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T76	NS I.1 58	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T6	NS I.1 22	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T280	NS I.1 197	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T342	NS I.1 240-241	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T82	NS I.1 60	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T58	NS I.1 51	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T64	NS I.1 53	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T339	NS I.1 239	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T139	NS I.1 94	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T46	NS I.1 45	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T337	NS I.1 238-239	1941		

1941	Beethoven Fragments: T152	NS I.1 102-103	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T153	NS I.1 103-104	1941		
1941	Beethoven Fragments: T263	NS I.1 170-172	1941		
1941/1942	Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung [with Max Horkheimer, early version of the latter's essay]		ca. winter 1941/1942	In Memoriam Walter Benjamin, New York/Los Angeles 1942	
1942-1944	Dialektik der Aufklärung	GS 3 7-296	"Geschichtsphiloso phischer Exkurs zur Odyssee": draft before August 1942; "Odysseus oder Mythologie und Aufklärung": revised version 1943, GS 3, 61-99; "Das Schema der Massenkultur" (published only in GS) completed October 1942; second draft of the part on the Culture Industry with annotations for the final version October 1942/February 1943, GS 3, 141-191, 299-335; final version with corrections 1944; last thesis of Elemente des Antisemitismus added later, before June 1947	1944	
ca. 1942- 1944	Zum Begriff des Glamour [note]		ca. 1942-1944		
1942	Neunzehn Beiträge über neue Musik [articles for an encyclopaedia]	GS 18 57-87	21 January 1942		
1942	Traumprotokolle: Los Angeles 1. Februar 1942	GS 20.2 574	1 February 1942	1942	
1942	Traumprotokolle: Los Angeles 22. Mai 1942	GS 20.2 574-575	22 May 1942	1942	
1942	Thesen über Bedürfnis	GS 8 392-396	first and second version 8 August 1942		
1942	Für Ernst Bloch	GS 20.1 190-193	12 October 1942	27 November 1942	
1942	Traumprotokolle: Los Angeles Anfang Dezember 1942	GS 20.2 575-576	early December 1942		
1942	Aldous Huxley und die Utopie	GS 10.1 97-122	1942		
1942	Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie	GS 8 373-391	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T193	NS I.1 120	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T240	NS I.1 159-160	1942		

1942	Beethoven Fragments: T347	NS I.1 243	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T251	NS I.1 166-167	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T136	NS I.1 92-93	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T65	NS I.1 53	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T173	NS I.1 111-112	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T346	NS I.1 242-243	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T110	NS I.1 82	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T310	NS I.1 224-225	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T100	NS I.1 69-70	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T264	NS I.1 172	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T89	NS I.1 63-65	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T370	NS I.1 254	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T91	NS I.1 65	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T159	NS I.1 105	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T230	NS I.1 151	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T234	NS I.1 155	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T196	NS I.1 120-121	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T197	NS I.1 121	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T160	NS I.1 105-106	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T356	NS I.1 245-246	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T357	NS I.1 246	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T68	NS I.1 54	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T207	NS I.1 126	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T261	NS I.1 169	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T351	NS I.1 244	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T341	NS I.1 240	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T144	NS I.1 98	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T182	NS I.1 114	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T352	NS I.1 244	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T216	NS I.1 134-135	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T54	NS I.1 48	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T208	NS I.1 126	1942		

1942	Beethoven Fragments: T318	NS I.1 228-230	1942		
1942	Beethoven Fragments: T338	NS I.1 239	1942		
1943-1949	Jewish Names, Simple Folks, Vigilance, Persecuted Innocence, Lone Wolf, Max' Bemerkungen zum Lone Wolf, What is a Fascist Agitator?, The Rabble Rouser's Manual, Pamphlet [Studies in Prejudice, preparatory work]		1943-1949		
1943	Ohne Titel [poem from the album for Renée]		1 February 1943		
1943	Traumprotokolle: Los Angeles 15. Februar 1943	GS 20.2 576	15 February 1943		
1943	Notizen ad Antisemitismus		12 April 1943		
1943	Ohne Titel [4 poems]		May-June 1943		
1943	The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses	GS 9.1 7-141	1943	privately published	
1943	Excerpts from Martin Luther Thomas		1943		
1943	Die psychologische Technik in Martin Luther Thomas' Rundfunkreden [The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses, translated by Peter Scharfmeister]		1943		
1943	Martin Luther Thomas' Propaganda-Tricks [list of the propaganda tricks]		1943		
1943	Über epische Naivetät [material for Dialektik der Aufklärung]	GS 11 34-40	1943		
1943	Beethoven Fragments: T122	NS I.1 86-87	1943		
1943	Beethoven Fragments: T360	NS I.1 249-250	1943		
1943	Beethoven Fragments: T187	NS I.1 117-118	1943		
1943	Beethoven Fragments: T188	NS I.1 118-119	1943		
ca. 1944-1946	Zum neunzackigen Krönchen: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen		ca. 1944-1946		
1944-1947	Minima Moralia	GS 4 11-300	part I, collection of single texts, ca. 1944, fair copy 1945, GS 4, 11-90; part II, fair copy, 1945, GS 4, 91-177; part III, fair copy 1946/1947, GS 4, 179-281; appendix 1944-1947, GS 4, 285-300		
1944-1949	Studies in the Authoritarian Personality	GS 9.1 143-509	1944-1949	1950	
ca. 1940s, first half	Ohne Titel [Zur Hegelschen Dialektik]		ca. 1940s, first half		

1944	Komposition für den Film [with Hanns Eisler]	GS 15 7-143	original version of the preface 1 September 1944, GS 15, 9-10; author's copy October 1944	English version 1947; German version 1949; expanded and modified German version 1969	
1944	The Musical Climate for Fascism in Germany	GS 20.2 430-440	First half of September 1944	15 September 1944 Dept. of Music UCLA	
1944	Manual for Distribution among Jews [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		30 October 1944		
1944	Ohne Titel [Autoritärer Antisemitismus, memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		3 November 1944		
1944	Theses upon Art and Religion Today	GS 11 647-653	12 November 1944		
1944	Bettelheim's Study of the Thematic Apperception Test [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		22 November 1944		
1944	Labor Project [memorandum for the New York institute]		1 December 1944		
1944	Ohne Titel [memorandum for Max Horkheimer with suggestions for the Labor Project and the Child Study]		5 December 1944		
1944	Research Project on Social Discrimination, done jointly by the Institute of Social Research and the "Berkeley Opinion Study" of the University of California [memorandum for Fred Pollock]		27 December 1944		
1944	Research Project on Childhood Anti-Semitism [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		28 December 1944		
1944	Ohne Titel [Labor Project, draft of a questionnaire]		1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T286	NS I.1 200-201	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T336	NS I.1 237-238	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T325	NS I.1 234	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T170	NS I.1 109-110	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T27	NS I.1 32-34	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T20	NS I.1 28-29	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T22	NS I.1 31	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T42	NS I.1 43-44	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T4	NS I.1 22	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T345	NS I.1 241-242	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T55	NS I.1 48-49	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T140	NS I.1 94-95	1944		

1944	Beethoven Fragments: T348	NS I.1 243	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T324	NS I.1 234	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T23	NS I.1 31	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T92	NS I.1 65-66	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T59	NS I.1 51-52	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T148	NS I.1 100-101	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T126	NS I.1 88-89	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T212	NS I.1 127	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T103	NS I.1 71	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T147	NS I.1 99-100	1944		
1944	Beethoven Fragments: T26	NS I.1 31-32	1944		
1945	Iconographies of Anti-Semites [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		5 January 1945		
1945	Research Project on Indirect Anti-Semitic Propaganda [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		9 January 1945		
1945	Research Project on Anti- Semitism among House Wives [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		15 January 1945		
1945	Project of a Manual for Jews [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		22 January 1945		
1945	Research Project on the Sociological, Political, and Economic Mechanisms behind American Anti-Semitism [memorandum for Max Horkheimer]		27 January 1945		
1945	Beethoven Fragments: T96	NS I.1 66-68	1 February 1945		
1945	What National Socialism has Done to the Arts	GS 20.2 413-429	February 1945		
1945	Qualitative "Content Analysis" in Communications Research [memorandum for Leo Löwenthal]		before 5 March 1948		
1945	Beethoven Fragments: T109	NS I.1 81	10 March 1945		
1945	Memorandum on the Berkeley Public Opinion Study [report to the Advisory Council in the AJC]		13 March 1945		
1945	Notes on the Comic Strip "Tomorrow the World" [Anti- Semitism project], Bemerkungen zu einer Aufklärungskampagne über den Nationalsozialismus			ca. mid March 1945	

1945	Hypotheses Concerning Indirect Question of Berkeley Questionnaire [addendum to the report to the Advisory Council in the AJC]		20 March 1945		
1945	Research Project on Contact Areas between Gentiles and Jews [draft for Max Horkheimer]		23 March 1945		
1945	Notes on the Pictorials of the "Believe it or not" Type		early April 1945		
1945	Notes on two Articles in the Spring Issue 1945 of "Common Ground" [Anti-Semitism project]		early April 1945		
1945	Ohne Titel [draft of an insert for the American version of Eclipse of Reason]		ca. April 1945		
1945	Vorschläge zur Neufassung der Vorlesungen von Max Horkheimer [memorandum for Leo Löwenthal on the American version of Eclipse of Reason]		5 June 1945		
1945	Below the Surface [memorandum on a film script for the Anti-Semitism project]		ca. April-July 1945		
1945	Memorandum über ein Gespräch mit Anton Lourie [about the psycho-analytical theory of the Jewish character]		26-29 September 1945		
1945	Traits of the Authoritarian Character [The Authoritarian Personality, 29 theses, with Max Horkheimer]		ca. second half of 1945		
1945	Fragen an die intellektuelle Emigration	GS 20.1	1945		
1945-1946	Notizen ad Child Study		ca. 1945-March 1946		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T93	NS I.1 66	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T71	NS I.1 56	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T194	NS I.1 120	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T70	NS I.1 55-56	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T217	NS I.1 135	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T218	NS I.1 135	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T161	NS I.1 106	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T157	NS I.1 104-105	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T151	NS I.1 101-102	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T149	NS I.1 101	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T77	NS I.1 58	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T317	NS I.1 228	1945-1947		

1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T80	NS I.1 59	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T17	NS I.1 28	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T354	NS I.1 245	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T284	NS I.1 198-199	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T285	NS I.1 199	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T203	NS I.1 125	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T24	NS I.1 31	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T94	NS I.1 66	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T150	NS I.1 101	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T143	NS I.1 97	1945-1947		
1945-1947	Beethoven Fragments: T329	NS I.1 235	1945-1947		
1946	Is there an "Anti-Semitic" Character [The Authoritarian Personality]		28 January 1946		
1946	Die revidierte Psychoanalyse	GS 8 20-41	English version April 1946; translated in 1952 by Rainer Koehne	German version 1962	English version 1946
1946	Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda	GS 8	1946	1946	
1947	Buchrezensionen: Wagner, Nietzsche, and Hitler	GS 19 404-412		winter 1947	
1948	Traumprotokolle: Los Angeles 18. Februar 1948	GS 20.2	18 February 1948		
1948	Kompositionskritiken: Egkomion [Werner Egk, Sonate für Klavier]	GS 19 334-340	24 June 1948		
1948	Die gegängelte Musik	GS 14 51-66	summer 1948; ca. September 1952	1953	
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T15	NS I.1 27	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T47	NS I.1 45	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T113	NS I.1 83	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T282	NS I.1 198	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T132	NS I.1 91	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T272	NS I.1 195	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T319	NS I.1 230	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T320	NS I.1 230-231	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T321	NS I.1 231	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T322	NS I.1 231-232	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T323	NS I.1 232-233	1948		

1948	Beethoven Fragments: T273	NS I.1 195-196	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T104	NS I.1 71	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T206	NS I.1 125-126	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T369	NS I.1 254	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T265	NS I.1 184-186	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T308	NS I.1 223	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T328	NS I.1 235	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T165	NS I.1 107-108	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T67	NS I.1 54	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T111	NS I.1 82	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T127	NS I.1 89	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T213	NS I.1 127-129	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T225	NS I.1 147	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T21	NS I.1 30	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T359	NS I.1 249	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T327	NS I.1 235	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T358	NS I.1 248-249	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T186	NS I.1 115-116	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T146	NS I.1 98-99	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T13	NS I.1 26	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T83	NS I.1 60-61	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T268	NS I.1 193	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T333	NS I.1 237	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T198	NS I.1 121-122	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T269	NS I.1 193-195	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T137	NS I.1 93	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T363	NS I.1 250-251	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T364	NS I.1 251	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T283	NS I.1 198	1948		
1948	Beethoven Fragments: T10	NS I.1 23-25	1948		
1949	Democratic Leadership and Mass Manipulation	GS 20.1 267-286	ca. spring 1949	1950	
1949	Toward a Reappraisal of Heine	GS 20.2 441-452	ca. spring 1949		

1949	Hermann Grab	GS 20.2 465-466	ca. August 1949	1949	
1949	Ohne Titel [Paul W. Massing, Rehearsal for Destruction, draft of a critique commissioned by Horkheimer, published under the name of Thomas Mann]		before 22 November 1949		
1949	Ohne Titel [statement on the double authorship with Horkheimer]		November 1949		
1949	Ad Strauss [Richard Strauss: Zum hundertsten Geburtstag: 11. Juni 1964, list of motives and early draft of the beginning]		ca. autumn 1949; April 1964		
1949	Die auferstandene Kultur	GS 20.2 453-464	1949	May 1950	
1949	Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft	GS 10.1 11-30	1949		
1949	Ad Lukács	GS 20.1 251-256	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T105	NS I.1 71	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T123	NS I.1 87-88	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T166	NS I.1 108	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T205	NS I.1 125	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T226	NS I.1 148	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T7	NS I.1 22	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T204	NS I.1 125	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T253	NS I.1 167	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T125	NS I.1 88	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T129	NS I.1 89-90	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T106	NS I.1 71-72	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T214	NS I.1 129-131	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T215	NS I.1 131-133	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T51	NS I.1 46-47	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T211	NS I.1 127	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T95	NS I.1 66	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T227	NS I.1 148	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T167	NS I.1 108-109	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T199	NS I.1 122-123	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T200	NS I.1 123	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T56	NS I.1 49	1949		

1949	Beethoven Fragments: T12	NS I.1 25-26	1949		
1949	Beethoven Fragments: T340	NS I.1 240	1949		
1949/1950	Theorie der Gesellschaft [replacement teaching for Max Horkheimer]		winter semester 1949/950		
1950	Charakteristik Walter Benamins	GS 10.1 238-253	1950		
1950	Kurt Weill	GS 18 544-547		15 April 1950	
1950	Vorurteil und Charakter [with Max Horkheimer]	GS 9.2 360-373	15.-21 May 1950		
1950	Prejudice and Personality [American translation of Vorurteil und Charakter by Heinz and Ruth Norden]		ca. June 1950		
1950	Für Alban Berg	GS 18 483-486	late June 1950		
1950	Exposé für die deutsche Version der Studies in Prejudice		1 July 1950		
1950	Indirekte Fragen zur Kontrolle, ob jemand noch Nazi ist [Anti- Semitism project], auf Deutschland übertragener Fragenkatalog		28 July 1950		
1950	Nachwort [tWalter Benjamin, Berliner Kindheit]	GS 20.1 170-172	August 1950	1950	
1950	Die UDSSR und der Frieden [with Max Horkheimer]	GS 20.1 390-393	ca. August 1950		
1950	Mißverständnisse [on Philosophie der neuen Musik]	GS 12 203-206		1950	
1950	o. Tit. [statement against the politics of the Soviet Union, with Max Horkheimer]		1950		
ca. 1950	Zum Verhältnis von Malerei und Musik heute [for René and Ellen Leibowitz]	GS 18 140-148	ca. 1950		
1950/1951	Ästhetik		winter semester 1950/1951		
1950/1951	Schuld und Abwehr	GS 9.2 121-324	1950/1951; 1951- 1955	1955	
1950/1951	Beethoven Fragments: T32	NS I.1 38-39	1950/1951		
1950/1951	Beethoven Fragments: T33	NS I.1 40	1950/1951		
1950/1951	Beethoven Fragments: T34	NS I.1 40	1950/1951		
1950/1951	Beethoven Fragments: T362	NS I.1 250	1950/1951		
1950/1951	Beethoven Fragments: T349	NS I.1 243	1950/1951		
1951	Individuum und Staat	GS 20. 1 287-292	March 1951		
1951	Probleme der zeitgenössischen Erkenntnistheorie (Husserl), Themen der letzten Stunden [incomplete tape transcription]		summer semester 1951		
1951	Notizen zu Heidegger		14 July 1951		

1951	Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik	GS 18 149-176	July/ August 1951	1953	
1951	Pressenotiz [on Über das gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik]		ca. autumn 1951		
1951	Arnold Schönberg: Worte des Gedenkens zum 13. September 1951	GS 18 623-626	after 13 September 1951		
1951	Schlagzeug [Quasi una fantasia: Motive]	GS 16 280-281	Revised from 1959	6 October 1951	
1951	Ohne Titel [Zum Begriff der Vernunft] [draft of the beginning of Max Horkheimer's inaugural lecture on 20 November 1951]		before 20 November 1951		
1951	Ohne Titel [Soziologie an der Universität] [draft of an article by Max Horkheimer for the Frankfurter Studentenzeitung, December 1951]		30 November 1951		
1951	Einführungen in die Darmstädter Gemeindestudie: Herbert Kötter, Struktur und Funktion von Landgemeinden im Einflußbereich einer deutschen Großstadt	GS 20.2 605-607	late November 1951		
1951	Zur gegenwärtigen Stellung der empirischen Sozialforschung in Deutschland	GS 8 478-493	late November/December 1951	1952	
1951	Fast zu ernst	GS 20.2 567-570	first draft 21 December 1951	31 December 1951	
1951	Zur Krisis der Literaturkritik	GS 11 661-664	December 1951	1952/1953	Bayerischer Rundfunk
1951	Ohne Titel [Rede auf Leopold von Wiese]		1951		
1951	Thesen zur Reproduktionstheorie [Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion]		1951		
1951	Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda	GS 8 408-433	1951	1951	
1951	Bach gegen seine Liebhaber verteidigt	GS 10.1 138-151	1951		
1951	Beethoven Fragments: T18	NS I.1 28	omitted in Tiedemann's list; dating in NS I.1, 284, fn 18		
ca. 1951	"Kulturanthropologie"	GS 20.1 135-139	ca. 1951		
1951/1952	Der Begriff der Philosophie	Frankfurter Adorno-Blätter II, 9-91	winter semester 1951/1952		
1952	Ein Titel	GS 11 654-657	first draft first half of January 1952	25 January 1952	
1952	Einführungen in die Darmstädter Gemeindestudie: Gerhard Teiwes, Der Nebenerwerbslandwirt und seine Familie im Schnittpunkt ländlicher und städtischer Lebensform	GS 20.2 614-618	draft 17 January 1952	1952	

1952	Öffentliche Meinung und Meinungsforschung	GS 20.1 293-301	January 1952		
1952	Unrat und Engel	GS 11	draft 5 February 1952	18 February 1952	
1952	Einführungen in die Darmstädter Gemeindestudie: Klaus A. Lindemann, Behörde und Bürger	GS 20.2 634-639	February 1952	1952	
1952	Ohne Titel [Zum Wiederaufbau der Frankfurter Universität] [draft of a report to Max Horkheimer]		5 March 1952		
1952	Einführungen in die Darmstädter Gemeindestudie: Karl-Guenther Grüneisen, Landbevölkerung im Kraftfeld der Stadt [with Max Rolfes]	GS 20.2 607-614	1-8 April 1952	1952	
1952	Notiz zur Erstausgabe des Versuch über Wagner	GS 13 503	Easter 1952		
1952	Entwicklung und Formen der neuen Musik	GS 18 118-123	28 April 1952		
1952	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Gerhart Baumert, Jugend der Nachkriegszeit; Irngard Kuhr, Schule und Jugend in einer ausgebombten Stadt; Giselheid Koepnick, Mädchen einer Oberprima	GS 20.2 618-629	April/ May 1952	1952	
1952	Ohne Titel [Probleme des Menschen] [draft of a radio lecture for Max Horkheimer]		2 May 1952		
1952	Zum Problem des akademischen Unterrichts [draft for Max Horkheimer's lecture on 31 Juli 1952 to the Deutsche Rektorenkonferenz in Kiel]		July 1952		
1952	Der Artist als Statthalter	GS 11 114-126	first lecture version ca. July 1952	1953	Bayerischer Rundfunk
1952	Selbstanzeige des Essaybuches "Versuch über Wagner"	GS 13 504-508	around 10 August 1952		
1952	Das Erbe und die neue Musik	GS 18 684-694	radio version 21 August 1952		Darmstadt, April 1954
1952	Ohne Titel [Zur psychoanalytischen Urszene]		27 August 1952		
1952	Imaginäre Begrüßung Thomas Manns	GS 20.2 467-472	October 1952		
1952	Huldigung an Zerlina	GS 17 34-35	1952	1952/1953	
1952	Vorurteil und Charakter [with Horkheimer]	GS 9.2 360-373		1952	
1952	Arnold Schönberg: 1874-1951	GS 10.1 152-180	1952		
1952	Public Opinion and Public Opinion Research [translation of Öffentliche Meinung und Meinungsforschung]		ca. 1952		
1952	Rodolphe Loewenstein, Psychanalyse de l'Antisémitisme	GS 20.1 384-385	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T178	NS I.1 113	1952		

1952	Beethoven Fragments: T189	NS I.1 119	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T231	NS I.1 151-152	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T232	NS I.1 152-154	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T25	NS I.1 31	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T233	NS I.1 154-155	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T180	NS I.1 114	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T175	NS I.1 112	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T190	NS I.1 119	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T235	NS I.1 155-156	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T236	NS I.1 156	1952		
1952	Beethoven Fragments: T19	NS I.1 28-29	1952		
1952/1953	Aberglaube aus zweiter Hand	GS 8 147-176	preparatory research 1952/1953	1957; 1959; 1966	
1952- 1953/1961	The Stars down to Earth	GS 9.2 7-120	ca. November 1952- July 1953; 27 April 1961	1957	
1953	Prolog zum Fernsehen	GS 10.2 507-517	27 January 1953		
1953	Zeitlose Mode	GS 10.1 123-137	18 February 1953		
1953	How to look at Television [with Bernice T. Eiduson]		ca. March/April 1953		
1953	Psychodynamics Televised [with Merrill B. Friend]		ca. March-May 1953		
1953	Thesen gegen die musikpädagogische Musik	GS 14 437-440	10 May 1953	1954	
1953/1956	Fragment über Musik und Sprache	GS 16 251-256	ca. May 1953/1956	1956/1957	
1953	Replik zu einer Kritik der "Zeitlosen Mode"	GS 10.2 805-809	16 July 1953 under the title "Mephistophelische s"	1953	
1953	Some Categories pertaining to the Problem of Musical Expertness and Criticism		6 August 1953		
1953	Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka	GS 10.1 254-287	7 August 1953		
1953	Fernsehen als Ideologie	GS 10.2 518-532	12 August 1953	1953	
1953	Valéry Proust Museum	GS 10.1 181-194	22 August 1953		
1953	Individuum und Organisation	GS 8 440-456	September 1953	1954	
1953	Meine stärksten Eindrücke 1953	GS 20.2 734-735	11 November 1953	25 December 1953	
1953	Ohne Titel [Über Freiheit]		before 26 November 1953		
1953	Über Technik und Humanismus	GS 20.1 310-317		7 December 1953	
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T237	NS I.1 157	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T239	NS I.1 158	1953		

1953	Beethoven Fragments: T238	NS I.1 157-158	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T229	NS I.1 149-150	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T243	NS I.1 162-164	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T2	NS I.1 21	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T6	NS I.1	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T249	NS I.1 165-166	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T179	NS I.1 113	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T9	NS I.1 23	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T262	NS I.1 169-170	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T250	NS I.1 166	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T135	NS I.1 92	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T158	NS I.1 105	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T36	NS I.1 41	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T37	NS I.1 41	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T16	NS I.1 28	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T177	NS I.1 113	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T254	NS I.1 167-168	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T255	NS I.1 168	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T256	NS I.1 169	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T43	NS I.1 44	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T169	NS I.1 109	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T176	NS I.1 112	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T168	NS I.1 109	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T66	NS I.1 53	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T312	NS I.1 227	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T241	NS I.1 160-161	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T209	NS I.1 126	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T210	NS I.1 126	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T50	NS I.1 46	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T14	NS I.1 27	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T69	NS I.1 55	1953		
1953	Beethoven Fragments: T78	NS I.1 58	1953		

1953	Beethoven Fragments: T248	NS I.1 165	1953		
1953/1954	Bemerkungen über Politik und Neurose	GS 8 434-439	late December 1953	1953/1954	
1953-1954	Zum Verhältnis von Soziologie und Psychologie	GS 8 42-85	summer 1953-early August 1954	1955	
1954	Im Flug erhascht	GS 20.2 548-551		9/10 January 1954	
1954	Aus einem Brief über die "Betrogene" an Thomas Mann	GS 11 66-679	18 January 1954	1955	
1954	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 24. Januar 1954	GS 20.2 577	24 January 1954		
1954	Der Schwarzseher antwortet	GS 20.1 339-341		25 January 1954	
1954	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt Januar 1954	GS 20.2 577	January 1954		
1954	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Gerhart Baumert, Deutsche Familien nach dem Kriege	GS 20.2 629-634	10-26 April 1954	1954	
1954	Standort des Erzählers im zeitgenössischen Roman	GS 11 41-48	30 April 1954	1954	1954, RIAS
1954	Zu Proust: Im Schatten junger Mädchenblüte	GS 11 670-675	15 August 1954	1954	1954, Hessischer Rundfunk
1954	Zur Uraufführung des Klaviertrios von Eduard Steuermann	GS 18 680-681	August 1954		
1954 [1967]	Zum Verständnis Schönbergs	GS 18 428-445	August 1954	early version June 1955; July 1967	
1954	Einführung in die Zweite Kammersymphonie von Schönberg	GS 18 627-629	first half of September 1954		
1954	Beitrag zur Ideologienlehre	GS 8 440-477	ca. mid September-mid October 1954	1954	
1954	Das Altern der Neuen Musik	GS 14 143-167	April 1954; October 1954; summer 1955		April 1954, Süddeutscher Rundfunk
1954	Zum Studium der Philosophie	GS 20.1 318-326	7 December 1954	1955	
1954	Eduard Steuermann: Klaviertrio	GS 18 682-683		25 December 1954	
1954	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Ton	GS 13 325-334	29 December 1954	1955	
1954	Empirische Sozialforschung [with other authors]	GS 9.2 327-359		1954	
1954	Beethoven Fragments: T124	NS I.1 88	1954		
1954	Beethoven Fragments: T367	NS I.1 253	1954		
1954	Beethoven Fragments: T174	NS I.1 112	1954		
1954	Beethoven Fragments: T306	NS I.1 223	1954		
1954	Beethoven Fragments: T63	NS I.1 52	1954		
1954	Beethoven Fragments: T287	NS I.1 201	1954		
1955	Zum Problem der Familie	GS 20.1 302-309	7 January 1955	revised version in <i>Soziologische Exkurse</i>	
1955	Max Horkheimer	GS 20.1	first half of February 1955	12 February 1955	

1955	Sociologica: Aufsätze, Max Horkheimer zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet [preface]	GS 20.2 640-642	February 1955	1955	
1955	Radiorede über Max Horkheimer	GS 20.1 152-154	16 February 1955		
1955	Kleiner Dank an Wien	GS 20.2	10 March 1955	1955	
1955	Fantasia sopra Carmen	GS 16 298-308	27 March 1955	1955	
1955	Bürgerliche Oper	GS 16 24-39	31 March 1955	1955	1955
1955	Die Musik zur glücklichen Hand	GS 18	29 April 1955	May 1955	
1955	Musiksoziologie	GS 18 840-841	draft from 30 May 1955		
1955	Benjamins Einbahnstraße	GS 11 680-685	12 June 1955; 21 June 1955	1955	
1955	Einleitung zu Benjamins "Schriften"	GS 11 567-582	July 1955	1955	
1955	"Betriebsklima" und Entfremdung	GS 20.2 674-684	ca. July 1955		
1955	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Betriebsklima: Eine industriesoziologische Untersuchung aus dem Ruhrgebiet	GS 20.2 642-643	1 August 1955	1955	
1955	Ohne Titel [Kriterien zur Verleihung der Schönberg-Medaille]		before 26 September 1955		
1955	Wird Spengler recht behalten?	GS 20.1 140-148	mid October 1955	December 1955	
1955	Nach einem Vierteljahrhundert	GS 18 548-551	19 October 1955	1955/1956	
1955	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt Ende Oktober 1955	GS 20.2 577-578	late October 1955		
1955	Im Gedächtnis an Alban Berg	GS 18 487-512		October 1955	
1955	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 12. November 1955	GS 20.2 578	12 November 1955		
1955	Neue Musik heute	GS 18 124-133	ca. November 1955	1956	
1955	Alban Berg	GS 16 85-96	early December 1955	1956	Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1955	Beethoven Fragments: T343	NS I.1 241	1955		
1955	Beethoven Fragments: T288	NS I.1 201-202	1955		
1955/1967	Zum Verständnis Schönbergs	GS 18 428-445		early version 1955; 1967	
ca. 1955	Für die Kranichsteiner Idee	GS 19 630-632	ca. 1955		
1952-1956	Kritik des Musikanten	GS 14 67-107	1952-1956		1956, Süddeutscher Rundfunk
1956	Musik, Sprache und ihr Verhältnis im gegenwärtigen Komponieren[expanded version of Fragment über Musik und Sprache]	GS 16 649-664	draft of part I before 1953 [before 1949?]; entire essay 8 January 1956; 21 January 1956	1956	
1956	Vortrupp und Avantgarde	GS 18 800-804	24 January 1956	1956	
1956	Die Wunde Heine	GS 11 95-100	first half of February 1956	1956	1956, Westdeutscher Rundfunk

1956	Zur Einführung in Heinz Krügers Studien über den Aphorismus als philosophische Form	GS 20.2 474-476	February 1956	1957	
1956	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Soziologische Exkurse	GS 20.2 644-646	spring 1956	1956	
1956	Wozzeck in Partitur	GS 18 480-82	9 April 1956	18 April 1956	
1956	Kolisch und die neue Interpretation	GS 19 460-462	12 July 1956	20 July 1956	
1956	Arnold Schönberg (I)	GS 18 304-323	10 June 1956; simplified version 22 August 1956	1957	
1956	Satzzeichen	GS 11 106-113	first half of September 1956	1956	
1956	Neue Musik, Interpretation, Publikum	GS 16 40-51	ca. mid September 1956	1957	
1956	Rückblickend auf den Surrealismus	GS 11 101-105	24 September 1956	1956	
1956	Zur Partitur des Parsifal	GS 17 47-51	30 September 1956	1956/1957	
1956	Aktualität der Erwachsenenbildung	GS 20.1 327-331	4 October 1956	11 October 1956	
1956	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 18. November 1956	GS 20.2 578	18 November 1956		
1956	Rede über Lyrik und Gesellschaft	GS 11 49-68	summer 1950/October 1956/late November 1956	1957	RIAS Berlin
1956	Widerspruch	GS 18 834-835	5 November 1956/21 December 1956	21 January 1956	
1956	Umfragen: "Die zehn größten Romane der deutschen Literatur"	GS 20.2 735-736		25 December 1956	
1956	Beethoven Fragments: T107	NS I.1 72-73	1956		
1956	Beethoven Fragments: T163	NS I.1 106-107	1956		
1956	Beethoven Fragments: T28	NS I.1 34	1956		
1956	Vorwort zum Forschungsbericht über Universität und Gesellschaft [with Max Horkheimer]	GS 20.2 685-688	1956	1956	
1953/1956	Fragment über Musik und Sprache	GS 16 251-256	ca. May 1953/1956	1956/1957	
1956	Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie: Studien über Husserl und die phänomenologischen Antinomien	GS 5 7-245	Chapters 1, 2 and 4 based on an MS from 1934-1937, revised 1956; introduction and chapter 3 written in 1955/1956	1956	
ca. 1956	Bei Gelegenheit von Wilhelm Lehmanns Bemerkungen zur Kunst des Gedichts	GS 11 665-668	ca. 1956 (Lehmann's Bemerkungen zur Kunst des Gedichts was published in 1956)		
1957	Replik zu Peter R. Holstätters Kritik des Gruppenexperiments	GS 9.2 378-394	9 January 1957	1957	

1957	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Freud in der Gegenwart: Ein Vortragszyklus	GS 20.2 646-649	spring 1957	1957	
1957	Vernunft und Offenbarung [radio discussion with Eugen Kogon]	GS 10.2 608-616	13 March 1957	1957	
1957	Physiognomik der Stimme	GS 20.2 510-514	25 March 1957	6 April 1957	
1957	Soziologie und empirische Forschung	GS 8 196-216	late February 1957/3 April 1957	1957	1957
1957	Die Funktion des Kontrapunkts in der neuen Musik	GS 16 145-169	13-21 July 1956/23 February 1957/April 1957	1957	in the Akademie der Künste, BErlin
1957	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 9. Mai 1957	GS 20.2 579	9 May 1957		
1957	Scholem spricht in den Loeb Lectures	GS 20.2 477-478	2 July 1957	4 July 1957	
1957	Zur Musikpädagogik	GS 14 108-126	ca. 17 September 1957		
1957	Notiz zur zweiten Ausgabe der Philosophie der neuen Musik von 1958	GS 12 199-200	25 September 1957		
1957	Teamwork in der Sozialforschung	GS 8 494-498	8 October 1957		
1957	Verfremdetes Hauptwerk: Zur Missa Solemnis	GS 17 145-161	25 October 1957	1959	
1957	Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs	GS 11 69-87	early October 1957/ca. 7 November 1957; ca. late November 1959	1958	1957, Westdeutscher Rundfunk
1957	Kleine Proust-Kommentare	GS 11 203-215	December 1957	1958	
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T246	NS I.1 164	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T289	NS I.1 202	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T290	NS I.1 202	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T291	NS I.1 202	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T292	NS I.1 202	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T293	NS I.1 202	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T294	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T295	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T296	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T297	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T298	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T299	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T300	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T301	NS I.1 301	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T302	NS I.1 203	1957		

1957	Beethoven Fragments: T303	NS I.1 203	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T304	NS I.1 204	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T305	NS I.1 204	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T252	NS I.1 167	1957		
1957	Beethoven Fragments: T259	NS I.1 169	1957		
1957	Zum Gedächtnis Eichendorffs: Coda: Schumanns Lieder	GS 11 87-94		1958	1957, Westdeutscher Rundfunk
1957	Zu Proust: In Swanns Welt	GS 11 669		1957	
1957	Die Abhängigkeit des Ausbildungszieles von den Studienerwartungen der Studenten	GS 20.2 689-697	1957 with Christoph Oehler	1959	
1954-1958	Der Essay als Form	GS 11	1954-February 1958		
1957/1958	Erkenntnistheorie	NS IV.1			winter semester 1957/1958, Frankfurt University
1958	Otto Büsch und Peter Furth, Rechtsradikalismus im Nachkriegsdeutschland	GS 20.1 386-389	early January 1958	1958	
1958	Buchrezensionen: Musiklexikon ohne Staub [Rudolf Stephan, Musik: Das Fischer Lexikon]	GS 19 413-417	10 January 1958		
1958	Zur Physiognomie Kteneks	GS 17 109-113	after 26 March 1958	1958	
1958	Einführung in die Dialektik	NS IV.2			summer semester 1958, Frankfurt University
1958	Die Meisterschaft des Maestro	GS 16 52-67	after 8 December 1957/ca. 9 July 1958	1958	
1958	Winfried Zillig: Serenade I für acht Blechbläser	GS 18 528-530	before 30 July 1958	1958	
1958	Kriterien der neuen Musik	GS 16 170-228	ca. second half of July 1957; 14 September 1957; ca. 16 September 1957; ca. 16 November 1957; ca. January 1958; ca. June/July 1958; 12 August 1958		July 1957 in Kranichstein
1958	Ideen zur Musiksoziologie	GS 16 9-23	late July 1958		
1958	Wörter aus der Fremde	GS 11 216-232	13 September 1958; 17 September 1958	1959	Hessischer Rundfunk
1958	Erwin Stein: Zu seinem Tode	GS 19 463-464	18 September 1958		
1958	Erpreßte Versöhnung: Zu Georg Lukács' "Wider den mißverstandenen Realismus"	GS 11 251-280	ca. early September 1958; 11 September 1958; 4 October 1958		
1958 [1927]	Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition	GS 16 68-84	October 1958, drawing on an article about the Orchesterstücke op. 16 from <i>Pult und Tuktstock</i> (1927)		1958, Norddeutscher Rundfunk

1958	Klassik, Romantik, Neue Musik	GS 16 126-144	6 November 1958; early December 1958	1959	Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1958	Im Jeu de Paume geknüttelt	GS 10.1 321-325	ca. 4 December 1958	20 December 1958	
1958	Ohne Titel [Karl Korn, Die Sprache in der verwaltetenWelt]	GS 20.2 515-520	12 December 1958		
1958 [1931/1933]	Naturgeschichte des Theaters	GS 16 309-320		1931/1933; expanded version 1958	
1958 [1931/1932]	Applaus, Zur Galerie, Loge, Foyer, Parkett, Kuppel als Schlußstück [Zur Naturgeschichte des Theaters]	GS 16 309-320		1931/1932; expanded version 1958	
1958	Musik und Technik	GS 16 229-248		1958	
1958	Über einige Arbeiten von Anton Webern	GS 18 673-679	1958		
1958/1959	Ästhetik	NS IV.3			winter semester 1958/1959, Frankfurt University
1959/1961	Anton von Webern	GS 16 110-125	12 November 1958; 2. December 1958; ca. early 1959; Postskriptum for the republication 2 February 1961	1959	Hessischer Rundfunk
1959	Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der deutschen Soziologie	GS 8 500-531	January 1959		
1959	Zu den Georgeliedern	GS 18 411-417	15 January 1959	1959	
1959	Schreker	GS 16 368-381	7 February 1959; ca. 23 February 1959		March 1959, Hessischer Rundfunk
1959	Dank an Peter Suhrkamp	GS 20.2 487-492	31 March 1959	9 April 1959	
1959	Buchrezensionen: Verständnis und Kritik [Rudolf Stephan, Neue Musik: Versuch einer kritischen Einführung]	GS 19 417-419	March 1959	1959	
1959	Zemlinsky	GS 16 351-367	28 May 1959		December 1959, Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1959	Theorie der Halbbildung	GS 8 93-121	5 versions, ca. mid April-2 July 1959	1959	
1959	Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"	NS IV.4			summer semester 1959, Frankfurt University
1959	Starrheit und Integration	GS 9.2 374-377	before 13 July 1959	1959	
1959	Anton Webern: Lieder op. 3 und op. 12 [Der getreue Korrepetitor, Interpretationsanalysen neuer Musik]	GS 15 251-276	27 July 1959; ca. July/August 1959	1963	
1959	Wien	GS 16 433-453	1 August 1959	1960	October 1960, Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1959	Vorwort zu Werner Mangolds Gegenstand und Methode des Gruppendiskussionsverfahrens	GS 9.2 395-398	Herbst 1959	1960	

1959	Vorschlag zur Ungüte	GS 10.1 330-336	22 September 1959	1959	
1959	Musik und neue Musik	GS 16 476-492	24 September 1959	1960	February 1960, Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1959	Zur Schlußszene des Faust	GS 11 129-138	2 October 1959	1959	
1959	Zum 11. Oktober 1959	GS 20.2 492-494	7 October 1959		
1959/1963	Bibliographische Grillen	GS 11 345-357	ca. 13 October 1959; first half of September 1963	1963	
1959	Zur Demokratisierung der deutschen Universitäten	GS 20.1 332-338	ca. mid October 1959		
1959/1962	Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit	GS 10.2 555-572	1-5 November 1959; 24 May 1962	November 1959	6 November 1959
1959	Blochs Spuren	GS 11 233-250	1 November 1959; early November 1959	1960	
1959	Kultur und Verwaltung	GS 8 122-146	30 October 1958; 26 March 1959; ca. mid November 1959		
1959	Einleitung zum Vortrage "Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit"	GS 10.2 816-817	ca. November 1959		
1959 [1932]	Die Instrumentation von Bergs frühen Liedern	GS 16 97-109		1932; revised version 1959 in <i>Klangfiguren</i>	
1959/1962	Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit	GS 10.2 555-572	1-5 November 1959; 24 May 1962	November 1959	6 November 1959
1959/1961	Anton von Webern	GS 16 110-125	12 November 1958; 2 December 1958; ca. early 1959; Postskriptum for the republication 2 February 1961	1959	Hessischer Rundfunk
1959/1960	Einleitung in die Philosophie	NS IV.5			winter semester 1959/1960, Frankfurt University
1960	Rede über Alban Bergs Lulu	GS 18 645-649	3 January 1960	19 January 1960	before the Frankfurt premiere o <i>Lulu</i>
1960	Über Statik und Dynamik als soziologische Kategorien	GS 8 217-237	from 1955; spring/summer 1956; 20 January 1960	1961	1956
1960	Valéry's Abweichungen	GS 11 158-202	not before 1959; 8 November 1959; ca. 22 February 1960; ca. 14 March 1960	1960	
1960	Verbindlichkeit des Neuen	GS 18 832-833	20 March 1960	1960	
1960	Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik	GS 13 149-317	January 1960-April 1960	1960, second edition 1963	
1960	Tradition	GS 14 127-142	13 December 1959; second half of May 1960; early June 1960		
1960	Philosophie und Soziologie	NS IV.6			summer semester 1960, Frankfurt University
1960	Mahlers Aktualität	GS 18 241-243	late June 1960	1960	

1960	Ohne Leitbild: Anstelle einer Vorrede	GS 10.1	4 July 1960	October 1960	24 August 1960, RIAS
1960	Mahler: Wiener Gedenkrede	GS 16 323-338	7 June 1960; ca. September 1960	1960	June 1960
1960	Zum Stand des Komponierens in Deutschland	GS 18 134-139	7 September 1960		
1960	Zweiter Mahler-Vortrag	GS 18 588-603	27 September 1960		
1960	Voraussetzungen: Aus Anlaß einer Lesung von Hans G. Helms	GS 11 431-446	7 October 1960	1961	
1960	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 10. Oktober 1960	GS 20.2 579	10 October 1960		
1960	Schönbergs Klavierwerk	GS 18 422-426	ca. 21 October 1960	1961	
1960	Einleitung zu einer Diskussion über die "Theorie der Halbbildung"	GS 8 574-577	October 1960		
1958/1960	Reinhold Zickel	GS 20.2 756-767	1958/4 November 1960	1958	
1960	Dritter Mahler-Vortrag	GS 18 604-622	19 November 1960		
1960	Balzac-Lektüre	GS 11 139-157	16 November 1960; 23 November 1960		
1960	Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen	GS 11 281-321	ca. early November 1960; 12 November 1960; 28 November 1960		1961 (partly)
1960	Beethoven Fragments: T38	NS I.1 41-42	1960		
1960	Beethoven Fragments: T39	NS I.1 42	1960		
1960	Aus dem ersten Mahler-Vortrag	GS 18 584-587	1960		
1960/1961	Ontologie und Dialektik	NS IV.7			winter semester 1960/1961
1961	Anton Webern: Sechs Bagatellen für Streichquartett op. 9 [Der getreue Korrepetitor, Interpretationsanalysen neuer Musik]	GS 15 277-301	4 January 1961	1963	
1959/1961	Anton von Webern	GS 16 110-125	12 November 1958; 2 December 1958; ca. early 1959; Postskriptum for the republication ² February 1961	1959	Hessischer Rundfunk
1961	Einleitung zur Vortragsfassung von Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen		ca. 28 February 1961		
1961	Umfrage über die Todesstrafe	GS 20.2 736-737	ca. 1 March 1961	1963	
1961	Bergs kompositionstechnische Funde	GS 16 413-432	2 March 1961	1961	April 1961, Hessischer Rundfunk
1961	Zilligs Verlaine-Lieder	GS 17 123-132	6 March 1961	1964	July 1961, Bayerischer Rundfunk
1961	Zum Beschluß einer Diskussion [about the article Tradition]	GS 14 441-447	8 March 1961	1961	
1952-1953/1961	The Stars down to Earth	GS 9.2 7-120	ca. November 1952- July 1953; 27 April 1961	1957	

1961	Die gewürdigte Musik	GS 15 163-187	5.-9 July 1961		
1961	Arnold Schönberg: Phantasie für Geige mit Klavierbegleitung op. 47 [Der getreue Korrepetitor, Interpretationsanalysen neuer Musik]	GS 15 313-337	26 June 1961; 6 July 1961	1963	
1961	Erwiderung	GS 18 836-837	before 27 July 1961	1961	
1961	Meinung	GS 10.2 573-594	15 September 1961		
1961	Jene zwanziger Jahre	GS 10.2 499-506	17 September 1961	1962	
1961	Anton Webern: Vier Stücke für Geige und Klavier op. 7 [Der getreue Korrepetitor, Interpretationsanalysen neuer Musik]	GS 15 302-312	5 August 1961; 21 September 1961	1963	
1961	Auf die Frage: Mögen Sie Picasso	GS 20.2 524-525	ca. 21 September 1961	21 October 1961	
1961	Bilderwelt des Freischütz	GS 17 36-41	22 September 1961	1961/1962	
1961	Vorrede zu Der getreue Korrepetitor	GS 15 159-162	September 1961		
1961	Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften	GS 8 547-565	late September 1961; 6 October 1961	1962	
1961	Leserbrief 29. November 1961	GS 20.2 740	16 November 1961	29 November 1961	
1961	Beethoven Fragments: T368	NS I.1 253	1961		
1961/1962	Alban Berg, Violinkonzert [Der getreue Korrepetitor, Interpretationsanalysen neuer Musik]	GS 15 338-368	8 December 1961; ca. 1962	1963	
1961/1962	Wozu noch Philosophie	GS 10.2 459-473	5 November 1961; ca. mid January 1962		1962
1961/1962	Ästhetik I und II	NS IV.8			summer semester 1961, winter semester 1961/1962; summer semester 1967, winter semester 1967/1968, Frankfurt University
1961/1962	Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie	GS 14 169-421	May 1961-20 July 1962	1962	
1962	Zu Benjamins Briefbuch Deutsche Menschen	GS 11 686-692	21 January 1962	1962	
1962	Philosophie und Lehrer	GS 10.2 474-494	early July 1961; ca. January 1962	March/April 1962	November 1961, Hessischer Rundfunk
1962	Titel: Paraphrasen zu Lessing	GS 11 325-334	10 March 1962	1962	
1962	Engagement	GS 11 409-430	26 February 1962; ca. 16 March 1962	1962	28 March 1962, Radio Bremen
1962	Zu einem Porträt Thomas Manns	GS 11 335-344	19 March 1962	1962	24 March 1962 at an exhibition in Darmstadt
1962	Eine unterdrückte Vorrede	GS 20.1 165-168	spring 1962		

1962	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Alfred Schmidt, Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx	GS 20.2 654-655	spring 1962	1962	
1962	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 13. April 1962	GS 20.2 579-581	13 April 1962		
1959/1962	Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit	GS 10.2 555-572	1-5 November 1959; 24 May 1962	November 1959	6 November 1959
1962	Vers une musique informelle	GS 16 493-540	4/5 September 1961; 28 March 1962; ca. 30 April 1962; May 1962	1961; expanded and revised version in GS	September 1961 in Kranichstein
1962	Nachruf auf einen Organisator	GS 10.1 346-352	8 July 1962	1962	
1962	Leserbrief 18. Juli 1962	GS 20.2 740-741		18 July 1962	
1962	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Peter von Haselberg, Funktionalismus und Irrationalität: Studien über Thorstein Veblens "Theory of the Leisure Class"	GS 20.2 655-658	Sommer 1962	1962	
1952/1959/1962	Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik	GS 15 188-248	first radio version 23 February 1952; 21 June 1959; 3 September 1962; ca. early September 1962	1963	Norddeutscher Rundfunk
1962	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - V	GS 17 235-239	13 September 1962	1964 under the title <i>Früher Irrtum</i>	7 February 1963, Westdeutscher Rundfunk, series on <i>Selbstkritik der Kritiker</i>
1962	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt 18. September 1962	GS 20.2 581	18 September 1962		
1962	Notiz über Geisteswissenschaft und Bildung	GS 10.2 495-498	ca. 20 September 1962	1962	
1962	Maria Proelss	GS 19 465-467	ca. 22 September 1962	28 September 1962	
1962	Sexualtabus und Recht heute	GS 10.2 533-554	ca. mid September 1962; ca. late September/early October 1962; ca. 12 October 1962; ca. 31 October 1962	1963	
1962/1967	Fortschritt	GS 10.2 617-638	ca. 15 October 1962; 19 October 1962; ca. mid November 1962; 8 March 1967		1962
1962	Theodor W. Adorno, Vier Lieder nach Gedichten von Stefan George für Singstimme und Klavier op. 7	GS 18 552-553	ca. 3 December 1962		
1962/1966	Résumé über Kulturindustrie	GS 10.1 337-345	ca. 29 November 1962; ca. 4 December 1962; ca. November 1966	1963	
1962	Auf die Frage: Warum sind sie zurückgekehrt	GS 20.1 394-395		20 December 1962	

1962	Leserbrief 22./23. Dezember 1962	GS 20.2 741-742		22./23 December 1962	
1962	Zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute	GS 20.1 360-383		1962	
1962	Haringer und Schönberg	GS 18 427		1962	
1962	Beethoven Fragments: T48	NS I.1 45	1962		
1962/1963	Über einige Arbeiten Arnold Schönbergs	GS 17 327-344	10 March 1962; ca. early June 1963	1963	
1962/1963	Strawinsky: Ein dialektisches Bild	GS 16 382-409	ca. 14 May 1962; ca. spring 1963		June 1962, Hessischer Rundfunk
1962/1963	Drei Studien zu Hegel, dritte Studie: Skoteinos oder Wie zu lesen sei	GS 5 326-375	first sketches 17 December 1959; ca. Winter 1961/1962; 9 March 1963; ca. late March 1963; May 1963	first published in 1963 along with the two other studies	
1962-1963	Philosophische Terminologie I und II	NS IV.9			summer semester 1962, winter semester 1962/1963, Frankfurt University
1963	Drei Studien zu Hegel, zweite Studie: Erfahrungsgehalt	GS 5 295-325	1958-1959 expanded version of a lecture from 25 October 1958; ca. first half of 1963	1963	
1963	Vorrede zur dritten Ausgabe [of Dissonanzen]	GS 14 9-13	spring 1963	1963	
1963	Rede über ein imaginäres Feuilleton	GS 11 358-366	ca. 24 January 1963; ca. 29 January 1963, ca. 13 March 1963	1963	
1963	Kann das Publikum wollen?	GS 20.1 342-347	30 March 1963	1963	
1963	Sakrales Fragment: Über Schönbergs Moses und Aron	GS 16 454-475	10 April 1963		April 1963 in Berlin
1963	Drei Studien zu Hegel, erste Studie: Aspekte	GS 5 251-294	19 October-28 November 1956/January 1957; ca. late April/early May 1963	1957	zum 125. Todestag Hegels an der FU Berlin
1963	Mahler: Epilegomena	GS 16 339-350	12 July 1961; ca. late May 1963	1961 (expanded version in GS)	
1963	Probleme der Moralphilosophie	NS IV.10			summer semester 1963
1963	Kierkegaard noch einmal	GS 2 237-258	ca. 19 April 1963; second half of June 1963	1963; reprinted in 1966 in the third edition of <i>Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen</i>	1963 Frankfurt University
1963	Buchrezensionen: Walter Kolneder, Anton Webern	GS 19 420-424	ca. 20 July 1963	November/December 1963	
1963	Arnold Schönberg: Fünfzehn Gedichte aus Das Buch der hängenden Gärten von Stefan George op. 15; Anton Webern: Fünf Lieder nach Gedichten von Stefan George op. 4	GS 18 418-421	second half of June 1963; ca. 22 July 1963	1963	

1959/1963	Bibliographische Grillen	GS 11 345-357	ca. 13 October 1959; first half of September 1963	1963	
1963	Notiz [on the second edition of Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik]	GS 13 318-319	early October 1963	1963	
1963	Luccheser Memorial	GS 10.1 396-400	30 October 1963	1963	
1963	Notiz zur Taschenbuchausgabe des Versuch über Wagner von 1964	GS 13 9-10	2 December 1963		
1963	Vorrede zu Moments musicaux	GS 17 9-12	before 5 December 1963		
1963	Parataxis: Zur späten Lyrik Hölderlins	GS 11 447-491	23 May 1963; 5 September 1963; 9 December 1963	1964	7 June 1963 to the Hölderlin Society
1963	Notiz [on Drei Studien zu Hegel]	GS 5 381	1963	1963	
1963	Alban Berg: Violinkonzert [Der getreue Korrepetitor, Interpretationsanalysen neuer Musik]	GS 15 338-368		1963	
1963	Über die musikalische Verwendung des Radios	GS 15 369-401		1963	
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T79	NS I.1 59	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T257	NS I.1 169	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T244	NS I.1 164	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T245	NS I.1 164	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T247	NS I.1 165	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T242	NS I.1 161	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T90	NS I.1 65	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T40	NS I.1 42	1963		
1963	Beethoven Fragments: T41	NS I.1 43	1963		
1963-1964	Jargon der Eigentlichkeit	GS 6 413-523	ca. January 1963- March 1964	1964	
1963/1964	Fragen der Dialektik	NS IV.11			winter semester 1963/1964
1963-1965	Wagners Aktualität	GS 16 543-564	30 September 1963; ca. late March/early April 1964; 13 April 1964; 9 March 1965	1964	30 September 1963, Berliner Festwochen
1964	Der wunderliche Realist: Über Siegfried Kracauer	GS 11 388-408	12 January 1964; second half of January 1964	1964	7 February, Hessischer Rundfunk
1964	Winfried Zillig: Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit	GS 17 318-326	1 February 1964; 5 March 1964	1964	10 June 1964, Bayerischer Rundfunk
1964	Meinungsforschung und Öffentlichkeit	GS 8 532-537	29 February 1964; early March 1964		
1964	Worte zum Gedenken an Theodor Heuss	GS 20.2 708-712	21 April 1964	1965	29 April 1964
1964	Rede beim Empfang anlässlich des 15. Deutschen Soziologentages	GS 20.2 703-707	24 April 1964	1965	28 April 1964

1964	Zweimal Chaplin	GS 10.1 362-366	part II 2 June 1964	part I 1930, part II 1964	
1964	Richard Strauss: Zum hundertsten Geburtstag: 11. Juni 1964	GS 16 565-606	ca. mid June 1964	1964	
1964	Zu einer imaginären Auswahl von Liedern Gustav Mahlers	GS 17 189-197	24 June 1964; ca. 26 June 1964	1964	
1964	Philosophische Elemente einer Theorie der Gesellschaft	NS IV.12			summer semester 1964, Frankfurt University
1964/1967	Anmerkungen zum philosophischen Denken	GS 10.2 599-607	29 July 1964; 10 October 1967		1964
1964	Beethoven im Geist der Moderne	GS 19 535-538	18 September 1964	22 December 1964	
1964	Nachschrift zu einer Wagner- Diskussion	GS 16 665-670	ca. 30 September 1964	1964	
1964	Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei	GS 16 628-642	early April 1964; 7 May 1964; 2 November 1964	1965	
1964	Gesellschaft	GS 8 9-19	Vorstufe 28 December 1954; 12 December 1964; ca. 15 December 1964	1966	
1964	Nach Steuermanns Tod	GS 17 311-317	21 November 1964	1964	
1964	Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität: Zum 11. Band der Werke von Karl Kraus	GS 11 367-387	27 June 1964; 7 July 1964; 19 July 1964; 4 November 1964; ca. 7 December 1964		
1964	Leserbrief 9. Dezember 1964	GS 20.2 742-744		9 December 1964	
1964	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt Dezember 1964	GS 20.2 581	December 1964		
1964	Erinnerungen [an Benjamin]	GS 20.1 173-178	1964	1966	
1964/1965	Schwierigkeiten: I: Beim Komponieren	GS 17 253-273	late April/early May 1964; 25 October 1964; ca. Frühjahr 1965	1965	5 May 1964 in Radio Bremen
1964/1965	Zur Lehre von der Geschichte und von der Freiheit	NS IV.13			winter semester 1964/1965
1965	Auf die Frage: Was ist deutsch	GS 10.2 691-701	ca. 12 January 1965		1965
1965	Offener Brief an Max Horkheimer	GS 20.1 155-163	24 January 1965	12 February 1965	
1965	Gratulator	GS 20.1 164	4 February 1965	13 February 1965	
1965	Henkel, Krug und frühe Erfahrung	GS 11 556-566	8 February 1965; 10 February 1965	1965	
1965	Leserbrief 24. März 1965	GS 20.2 744-745	2 March 95	1 April 1965	
1965	Über H. G. Adler	GS 20.2 495	18 March 1965		
1965	Leserbrief 1. April 1965	GS 20.2 744-745		1 April 1965	
1965	Vorrede zu Rolf Tiedemanns Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins	GS 20.1 178-182	ca. 6 May 1965	1965	
1965	Schöne Stellen	GS 18 695-718	7 May 1965		

1965	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Heribert Adam, Studentenschaft und Hochschule	GS 20.2 661-664	May 1965	1965	
1965	Metaphysik: Begriff und Probleme	NS IV.14			11 May-29 July 1965, Frankfurt University
1965	Notiz über sozialwissenschaftliche Objektivität	GS 8 238-244	21 June 1965; 12 July 1965	1965	
1965 [1928]	Nadelkurven	GS 19 525-529		February 1928; July/August 1965	
1965	Reflexion über das Volksstück	GS 11 693-694	7 September 1965	1965; the play discussed in the article was premiered in 1965	
1965	Über Tradition	GS 10.1 310-320	10 June 1965; mid September 1965	1966	
1965	Tabus über dem Lehrberuf	GS 10.2 656-673	ca. mid May 1965; 18 September 1965		1965
1965	Zu Arbeiten von Hans Glauber	GS 20.2 526	mid October 1965	1967	
1965	Form in der neuen Musik	GS 16 607-627	12 July 1965; 20 July 1965; 20 October 1965	1966	
1965	Benjamin, der Briefschreiber	GS 11 583-590	6 October 1965; 28 October 1965	1966	
1965	Glosse über Persönlichkeit	GS 10.2 639-644	17 November 1965		1966
1965	Gegen den Muff	GS 20.2 496-497	2 December 1965	8 December 1965	
1965	Kleine Häresie	GS 17 297-302		1965	
1965	Zuschrift über Bartók	GS 18 295		1965	
1965/1966	Thesen zur Kunstsoziologie	GS 10.1 367-374	ca. October 1965; 3 November 1965; January 1966		1965
1965/1966	Funktionalismus heute	GS 10.1 375-395	16 October 1965; ca. 2 May 1966		1965
1965/1966	Negative Dialektik	NS IV.?	winter semester 1965/1966		
1959-1966	Negative Dialektik	GS 6 7-412	1959-1966	1966	
1966	Postscriptum	GS 8 86-92	22 January 1966	1966	
1966	Fragen des gegenwärtigen Operntheaters	GS 19 481-493	21 December 1955; November 1956; January 1966	January 1957; 1966	
1966	Notiz [on Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen]	GS 2 261-263	January 1966		
1966	Erziehung nach Auschwitz	GS 10.2 674-690	15 April 1966		1966
1966	Vorwort zur deutschen Übertragung der Quatre Mouvements von Charles Fourier	GS 20.2 698-699	May 1966	1966	
1966	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Adalbert Rang, Der politische Pestalozzi	GS 20.2 664-666	June 1966	1966	

1966	Gleichwohl	GS 20.2 498-499	24 August 1966	27/28 August 1966	
1966	Aus Sils-Maria	GS 10.1 326-329	15 September 1966	1966	
1966	Wagner und Bayreuth	GS 18 210-225	6 May 1966; 10 September 1966; ca. 19 September 1966	1966	7 July 1966, Gesellschaft der Freunde von Bayreuth
1966	"Welches Buch beeindruckte sie in den letzten 12 Monaten?"	GS 20.2 737		21 September 1966	
1966	Schwierigkeiten: II: In der Auffassung neuer Musik	GS 17 273-291	4 May 1966; ca. early September 1966; 28 September 1966; 27 October 1966	1968	6 May 1966, Radio Bremen
1966	Filmtransparente	GS 10.1 353-361	2 November 1966	1966 (partly)	
1966	Anmerkungen zum deutschen Musikleben	GS 17 167-188	15 November 1966; ca. 21 November 1966	1967	
1966	Nach Kracauers Tod	GS 20.1 194-196	29 November 1966	1966/1967	
1966	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den „Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie: Regina Schmidt, Egon Becker, Reaktionen auf politische Vorgänge	GS 20.2 666-668	November 1966	1966	
1962/1966	Résumé über Kulturindustrie	GS 10.1 337-345	ca. 29 November 1962; ca. 4 December 1962; ca. November 1966	1963	
1966	Amorbach	GS 10.1 302-309	18 September 1966; ca. November 1966	1966	
1966	Der mißbrauchte Barock	GS 10.1 401-422	14 September 1966; ca. early December 1966	.	1966
1966	Notiz [on Negative Dialektik]	GS 6 409	1966	1966	
1966	Einleitung zum Vortrag "Gesellschaft"	GS 8 569-573	1966		1966 in Rom
1966	Internes Arbeitsgespräch 1966: Zur Vorbereitung eines geplanten Kongresses mit dem Themenschwerpunkt "Zeit in der neuen Musik"	<i>Musik- Konzepte Sonderb and Darmst adt- Dokum ente (Januar 1999), 313-329</i>			
1966	Beethoven Fragments: T162	NS I.1 106	1966		
1966/1967	"Drei Fragen in der Silvesternacht 1966"	GS 20.2 737-738		31 December 1966/1 January 1967	
1966/1967	Klemperers Don Giovanni	GS 19 539-544	28 December 1966; 2 January 1967	24 February 1967	
1966/1967	Die Kunst und die Künste	GS 10.1 432-453	ca. late June 1966; 15 September 1966; ca. 7 December 1966; August 1967		1966

1967	Zum Klassizismus von Goethes Iphigenie	GS 11 495-514	ca. mid January 1967	1967	
1967	Franz Neumann zum Gedächtnis	GS 20.2 700-702	January 1967	1982	
1967	"Händedruck - Symbol des guten Willens"	GS 20.2 738		24 February 1967	
1967	Traumprotokolle: Frankfurt Februar 1967	GS 20.2 581-582	February 1967		
1962/1967	Fortschritt	GS 10.2 617-638	ca. 15 October 1962; 19 October 1962; ca. mid November 1962; 8 March 1967		1962
1967	Von der Musik her	GS 20.2 527-529	ca. 27 March 1967	1967	
1967	George	GS 11 523-535	26 February 1967; ca. first half of March 1967; ca. late March 1967		1967, Deutschlandfunk
1967	Vorwort zu einer Übersetzung der "Prismen"	GS 10.2 803-804	March 1967		
1967	Anerkungen zum sozialen Konflikt heute [with Ursula Jaerisch]	GS 8 177-195	25 March 1967; 19 April 1967		
1967	Zu einem Streitgespräch über Mahler	GS 18 244-250	early March 1967; 26 April 1967	1968	
1967	Ist die Kunst heiter?	GS 11 599-606	21 April 1967; 8 May 1967	1967	
1967	Uromi	GS 20.2 571	8 May 1967	11 May 1967	
1967	Wien nach Ostern 1967	GS 10.1 423-431	22 May 1967	1967	
1967	Offener Brief an Rolf Hochhuth	GS 11 591-598	28 May 1967; 30 May 1967	1967	
1967	Notiz [on Jargon der Eigentlichkeit]	GS 6 524-526	June 1967		
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1967	Zu Ludwig von Fickers Aufsätzen und Reden	GS 20.2 500-502	12 July 1967	1967	
1967	Einleitung zu Emile Durkheim, Soziologie und Philosophie	GS 8 245-279	ca. July 1967; ca. 22 August 1967; early September 1967	1967	
1967	Fällige Revision: Zu Schweppenhäusers Buch über Kierkegaard und Hegel	GS 20.1 257-261	13 September 1967	11 October 1967	
1967	Keine Würdigung	GS 20.2 503-504	19 September 1967	1968	
1967	Schlußwort zu einer Kontroverse über Kunstsoziologie	GS 10.2 810-815	ca. 27 September 1967		
1964/1967	Anmerkungen zum philosophischen Denken	GS 10.2 599-607	29 July 1964; 10 October 1967		1964
1967	Nachwort: Musiksoziologie [on Einführung in die Musiksoziologie]	GS 14 422-433	October 1967		
1967	"Wohin steuern unsere Universitäten?"	GS 20.2 738-739	before 24 November 1967	30 November 1967	
1967	Gruß an Gershom G. Scholem	GS 20.2 478-486		2 December 1967	

1967	Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen in Amerika	GS 10.2 702-738	10 December 1967	1968	
1967	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - Präludium	GS 17 210-212		1967	
1955/1967	Zum Verständnis Schönbergs	GS 18 428-445		early Fassung 1955; 1967	
1967/1968	Die beschworene Sprache: Zur Lyrik Wolfgang Borchardts	GS 11 536-555	1 October 1967; ca. 4.-8 October 1967; ca. second half of October 1967; ca. Winter 1967/1968	1968	
1968	Zur Neuausgabe 1968 [of Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie]	GS 14 171-172	January 1968	1968	
1968	"Musik im Fernsehen ist Brimborium"	GS 19 559-569		26 February 1968	
1968	Interimsbescheid	GS 20.1 182-186	ca. 4 March 1968	6 March 1968	
1968	Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft	GS 8 354-370	3 March 1968; ca. late February/early March 1968; 17 March 1968	1969	1969
1968	Zu einer Umfrage: Neue Oper und Publikum	GS 19 494-495	5 April 1968	1967/1968	
1968	Buchrezensionen: Oper: Provinz oder Monopol	GS 19 425-430	ca. 12 March 1968; ca. 13 March 1968	8 April 1968	
1968	Chormusik und falsches Bewußtsein	GS 18 813-814	3 April 1968	1968	
1968	Antwort des Fachidioten	GS 19 570-572		22 April 1968	
1968	Vorworte, Vorreden und Vorbemerkungen zu den "Frankfurter Beiträgen zur Soziologie": Manfred Teschner, Politik und Gesellschaft im Unterricht	GS 20.2 671-673	spring 1968	1968	
1968	Gegen die Notstandsgesetze	GS 20.1 396-397	28 May 1968		28 May 1968, Demokratie im Notstand in Frankfurt am Main
1968	Alban Bergs Kammerkonzert	GS 18 630-640	1954; ca. mid January 1956; Sommer 1968	1979	
1968	Einleitung in die Soziologie	NS IV.15			summer semester 1968
1968	Orpheus in der Unterwelt	GS 19 545-554	6 October 1968	11 November 1968	
1968	Konzeption eines Wiener Operntheaters	GS 19 496-515	ca. 15 October 1968; 18 October 1968	1969	
1968	Vorbemerkung zu "Dogmatismus, Intoleranz und die Beurteilung moderner Kunstwerke" von Christian Rittelmeyer	GS 18 838-839	8 November 1968	1969	
1968	Ad vocem Hindemith: Eine Dokumentation - Postludium	GS 17 239-246		1968	
1968	Wilhelm Furtwängler	GS 19 468-469		1968	
1968	Über Herbert Marcuse	GS 20.2 768		1968	
1968	Diskussionsbeitrag zu "Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft"	GS 8 578-587	1968		1968

1968	Frühe Einleitung [to Ästhetische Theorie]	GS 7 491-533	1968		
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Analyse und Berg	GS 13 368-374	1968	1968	
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Erinnerung	GS 13 335-367	1968, on the basis of the article from Christmas 1935 and unpublished material from 1956	1968	
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Altenberglieder	GS 13 401-408		1968	
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Zur Charakteristik des Wozzeck	GS 13 428-434	1968, on the basis of material from 1956 und 1958/1959	1968	
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Epilegomena zum Kammerkonzert	GS 13 434-451		1968	
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Weinarie	GS 13 463-471		1968	
1968	Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs: Erfahrungen an Lulu, Einleitung und Teil II	GS 13 471, 478-490		1968	
1968/1969	Einleitung zum "Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie"	GS 8 280-353	ca. 6 June 1968; ca. January 1969	1969	
1956-1969	Ästhetische Theorie	GS 7 7-490	notes at least since 1956; first version 1961; interrupted until 1966 for Negative Dialektik; revisions since 1967, dictation during the entire year, at the end of which one third of the draft was completed; end of dictation 25 December 1967; further dictations until 24 January 1968; third version begun September 1968, completed 5 March 1969, further revisions until 14 May; last dated text 16 July 1969	1970	
1967-1969	Reflexionen über Musikkritik	GS 19 573-591	ca. 5 October 1967; ca. 27 February 1968; ca. 16 May 1969	1968	
1969	Resignation	GS 10.2 794-799	29 January 1969; ca. 4 February 1969		1969
1969	Gesellschaftstheorie und empirische Forschung	GS 8 538-546	4 February 1969; 6 February 1969	1970	
1969	Zu Ulrich Sonnemanns Negativer Anthropologie	GS 20.1 262-263	ca. 17 February 1969	1969	
1969	Oper und Langspielplatte	GS 19 555-558	19/20 February 1969	24 March 1969	
1969	Fragment als Graphik	GS 18 251-253	24 February 1969	8/9 March 1969	

1969	Zum Problem der musikalischen Analyse	<i>Frankfurter Adorno-Blätter</i> 7 (2001), 73-89			24 February 1969, Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst Frankfurt am Main
1969	Alban Berg: Oper und Moderne	GS 18 650-672	8 March 1969		
1969	Freizeit	GS 10.2 645-655	15 March 1969		1969
1969	A l'écart de tous les courants	GS 20.1 187-189	ca. 25 March 1969; ca. 31 March 1969	1970	
1969	Kritische Theorie und Protestbewegung	GS 20.1 398-401	18 April 1969	26/27 April 1969	
1969	Notiz [on the fifth edition of Philosophie der neuen Musik]	GS 12 199-200	April 1969	1969	
1969	Marginalien zu Theorie und Praxis	GS 10.2 759-782	5 May 1969		
1969	"Keine Angst vor dem Elfenbeinturm"	GS 20.1 402-409		5 May 1969	
1969	Kritik	GS 10.2 785-793	ca. 13 May 1969		1969
1969	Zu Subjekt und Objekt	GS 10.2 743-758	1 May 1969; 18 May 1969		
1969	Zum Erstdruck der Originalfassung [of Komposition für den Film]	GS 15 144-146	May 1969	1969	
1969	Zu einer Auswahl aus den Klangfiguren	GS 16 645-648		1969	
not dated	Beethoven Fragments: T270	NS I.1 195	not dated		
not dated	Beethoven Fragments: T98	NS I.1 69	not dated		

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GS 7 *Ästhetische Theorie*, 1970.

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GS 9 *Soziologische Schriften II*, 1975.

GS 10 *Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft*, 1977.

GS 11 *Noten zur Literatur*, 1974.

GS 12 *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, 1975.

GS 13 *Die musikalischen Monographien (Versuch über Wagner, Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik, Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs)*, 1971.

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